MIT Krb5 KDC in the AD DC
abartlet at samba.org
Thu Aug 7 15:55:57 MDT 2014
On Thu, 2014-08-07 at 17:50 +0200, Andreas Schneider wrote:
> On Friday 01 August 2014 15:35:24 Andrew Bartlett wrote:
> > Can we try and avoid adding back all this glue by taking an alternative
> > approach on the kpasswd server? It is the only user of the gensec_krb5
> > code, which is essentially still the old, horrid, kerberos acceptor from
> > the 3.0 days.
> Günther and I worked on starting kadmind the whole week. We can change
> passwords with kpasswd now!
Great! The only concern that came to my mind is a rename risk: Do you
have some way to determine that if you get a ticket to change the
password on one user, and before the password is changed the user is
renamed, that user is renamed, and a new user created in it's place, you
change the password on the 'right' user?
(The SID in the PAC would be unchanged, but the principal would have
> In the MIT KRB5 build we don't build gensec_krb5 and we removed the patches we
> resurrected for this. We will take a look later if we could remove gensec_krb5
The trouble is we don't run the Heimdal kadmind, so I think we are stuck
with some of gensec_krb5 for the Heimdal case.
> So here is a updated branch for review:
I'll take another look over it. I was quite pleased with it when I last
looked over that part of the changes.
Authentication Developer, Samba Team http://samba.org
Samba Developer, Catalyst IT http://catalyst.net.nz/services/samba
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