[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch v4-4-test updated

Stefan Metzmacher metze at samba.org
Tue Apr 12 19:10:13 UTC 2016

The branch, v4-4-test has been updated
       via  e8918a1 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.4.3...
       via  71de921 VERSION: Disable git snapshots for the 4.4.2 release.
       via  370b3dd WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.4.2.
       via  87fb3b8 s3:libads: sasl wrapped LDAP connections against with kerberos and arcfour-hmac-md5
       via  bfc9525 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.4.2...
       via  c8180d1 VERSION: Disable git snapshots for the 4.4.1 release.
       via  bd94b86 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.4.1.
       via  13e3e81 CVE-2015-5370: s4:selftest: run samba.tests.dcerpc.raw_protocol against ad_dc
       via  2c6f01d CVE-2015-5370: python/samba/tests: add some dcerpc raw_protocol tests
       via  78b84d5 CVE-2015-5370: python/samba/tests: add infrastructure to do raw protocol tests for DCERPC
       via  9d953e2 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: call dcerpc_connection_dead() on protocol errors
       via  4a496d3 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: disconnect connection on protocol errors
       via  45a2445 CVE-2015-5370: libcli/smb: use a max timeout of 1 second in tstream_smbXcli_np_destructor()
       via  b65429f CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: verify auth_context_id in api_pipe_{bind_auth3,alter_context}
       via  97a0811 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: verify auth_context_id in rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done()
       via  49379e4 CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: verify auth_context_id in dcerpc_check_auth()
       via  518f8bb CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: make use of auth->auth_context_id in dcerpc_add_auth_footer()
       via  a663ad5 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of pipe_auth_data->auth_context_id
       via  a3fc86d CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of pipe_auth_data->auth_context_id
       via  6d509e3 CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: add auth_context_id to struct pipe_auth_data
       via  57d5a84 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: pass struct pipe_auth_data to create_rpc_{bind_auth3,alter_context}()
       via  e84519d CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't allow an existing context to be changed in check_bind_req()
       via  6fd2714 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: check the transfer syntax in check_bind_req() first
       via  7b902c3 CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: remove unused dcerpc_pull_dcerpc_auth()
       via  5cfe5ec CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: use DCERPC_NCA_S_PROTO_ERROR FAULTs for protocol errors
       via  a9c46e8 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing BIND mark the connection as broken
       via  9c2592f CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: disconnect the connection after a fatal FAULT pdu
       via  6456408 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() to verify incoming pdus
       via  d2c964f CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: verify presentation context arrays
       via  218bd4a CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: use 'alter' instead of 'bind' for variables in api_pipe_alter_context()
       via  5148a26 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: ensure that the message ordering doesn't violate the spec
       via  198ecf4 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make sure auth_level isn't changed by alter_context or auth3
       via  bf4a716 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing auth3 mark the authentication as invalid
       via  087b363 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't allow auth3 if the authentication was already finished
       via  e6cdac4 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: don't ignore failures of dcerpc_push_ncacn_packet()
       via  56014f6 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: just call pipe_auth_generic_bind() in api_pipe_bind_req()
       via  8c7d8c8 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: let a failing sec_verification_trailer mark the connection as broken
       via  4c51c89 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_server: make use of dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() in api_pipe_{bind_req,alter_context,bind_auth3}()
       via  5c495ab CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: verify auth_{type,level} in rpc_pipe_bind_step_one_done()
       via  f4ef85f CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: protect rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu() against too large payloads
       via  654d8a5 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() in cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu()
       via  dfab482 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: make use of dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
       via  569781f CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: let dcerpc_check_auth() auth_{type,level} against the expected values.
       via  dd2c270 CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: remove auth trailer and possible padding within dcerpc_check_auth()
       via  b1b538a CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: don't allow pkt->auth_length == 0 in dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
       via  ddd4d03 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: reject DCERPC_PFC_FLAG_PENDING_CANCEL with DCERPC_FAULT_NO_CALL_ACTIVE
       via  7e682ed CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: the assoc_group is relative to the connection (association)
       via  9625f91 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: only allow one fragmented call_id at a time
       via  2fd10be CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: limit allocation and alloc_hint to 4 MByte
       via  d1ffe41 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: check frag_length for requests
       via  74347a4 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: give the correct reject reasons for invalid auth_level values
       via  d7af609 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: disconnect after a failing dcesrv_auth_request()
       via  a3008ec CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: let a failing auth3 mark the authentication as invalid
       via  6a9b4ca CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: failing authentication should generate a SEC_PKG_ERROR
       via  9e86b09 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: fix the order of error checking in dcesrv_alter()
       via  3d075a4 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: changing an existing presentation context via alter_context is a protocol error
       via  cace627 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: don't derefence an empty ctx_list array in dcesrv_alter()
       via  bf333e9 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: remove pointless dcesrv_find_context() from dcesrv_bind()
       via  e3775db CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: let invalid request fragments disconnect the connection with a protocol error
       via  e365d16 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: make sure alter_context and auth3 can't change auth_{type,level,context_id}
       via  af03332e CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: maintain in and out struct dcerpc_auth per dcesrv_call_state
       via  503d08d CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: ensure that the message ordering doesn't violate the spec
       via  75d9b58 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: verify the protocol headers before processing pdus
       via  e3c1c20 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: add infrastructure to terminate a connection after a response
       via  b5d0de4 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: make dcesrv_process_ncacn_packet() static
       via  c8a1adb CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: return the correct secondary_address in dcesrv_bind()
       via  a689216 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: add some padding to dcesrv_bind_nak() responses
       via  eb16dfa CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: split out a dcesrv_fault_with_flags() helper function
       via  448435a CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: fill context_id in dcesrv_fault()
       via  7c2984a CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: set alloc_hint = 24 in dcesrv_fault()
       via  f9ed1a9 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: avoid ZERO_STRUCT() in dcesrv_fault()
       via  83d93a8 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: correctly maintain dcesrv_connection->max_{recv,xmit}_frag
       via  08ec7e7 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server/netlogon: make use of dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_{level,type}
       via  62f8a54 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server/samr: make use of dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_level
       via  8ad4695 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server/lsa: make use of dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_{level,type}
       via  1ed3e26 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: make use of dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_* in dcesrv_request()
       via  dc15870 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: maintain dcesrv_auth->auth_{type,level,context_id}
       via  58b1cdf CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: check the result of dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() in dcesrv_auth_bind()
       via  8332714 CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: no authentication is indicated by pkt->auth_length == 0
       via  b0349be CVE-2015-5370: s4:rpc_server: make use of talloc_zero()
       via  7f348a7 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: protect dcerpc_request_recv_data() against too large payloads
       via  50fc638 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: use dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() to verify BIND_ACK,ALTER_RESP,RESPONSE pdus
       via  a96543e CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: handle DCERPC_PKT_FAULT before anything else in dcerpc_alter_context_recv_handler()
       via  f89c218 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: make use of dcerpc_map_ack_reason() in dcerpc_bind_recv_handler()
       via  94de482 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: remove useless frag_length check in rpc_api_pipe_got_pdu()
       via  f64f451 CVE-2015-5370: s3:rpc_client: move AS/U hack to the top of cli_pipe_validate_current_pdu()
       via  ac8910f CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: add a dcerpc_verify_ncacn_packet_header() helper function
       via  d3bb3ef CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: finally verify the server uses the expected auth_{type,level,context_id} values
       via  e05c7dd CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: avoid using dcecli_security->auth_info and use per request values
       via  23f4243 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: simplify checks if gensec is used in dcerpc_ship_next_request()
       via  33ee36e CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: avoid dereferencing sec->auth_info in dcerpc_request_prepare_vt()
       via  245fc41 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: always use ncacn_pull_request_auth() for DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE pdus
       via  4907895 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: avoid using c->security_state.auth_info in ncacn_pull_request_auth()
       via  7ee85d6 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: avoid using hs->p->conn->security_state.auth_info in dcerpc_bh_auth_info()
       via  25e48af CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: use a local auth_info variable in ncacn_push_request_sign()
       via  3f447f6 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: use auth_context_id = 1
       via  32d8e05 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: maintain dcecli_security->auth_{type,level,context_id}
       via  4867460 CVE-2015-5370: s4:librpc/rpc: send a dcerpc_sec_verification_trailer if needed
       via  b095508 CVE-2015-5370: s3:librpc/rpc: don't call dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer() if auth_length is 0
       via  b77eab0 CVE-2015-5370: librpc/rpc: simplify and harden dcerpc_pull_auth_trailer()
       via  22ab56d CVE-2015-5370: dcerpc.idl: add DCERPC_{NCACN_PAYLOAD,FRAG}_MAX_SIZE defines
       via  fa0d681 CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server/samr: allow _samr_ValidatePassword only with PRIVACY...
       via  e675f63 CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/samr: allow _samr_ValidatePassword only with PRIVACY...
       via  f425bfd CVE-2016-2118: docs-xml: default "allow dcerpc auth level connect" to "no"
       via  6750ffd CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server/{epmapper,echo}: allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  ba69e95 CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server/{samr,lsa,netlogon}: reject DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  3133233 CVE-2016-2118: s3:rpc_server: make use of "allow dcerpc auth level connect"
       via  2e4f09b CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/rpcecho: allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  36278e3 CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/mgmt: allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  4862ee5 CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/epmapper: allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  6568d5d CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/netlogon: reject DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  34969d6 CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/samr: reject DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  c98143b CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/lsa: reject DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT by default
       via  1a3c82e CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server: make use of "allow dcerpc auth level connect"
       via  2e9824e CVE-2016-2118: docs-xml: add "allow dcerpc auth level connect" defaulting to "yes"
       via  d565761 CVE-2016-2118: s4:librpc: use integrity by default for authenticated binds
       via  70ba7b0 CVE-2016-2118: librpc: change the default auth level from DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY
       via  6142767 CVE-2016-2118: s3: rpcclient: change the default auth level from DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY
       via  be98e7e CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/dnsserver: require at least DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY
       via  5d4d8ec CVE-2016-2118: python:tests/dcerpc: use [sign] for dnsserver tests
       via  778dab9 CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/backupkey: require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY
       via  e1de6ec CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server/drsuapi: require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY
       via  3502195 CVE-2016-2118: s4:rpc_server: make it possible to define a min_auth_level on a presentation context
       via  d8c3cf1 CVE-2016-2115: docs-xml: always default "client ipc signing" to "mandatory"
       via  e7ef30e CVE-2016-2115: s3:libsmb: use SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT and lp_client_ipc_{min,max}_protocol()
       via  f76e6f9 CVE-2016-2115: s3:libnet: use SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT
       via  084b20e CVE-2016-2115: s3:auth_domain: use SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT
       via  fdd2807 CVE-2016-2115: s3:lib/netapi: use SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT
       via  0422c64 CVE-2016-2115: net: use SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT
       via  80102ed CVE-2016-2115: s3:libsmb: let SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT use "client ipc min/max protocol"
       via  afda479 CVE-2016-2115: s3:libsmb: add signing constant SMB_SIGNING_IPC_DEFAULT
       via  1309832 CVE-2016-2115: s3:winbindd: use lp_client_ipc_signing()
       via  f1dea29 CVE-2016-2115: s3:winbindd: use lp_client_ipc_{min,max}_protocol()
       via  2c62a54 CVE-2016-2115: s4:librpc/rpc: make use of "client ipc *" options for ncacn_np
       via  dbe7a43 CVE-2016-2115: s4:libcli/raw: pass the minprotocol to smb_raw_negotiate*()
       via  ee4f114 CVE-2016-2115: s4:libcli/raw: limit maxprotocol to NT1 in smb_raw_negotiate*()
       via  f3da02a CVE-2016-2115: s4:libcli/smb2: use the configured min_protocol
       via  8466fe8 CVE-2016-2115: s4:libcli/raw: add smbcli_options.min_protocol
       via  863d419 CVE-2016-2115: docs-xml: add "client ipc signing" option
       via  39282d2 CVE-2016-2115: docs-xml: add "client ipc min protocol" and "client ipc max protocol" options
       via  09a7576 CVE-2016-2114: docs-xml: let the "smb signing" documentation reflect the reality
       via  2c3649c CVE-2016-2114: s3:smbd: enforce "server signing = mandatory"
       via  0b05bc9 CVE-2016-2114: libcli/smb: let mandatory signing imply allowed signing
       via  cc8bbc3 CVE-2016-2114: s3:smbd: use the correct default values for "smb signing"
       via  4177489 CVE-2016-2114: s4:smb2_server: fix session setup with required signing
       via  b2af10b CVE-2016-2113: docs-xml: let "tls verify peer" default to "as_strict_as_possible"
       via  2ced06d CVE-2016-2113: selftest: use "tls verify peer = no_check"
       via  5c94dfa CVE-2016-2113: selftest: test all "tls verify peer" combinations with ldaps
       via  660dbb8 CVE-2016-2113: s4:librpc/rpc: verify the rpc_proxy certificate and hostname if configured
       via  a443abe CVE-2016-2113: s4:libcli/ldap: verify the server certificate and hostname if configured
       via  cd4b292 CVE-2016-2113: s4:selftest: explicitly use '--option="tlsverifypeer=no_check" for some ldaps tests
       via  5ec881c CVE-2016-2113: docs-xml: add "tls verify peer" option defaulting to "no_check"
       via  36ec246 CVE-2016-2113: s4:lib/tls: implement infrastructure to do peer verification
       via  2d2ab58 CVE-2016-2113: s4:lib/tls: create better certificates and sign the host cert with the ca cert
       via  6db65fb CVE-2016-2112: docs-xml: change the default of "ldap server require strong auth" to "yes"
       via  5fbce21 CVE-2016-2112: s4:selftest: run some ldap test against ad_dc_ntvfs, fl2008r2dc and fl2003dc
       via  39c169b CVE-2016-2112: selftest: servers with explicit "ldap server require strong auth" options
       via  d68c225 CVE-2016-2112: s4:selftest: run samba4.ldap.bind against fl2008r2dc
       via  f44664d CVE-2016-2112: s4:ldap_server: implement "ldap server require strong auth" option
       via  8105ff1 CVE-2016-2112: docs-xml: add "ldap server require strong auth" option
       via  483a926 CVE-2016-2112: s4:ldap_server: reduce scope of old_session_info variable
       via  52ae0cc CVE-2016-2112: s4:selftest: use --option=clientldapsaslwrapping=plain for plain connections
       via  c4f9336 CVE-2016-2112: s4:libcli/ldap: auto upgrade to SIGN after STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED
       via  01acb21 CVE-2016-2112: s4:libcli/ldap: make sure we detect downgrade attacks
       via  76b1826 CVE-2016-2112: s4:libcli/ldap: honour "client ldap sasl wrapping" option
       via  187e32b CVE-2016-2112: s3:libads: make sure we detect downgrade attacks
       via  0d2e185 CVE-2016-2111: docs-xml/smbdotconf: default "raw NTLMv2 auth" to "no"
       via  be45c4b CVE-2016-2111: selftest:Samba3: use "raw NTLMv2 auth = yes" for nt4_dc
       via  ae29971 CVE-2016-2111: s4:smb_server: implement "raw NTLMv2 auth" checks
       via  560213f CVE-2016-2111: s3:auth: implement "raw NTLMv2 auth" checks
       via  5d69272 CVE-2016-2111: docs-xml: add "raw NTLMv2 auth" defaulting to "yes"
       via  7bad35b CVE-2016-2111: docs-xml: document the new "client NTLMv2 auth" and "client use spnego" interaction
       via  f5035af CVE-2016-2111: s3:libsmb: don't send a raw NTLMv2 response when we want to use spnego
       via  acd6697 CVE-2016-2111: s4:libcli: don't send a raw NTLMv2 response when we want to use spnego
       via  7e5966f CVE-2016-2111: s4:param: use "client use spnego" to initialize options->use_spnego
       via  dc359da CVE-2016-2111: s4:libcli: don't allow the LANMAN2 session setup without "client lanman auth = yes"
       via  379604a CVE-2016-2111: s4:torture/base: don't use ntlmv2 for dos connection in base.samba3error
       via  7f303d7 CVE-2016-2111: s4:torture/raw: don't use ntlmv2 for dos connection in raw.samba3badpath
       via  b38d560 CVE-2016-2111: s3:rpc_server/netlogon: check NTLMv2_RESPONSE values for SEC_CHAN_WKSTA
       via  54fef0f CVE-2016-2111: s4:rpc_server/netlogon: check NTLMv2_RESPONSE values for SEC_CHAN_WKSTA
       via  8421d13 CVE-2016-2111: libcli/auth: add NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds() helper function
       via  80401c9 CVE-2016-2111: s4:torture/rpc: fix rpc.pac ntlmv2 test
       via  a193154 CVE-2016-2111: s4:torture/rpc: fix rpc.samba3.netlogon ntlmv2 test
       via  ab0e71b CVE-2016-2111: s3:rpc_server/netlogon: require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY for validation level 6
       via  aaf3893 CVE-2016-2111: s4:rpc_server/netlogon: require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY for validation level 6
       via  1d33ade CVE-2016-2111: s3:rpc_server/netlogon: always go through netr_creds_server_step_check()
       via  d960002 CVE-2016-2111: s4:rpc_server: implement 'server schannel = yes' restriction
       via  e1101a6 CVE-2016-2111: auth/gensec: correctly report GENSEC_FEATURE_{SIGN,SEAL} in schannel_have_feature()
       via  0654735 CVE-2016-2111: auth/gensec: require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY or higher in schannel_update()
       via  861b86d CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: implement new_spnego support including MIC generation (as client)
       via  4956428 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: implement new_spnego support including MIC checking (as server)
       via  c5032e9 CVE-2016-2110: ntlmssp.idl: add NTLMSSP_MIC_{OFFSET,SIZE}
       via  d35bc35 CVE-2016-2110: libcli/auth: pass server_timestamp to SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash()
       via  f77cf81 CVE-2016-2110: auth/credentials: pass server_timestamp to cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response()
       via  95af5d9 CVE-2016-2110: auth/credentials: clear the LMv2 key for NTLMv2 in cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response()
       via  769eec8 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: implement gensec_ntlmssp_may_reset_crypto()
       via  6b0ee68 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: call ntlmssp_sign_init if we provide GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN
       via  6675796 CVE-2016-2110: auth/gensec: add gensec_may_reset_crypto() infrastructure
       via  ce87fef CVE-2016-2110: auth/gensec: require spnego mechListMIC exchange for new_spnego backends
       via  6a56dd2 CVE-2016-2110: auth/gensec: fix the client side of a spnego downgrade
       via  77d59f1 CVE-2016-2110: auth/gensec: fix the client side of a new_spnego exchange
       via  beb1f96 CVE-2016-2110: libcli/auth: add SPNEGO_REQUEST_MIC to enum spnego_negResult
       via  3a934e1 CVE-2016-2110: libcli/auth: use enum spnego_negResult instead of uint8_t
       via  fc3582b CVE-2016-2110: winbindd: add new_spnego to the WINBINDD_CCACHE_NTLMAUTH response
       via  03ccba7 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: let gensec_ntlmssp_client_start require NTLM2 (EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY) when using ntlmv2
       via  45a1008 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: let gensec_ntlmssp_client_start require flags depending on the requested features
       via  67787ff CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: don't let ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags() change ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2
       via  5b86a859 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: don't allow a downgrade from NTLMv2 to LM_AUTH
       via  e6e8da9 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: split allow_lm_response from allow_lm_key
       via  00d1eaa9 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: maintain conf_flags and required_flags variables
       via  ebd79e5 CVE-2016-2110: auth/ntlmssp: let ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags() return NTSTATUS
       via  1437724 s3:ntlm_auth: pass manage_squid_request() needs a valid struct ntlm_auth_state from within get_password()
       via  b4125aa s3:rpc_server/samr: correctly handle session_extract_session_key() failures
       via  54cd107 s4:selftest: run rpc.netlogon.admin also over ncalrpc and ncacn_ip_tcp
       via  40b3284 libads: Fix CID 1356316 Uninitialized pointer read
       via  9af768f libsmb: Fix CID 1356312 Explicit null dereferenced
       via  9f3ae00 s3-auth: check for return code of cli_credentials_set_machine_account().
       via  1b646bb s4-smb_server: check for return code of cli_credentials_set_machine_account().
       via  168b015 s4:rpc_server: require access to the machine account credentials
       via  cbeff28 auth/gensec: split out a gensec_verify_dcerpc_auth_level() function
       via  2779ec8 auth/gensec: make sure gensec_security_by_auth_type() returns NULL for AUTH_TYPE_NONE
       via  2c1fa78 s4:torture/rpc/schannel: don't use validation level 6 without privacy
       via  eef3a10 s4:torture/rpc: correctly use torture_skip() for test_ManyGetDCName() without NCACN_NP
       via  dba5783 s4:torture/rpc/samlogon: use DCERPC_SEAL for netr_LogonSamLogonEx and validation level 6
       via  8dea510 s4:torture/rpc/samr: use DCERPC_SEAL in setup_schannel_netlogon_pipe()
       via  10eda28 s4:torture/netlogon: add/use test_SetupCredentialsPipe() helper function
       via  402d4ac s3:test_rpcclient_samlogon.sh: test samlogon with schannel
       via  ff65d5b s3:selftest: rpc.samr.passwords.validate should run with [seal] in order to be realistic
       via  8b90698 selftest: setup information of new samba.example.com CA in the client environment
       via  46fa417 selftest: set tls crlfile if it exist
       via  5e62983 selftest: use Samba::prepare_keyblobs() and use the certs from the new CA
       via  0e5d2dd selftest: add Samba::prepare_keyblobs() helper function
       via  91d2c97 selftest: mark commands in manage-CA-samba.example.com.sh as DONE
       via  bbb66a9 selftest: add CA-samba.example.com (non-binary) files
       via  6a09084 selftest: add config and script to create a samba.example.com CA
       via  03479af selftest: add some helper scripts to mange a CA
       via  da66e65 selftest: s!addc.samba.example.com!addom.samba.example.com!
       via  df14c6a s4:rpc_server: dcesrv_generic_session_key should only work on local transports
       via  bb63122 s4:rpc_server/samr: hide a possible NO_USER_SESSION_KEY error
       via  511dfb4 s4:librpc/rpc: dcerpc_generic_session_key() should only be available on local transports
       via  934f731 s4:torture:samba3rpc: use an authenticated SMB connection and an anonymous DCERPC connection on top
       via  fe4cdee s4:selftest: run rpc.samr over ncacn_np instead of ncacn_ip_tcp
       via  528db7f s4:torture: the backupkey tests need to use ncacn_np: for LSA calls
       via  b282ac7 s4:torture/rpc: do testjoin only via ncalrpc or ncacn_np
       via  5a8126d s3:libsmb: remove unused functions in clispnego.c
       via  506ac99 s3:libsmb: remove unused cli_session_setup_kerberos*() functions
       via  d1921c6 s3:libsmb: make use of cli_session_setup_gensec*() for Kerberos
       via  a167728 s3:libsmb: call cli_state_remote_realm() within cli_session_setup_spnego_send()
       via  a7f8e94 s3:libsmb: provide generic cli_session_setup_gensec_send/recv() pair
       via  4b55e96 s3:libsmb: let cli_session_setup_ntlmssp*() use gensec_update_send/recv()
       via  20c847f s3:libsmb: unused ntlmssp.c
       via  7767d82 s3:libsmb: make use gensec based SPNEGO/NTLMSSP
       via  a16bbec s3:libads: make use of ads_sasl_spnego_gensec_bind() for GSS-SPNEGO with Kerberos
       via  6507d6f s3:libads: keep service and hostname separately in ads_service_principal
       via  1571a9f s3:libads: don't pass given_principal to ads_generate_service_principal() anymore.
       via  8e7229d s3:libads: provide a generic ads_sasl_spnego_gensec_bind() function
       via  468c68c s3:libads: make use of GENSEC_OID_SPNEGO in ads_sasl_spnego_ntlmssp_bind()
       via  ea56849 s3:libads: make use of GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
       via  52629ac s3:libads: add missing TALLOC_FREE(frame) in error path
       via  c5da725 s4:ldap_server: make use of GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
       via  0577097 s4:selftest: simplify the loops over samba4.ldb.ldap
       via  ff77277 s4:selftest: we don't need to run ldap test with --option=socket:testnonblock=true
       via  f74c031 s4:libcli/ldap: fix retry authentication after a bad password
       via  2ace844 s4:libcli/ldap: make use of GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
       via  482555b auth/ntlmssp: remove ntlmssp_unwrap() fallback for LDAP
       via  8f747f6 auth/ntlmssp: add more compat for GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
       via  2a496ba auth/ntlmssp: implement GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
       via  eafd97e auth/gensec: add GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE define
       via  c9edc04 auth/ntlmssp: use ndr_push_AV_PAIR_LIST in gensec_ntlmssp_server_negotiate().
       via  5c61712 librpc/ndr: add ndr_ntlmssp_find_av() helper function
       via  92d7499 ntlmssp.idl: make AV_PAIR_LIST public
       via  e2e7ffe ntlmssp.idl: MsAvRestrictions is MsvAvSingleHost now
       via  159be66 security.idl: add LSAP_TOKEN_INFO_INTEGRITY
       via  62d31f6 auth/ntlmssp: use ntlmssp_version_blob() in the server
       via  47cebc5 auth/ntlmssp: let the client always include NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION
       via  423f193 auth/ntlmssp: add ntlmssp_version_blob()
       via  28725ef auth/ntlmssp: don't send domain and workstation in the NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE
       via  7494612 auth/ntlmssp: set NTLMSSP_ANONYMOUS for anonymous authentication
       via  3adc8f5 auth/ntlmssp: define all client neg_flags in gensec_ntlmssp_client_start()
       via  2e40c60 auth/ntlmssp: NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION is not a negotiated option
       via  2663f44 auth/ntlmssp: split out a debug_ntlmssp_flags_raw() that's more complete
       via  75bdf52 s3:ntlm_auth: also use gensec for "ntlmssp-client-1" and "gss-spnego-client"
       via  b57c0e7 winbindd: make use of ntlmssp_resume_ccache backend for WINBINDD_CCACHE_NTLMAUTH
       via  8f69094 s3:auth_generic: add "ntlmssp_resume_ccache" backend in auth_generic_client_prepare()
       via  cb0719d auth/ntlmssp: implement GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE
       via  333e02b auth/gensec: add GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE define
       via  4e2e1f6 auth/ntlmssp: provide a "ntlmssp_resume_ccache" backend
       via  4f94262 s3:ntlmssp: remove unused libsmb/ntlmssp_wrap.c
       via  17d6b17 s3:auth_generic: make use of the top level NTLMSSP client code
       via  6ed7942 winbindd: pass an memory context to do_ntlm_auth_with_stored_pw()
       via  eab2039 s3:tests/test_ntlm_auth_s3: test ntlmssp-client-1 with cached credentials
       via  06e6d37 s3:torture/test_ntlm_auth.py: add --client-use-cached-creds option
       via  b8eabce s3:torture/test_ntlm_auth.py: replace tabs with whitespaces
       via  6b766dc s3:ntlm_auth: fix --use-cached-creds with ntlmssp-client-1
       via  c6aef8c auth/ntlmssp: add gensec_ntlmssp_server_domain()
       via  3d0fc91 auth/ntlmssp: keep ntlmssp_state->server.netbios_domain on the correct talloc context
       via  76e22d9 s3:auth_generic: add auth_generic_client_start_by_sasl()
       via  4f97bcb s3:auth_generic: add auth_generic_client_start_by_name()
       via  1317625 auth/gensec: make gensec_security_by_name() public
       via  967282e auth/gensec: handle gensec_security_by_sasl_name(NULL, ...)
       via  7cad825 auth/gensec: keep a pointer to a possible child/sub gensec_security context
       via  9e8749a s4:pygensec: make sig_size() and sign/check_packet() available
       via  028c609 s3:librpc/gse: implement gensec_gse_max_{input,wrapped}_size()
       via  8614c6c s3:librpc/gse: don't log gss_acquire_creds failed at level 0
       via  1448dba s3:librpc/gse: correctly support GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY
       via  55b0f3c s3:librpc/gse: set GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_CI_FLAGS_X in gse_init_client() if available
       via  b10c1db s3:librpc/gse: fix debug message in gse_init_client()
       via  73f2fa6 s3:librpc/gse: make use of GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER in gse_init_client
       via  26d4f25 wscript_configure_system_mitkrb5: add configure checks for GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_CI_FLAGS_X
       via  1a5f082 s3:libads: remove unused ads_connect_gc()
       via  93332f4 s4:librpc/rpc: map alter context SEC_PKG_ERROR to NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
       via  d356450 librpc/rpc: add error mappings for NO_CALL_ACTIVE, OUT_OF_RESOURCES and BAD_STUB_DATA
       via  6ea3642 dcerpc.idl: make WERROR RPC faults available in ndr_print output
       via  b6a1b04 epmapper.idl: make epm_twr_t available in python bindings
       via  557fc14 s3:selftest: run samba3.blackbox.smbclient_auth.plain also with $SERVER_IPV6
       via  338e1a9 s3:test_smbclient_auth.sh: test using the ip address in the unc path (incl. ipv6-literal.net)
       via  c51b125 lib/util_net: add support for .ipv6-literal.net
       via  b0c603c lib/util_net: move ipv6 linklocal handling into interpret_string_addr_internal()
       via  84f8c9a spnego: Correctly check asn1_tag_remaining retval
       via  4d73b84 s4:torture/ntlmssp fix a compiler warning
       via  2e8f4c8 s4-torture: flesh out ntlmssp_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE_check().
       via  baa0a10 s4-torture: add ndr pullpush validation for NTLMSSP CHALLENGE and AUTHENTICATE messages.
       via  f39d6d4 s4-torture: flesh out ntlmssp_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE_check().
       via  dd6b293 s4-torture: activate testing of CHALLENGE and AUTHENTICATE ntlmssp messages.
       via  98466ff s4-torture: fill in ntlmssp_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE_check().
       via  b1f72ca ntlmssp: when pulling messages it is important to clear memory first.
       via  3b93cf0 ntlmssp: properly document version defines in IDL (from MS-NLMP).
       via  9ed62a3 ntlmssp: fix copy/paste typo in CHALLENGE_MESSAGE in IDL.
       via  0c1671a ntlmssp: add some missing defines from MS-NLMP to our IDL.
      from  2a33a44 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.0.1...


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit e8918a1ae21081189b24a87e167bcca4ba962ded
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Tue Apr 12 21:08:22 2016 +0200

    VERSION: Bump version up to 4.4.3...
    and re-enable git snapshots.
    Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>


Summary of changes:
 VERSION                                            |    2 +-
 WHATSNEW.txt                                       |  550 ++++
 auth/credentials/credentials.h                     |    5 +-
 auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c                |   12 +-
 auth/gensec/gensec.c                               |  113 +-
 auth/gensec/gensec.h                               |    4 +
 auth/gensec/gensec_internal.h                      |    7 +
 auth/gensec/gensec_start.c                         |   18 +-
 auth/gensec/schannel.c                             |   22 +-
 auth/gensec/spnego.c                               |  289 ++-
 auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp.c                      |    9 +
 auth/ntlmssp/gensec_ntlmssp_server.c               |   44 +-
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.c                             |   91 +-
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp.h                             |   17 +
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_client.c                      |  513 +++-
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_ndr.c                         |    1 +
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_private.h                     |   10 +-
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c                      |  424 +++-
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_sign.c                        |  103 +-
 auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_util.c                        |  176 +-
 auth/ntlmssp/wscript_build                         |    2 +-
 .../ldap/ldapserverrequirestrongauth.xml           |   26 +
 .../smbdotconf/protocol/clientipcmaxprotocol.xml   |   29 +
 .../smbdotconf/protocol/clientipcminprotocol.xml   |   29 +
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientmaxprotocol.xml |    9 +-
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientminprotocol.xml |    6 +
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientusespnego.xml   |    5 +
 .../security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml       |   27 +
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml  |   26 +
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientntlmv2auth.xml  |    5 +
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml     |   12 +-
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/rawntlmv2auth.xml     |   19 +
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serversigning.xml     |    2 +-
 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/tlsverifypeer.xml     |   47 +
 lib/param/loadparm.c                               |   47 +-
 lib/param/loadparm.h                               |    6 +
 lib/param/param_table.c                            |   27 +
 lib/util/util_net.c                                |  247 +-
 lib/util/util_net.h                                |    1 +
 libcli/auth/proto.h                                |    6 +
 libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c                           |  170 +-
 libcli/auth/spnego.h                               |    8 +-
 libcli/auth/spnego_parse.c                         |    5 +-
 libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c                          |    1 +
 libcli/smb/smb_constants.h                         |    1 +
 libcli/smb/smb_signing.c                           |    4 +
 libcli/smb/tstream_smbXcli_np.c                    |    4 +
 librpc/idl/dcerpc.idl                              |   15 +-
 librpc/idl/epmapper.idl                            |    2 +-
 librpc/idl/ntlmssp.idl                             |   48 +-
 librpc/idl/security.idl                            |    9 +
 librpc/ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.c                           |   16 +
 librpc/ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h                           |    2 +
 librpc/rpc/binding.c                               |    2 +-
 librpc/rpc/dcerpc_error.c                          |    6 +-
 librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c                           |  141 +-
 librpc/rpc/rpc_common.h                            |    9 +-
 nsswitch/libwbclient/wbc_pam.c                     |   21 +-
 nsswitch/winbind_struct_protocol.h                 |    1 +
 python/samba/tests/__init__.py                     |  525 ++++
 python/samba/tests/dcerpc/dnsserver.py             |    2 +-
 python/samba/tests/dcerpc/raw_protocol.py          | 2623 ++++++++++++++++++++
 selftest/knownfail                                 |   28 +
 .../DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-cert.pem   |  191 ++
 .../DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-key.pem    |   54 +
 ...DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-openssl.cnf |  250 ++
 ...ddc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-private-key.pem |   51 +
 .../DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-req.pem    |   30 +
 .../DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-cert.pem       |    1 +
 ...DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-private-key.pem |    1 +
 .../DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-cert.pem      |  190 ++
 .../DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-key.pem       |   54 +
 .../DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-openssl.cnf   |  250 ++
 ...C-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-private-key.pem |   51 +
 .../DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-req.pem       |   30 +
 .../DC-localdc.samba.example.com-cert.pem          |    1 +
 .../DC-localdc.samba.example.com-private-key.pem   |    1 +
 .../manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/00.pem |  190 ++
 .../manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/01.pem |  169 ++
 .../manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/02.pem |  191 ++
 .../manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/03.pem |  169 ++
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-crlnumber.txt     |    1 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-crlnumber.txt.old |    1 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt         |    4 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt.attr    |    1 +
 .../CA-samba.example.com-index.txt.attr.old        |    1 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt.old     |    3 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-openssl.cnf       |  203 ++
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-private-key.pem   |  102 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-serial.txt        |    1 +
 .../Private/CA-samba.example.com-serial.txt.old    |    1 +
 .../Public/CA-samba.example.com-cert.pem           |   62 +
 .../Public/CA-samba.example.com-crl.pem            |   32 +
 ...inistrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-cert.pem |  169 ++
 ...ministrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-key.pem |   30 +
 ...strator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-openssl.cnf |  242 ++
 ...tor at addom.samba.example.com-S03-private-key.pem |   27 +
 ...ministrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-req.pem |   19 +
 ...-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-cert.pem |    1 +
 ...strator at addom.samba.example.com-private-key.pem |    1 +
 ...ER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-cert.pem |  169 ++
 ...SER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-key.pem |   30 +
 ...administrator at samba.example.com-S01-openssl.cnf |  242 ++
 ...nistrator at samba.example.com-S01-private-key.pem |   27 +
 ...SER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-req.pem |   19 +
 .../USER-administrator at samba.example.com-cert.pem  |    1 +
 ...administrator at samba.example.com-private-key.pem |    1 +
 selftest/manage-ca/manage-CA-samba.example.com.cnf |   21 +
 selftest/manage-ca/manage-CA-samba.example.com.sh  |   18 +
 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.sh                    |  387 +++
 .../manage-CA-example.com.cnf                      |   17 +
 .../openssl-BASE-template.cnf                      |  201 ++
 .../manage-ca.templates.d/openssl-CA-template.cnf  |    2 +
 .../manage-ca.templates.d/openssl-DC-template.cnf  |   49 +
 .../openssl-USER-template.cnf                      |   41 +
 selftest/selftest.pl                               |   40 +
 selftest/target/Samba.pm                           |  105 +
 selftest/target/Samba3.pm                          |    1 +
 selftest/target/Samba4.pm                          |  232 +-
 source3/auth/auth_domain.c                         |    2 +-
 source3/auth/auth_samba4.c                         |    4 +-
 source3/auth/auth_util.c                           |   15 +
 source3/include/auth_generic.h                     |    7 +-
 source3/include/proto.h                            |   48 +-
 source3/lib/netapi/cm.c                            |    2 +-
 source3/libads/ads_proto.h                         |    1 -
 source3/libads/ldap.c                              |  134 -
 source3/libads/sasl.c                              |  671 ++---
 source3/libnet/libnet_join.c                       |    6 +-
 source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c                        |   81 +-
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h                        |   10 +-
 source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_helpers.c                |   98 +-
 source3/libsmb/auth_generic.c                      |   51 +-
 source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c                        |  669 ++---
 source3/libsmb/clientgen.c                         |    9 +
 source3/libsmb/clispnego.c                         |  282 ---
 source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c                           |  765 ------
 source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_wrap.c                      |  135 -
 source3/libsmb/passchange.c                        |    7 +-
 source3/param/loadparm.c                           |   43 +-
 source3/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c                      |  314 ++-
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c        |   57 +-
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_handles.c                   |    1 +
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_ncacn_np.c                  |    3 +-
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_pipes.h                     |   11 +
 source3/rpc_server/rpc_server.c                    |   12 +
 source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c              |   21 +-
 source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c                      |  494 ++--
 source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c                      |    5 +-
 source3/script/tests/test_ntlm_auth_s3.sh          |    2 +
 source3/script/tests/test_rpcclient_samlogon.sh    |   11 +-
 source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_auth.sh        |   11 +
 source3/selftest/tests.py                          |    7 +-
 source3/smbd/negprot.c                             |    6 +-
 source3/smbd/sesssetup.c                           |    4 +-
 source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c                        |   10 +-
 source3/smbd/smb2_sesssetup.c                      |    3 +-
 source3/torture/test_ntlm_auth.py                  |  553 +++--
 source3/utils/net_ads.c                            |    2 +-
 source3/utils/net_rpc.c                            |    2 +-
 source3/utils/net_util.c                           |    2 +-
 source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c                          |  803 +-----
 source3/winbindd/winbindd_ccache_access.c          |   44 +-
 source3/winbindd/winbindd_cm.c                     |    6 +-
 source3/wscript_build                              |   10 +-
 source4/auth/gensec/pygensec.c                     |   83 +
 source4/auth/ntlm/auth_util.c                      |    4 +-
 source4/ldap_server/ldap_bind.c                    |   50 +-
 source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.c                  |    6 +
 source4/ldap_server/ldap_server.h                  |    2 +
 source4/lib/tls/tls.h                              |   23 +
 source4/lib/tls/tls_tstream.c                      |  249 ++
 source4/lib/tls/tlscert.c                          |   18 +-
 source4/lib/tls/wscript                            |    5 +
 source4/libcli/cliconnect.c                        |    2 +-
 source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_bind.c                    |   62 +-
 source4/libcli/ldap/ldap_client.c                  |    9 +-
 source4/libcli/raw/libcliraw.h                     |    1 +
 source4/libcli/raw/rawnegotiate.c                  |   11 +-
 source4/libcli/smb2/connect.c                      |    7 +-
 source4/libcli/smb_composite/connect.c             |    1 +
 source4/libcli/smb_composite/sesssetup.c           |   35 +-
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.c                        |  351 ++-
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc.h                        |   14 +-
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_auth.c                   |   93 +-
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_connect.c                |   22 +
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_roh.c                    |   13 +-
 source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c                   |   22 +-
 source4/param/loadparm.c                           |    3 +-
 source4/rpc_server/backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey.c    |   13 +-
 .../backupkey/dcesrv_backupkey_heimdal.c           |   12 +-
 source4/rpc_server/common/reply.c                  |   49 +-
 source4/rpc_server/dcerpc_server.c                 |  812 ++++--
 source4/rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h                 |   57 +-
 source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_auth.c                   |  261 +-
 source4/rpc_server/dcesrv_mgmt.c                   |    8 +
 source4/rpc_server/dnsserver/dcerpc_dnsserver.c    |    8 +
 source4/rpc_server/drsuapi/dcesrv_drsuapi.c        |    8 +
 source4/rpc_server/echo/rpc_echo.c                 |    7 +
 source4/rpc_server/epmapper/rpc_epmapper.c         |    8 +
 source4/rpc_server/handles.c                       |    8 +-
 source4/rpc_server/lsa/dcesrv_lsa.c                |    8 +
 source4/rpc_server/lsa/lsa_lookup.c                |   12 +-
 source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c      |   46 +-
 source4/rpc_server/remote/dcesrv_remote.c          |    8 +-
 source4/rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.c              |   12 +
 source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c            |   25 +-
 source4/selftest/tests.py                          |   75 +-
 source4/smb_server/smb/negprot.c                   |    6 +-
 source4/smb_server/smb/sesssetup.c                 |   10 +
 source4/smb_server/smb2/negprot.c                  |    7 +-
 source4/smb_server/smb2/sesssetup.c                |    8 -
 source4/torture/basic/base.c                       |   20 +-
 source4/torture/ndr/ntlmssp.c                      |  183 +-
 source4/torture/raw/samba3misc.c                   |    7 +
 source4/torture/rpc/backupkey.c                    |   19 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/backupkey_heimdal.c            |   19 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/forest_trust.c                 |   12 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c                          |   14 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c                     |  101 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.h                     |    7 +
 source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c                   |   39 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/samba3rpc.c                    |   61 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/samlogon.c                     |    3 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/samr.c                         |    4 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/schannel.c                     |   29 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/testjoin.c                     |   35 +-
 testprogs/blackbox/test_ldb_simple.sh              |   41 +
 wscript_configure_system_mitkrb5                   |    4 +-
 229 files changed, 14845 insertions(+), 4750 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/ldap/ldapserverrequirestrongauth.xml
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientipcmaxprotocol.xml
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientipcminprotocol.xml
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/rawntlmv2auth.xml
 create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/tlsverifypeer.xml
 create mode 100755 python/samba/tests/dcerpc/raw_protocol.py
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-openssl.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-S02-req.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-cert.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/addc.addom.samba.example.com/DC-addc.addom.samba.example.com-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-openssl.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-S00-req.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-cert.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/DCs/localdc.samba.example.com/DC-localdc.samba.example.com-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/00.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/01.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/02.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/NewCerts/03.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-crlnumber.txt
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-crlnumber.txt.old
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt.attr
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt.attr.old
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-index.txt.old
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-openssl.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-serial.txt
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Private/CA-samba.example.com-serial.txt.old
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Public/CA-samba.example.com-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Public/CA-samba.example.com-crl.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-openssl.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-S03-req.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-cert.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at addom.samba.example.com/USER-administrator at addom.samba.example.com-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-cert.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-openssl.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-S01-req.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-cert.pem
 create mode 120000 selftest/manage-ca/CA-samba.example.com/Users/administrator at samba.example.com/USER-administrator at samba.example.com-private-key.pem
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-CA-samba.example.com.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-CA-samba.example.com.sh
 create mode 100755 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.sh
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.templates.d/manage-CA-example.com.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.templates.d/openssl-BASE-template.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.templates.d/openssl-CA-template.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.templates.d/openssl-DC-template.cnf
 create mode 100644 selftest/manage-ca/manage-ca.templates.d/openssl-USER-template.cnf
 delete mode 100644 source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
 delete mode 100644 source3/libsmb/ntlmssp_wrap.c
 create mode 100755 testprogs/blackbox/test_ldb_simple.sh

Changeset truncated at 500 lines:

diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index c3d4cc4..5c6793e 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 # If a official release has a serious bug              #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 396ce6e..cea4492 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,553 @@
+                   =============================
+                   Release Notes for Samba 4.4.2
+                           April 12, 2016
+                   =============================
+This is a security release containing one additional
+regression fix for the security release 4.4.1.
+This fixes a regression that prevents things like 'net ads join'
+from working against a Windows 2003 domain.
+Changes since 4.4.1:
+o  Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+   * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
+     April 12th, 2016
+Release notes for the original 4.4.1 release follows:
+                   =============================
+                   Release Notes for Samba 4.4.1
+                           April 12, 2016
+                   =============================
+This is a security release in order to address the following CVEs:
+o  CVE-2015-5370 (Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code)
+o  CVE-2016-2110 (Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP)
+o  CVE-2016-2111 (NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability)
+o  CVE-2016-2112 (LDAP client and server don't enforce integrity)
+o  CVE-2016-2113 (Missing TLS certificate validation)
+o  CVE-2016-2114 ("server signing = mandatory" not enforced)
+o  CVE-2016-2115 (SMB IPC traffic is not integrity protected)
+o  CVE-2016-2118 (SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible)
+The number of changes are rather huge for a security release,
+compared to typical security releases.
+Given the number of problems and the fact that they are all related
+to man in the middle attacks we decided to fix them all at once
+instead of splitting them.
+In order to prevent the man in the middle attacks it was required
+to change the (default) behavior for some protocols. Please see the
+"New smb.conf options" and "Behavior changes" sections below.
+o  CVE-2015-5370
+   Versions of Samba from 3.6.0 to 4.4.0 inclusive are vulnerable to
+   denial of service attacks (crashes and high cpu consumption)
+   in the DCE-RPC client and server implementations. In addition,
+   errors in validation of the DCE-RPC packets can lead to a downgrade
+   of a secure connection to an insecure one.
+   While we think it is unlikely, there's a nonzero chance for
+   a remote code execution attack against the client components,
+   which are used by smbd, winbindd and tools like net, rpcclient and
+   others. This may gain root access to the attacker.
+   The above applies all possible server roles Samba can operate in.
+   Note that versions before 3.6.0 had completely different marshalling
+   functions for the generic DCE-RPC layer. It's quite possible that
+   that code has similar problems!
+   The downgrade of a secure connection to an insecure one may
+   allow an attacker to take control of Active Directory object
+   handles created on a connection created from an Administrator
+   account and re-use them on the now non-privileged connection,
+   compromising the security of the Samba AD-DC.
+o  CVE-2016-2110:
+   There are several man in the middle attacks possible with
+   NTLMSSP authentication.
+   can be cleared by a man in the middle.
+   This was by protocol design in earlier Windows versions.
+   Windows Server 2003 RTM and Vista RTM introduced a way
+   to protect against the trivial downgrade.
+   See MsvAvFlags and flag 0x00000002 in
+   https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc236646.aspx
+   This new feature also implies support for a mechlistMIC
+   when used within SPNEGO, which may prevent downgrades
+   from other SPNEGO mechs, e.g. Kerberos, if sign or
+   seal is finally negotiated.
+   The Samba implementation doesn't enforce the existence of
+   required flags, which were requested by the application layer,
+   e.g. LDAP or SMB1 encryption (via the unix extensions).
+   As a result a man in the middle can take over the connection.
+   It is also possible to misguide client and/or
+   server to send unencrypted traffic even if encryption
+   was explicitly requested.
+   LDAP (with NTLMSSP authentication) is used as a client
+   by various admin tools of the Samba project,
+   e.g. "net", "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit", ...
+   As an active directory member server LDAP is also used
+   by the winbindd service when connecting to domain controllers.
+   Samba also offers an LDAP server when running as
+   active directory domain controller.
+   The NTLMSSP authentication used by the SMB1 encryption
+   is protected by smb signing, see CVE-2015-5296.
+o  CVE-2016-2111:
+   It's basically the same as CVE-2015-0005 for Windows:
+     The NETLOGON service in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2,
+     Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold
+     and R2, when a Domain Controller is configured, allows remote
+     attackers to spoof the computer name of a secure channel's
+     endpoint, and obtain sensitive session information, by running a
+     crafted application and leveraging the ability to sniff network
+     traffic, aka "NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability".
+   The vulnerability in Samba is worse as it doesn't require
+   credentials of a computer account in the domain.
+   This only applies to Samba running as classic primary domain controller,
+   classic backup domain controller or active directory domain controller.
+   The security patches introduce a new option called "raw NTLMv2 auth"
+   ("yes" or "no") for the [global] section in smb.conf.
+   Samba (the smbd process) will reject client using raw NTLMv2
+   without using NTLMSSP.
+   Note that this option also applies to Samba running as
+   standalone server and member server.
+   You should also consider using "lanman auth = no" (which is already the default)
+   and "ntlm auth = no". Have a look at the smb.conf manpage for further details,
+   as they might impact compatibility with older clients. These also
+   apply for all server roles.
+o  CVE-2016-2112:
+   Samba uses various LDAP client libraries, a builtin one and/or the system
+   ldap libraries (typically openldap).
+   As active directory domain controller Samba also provides an LDAP server.
+   Samba takes care of doing SASL (GSS-SPNEGO) authentication with Kerberos or NTLMSSP
+   for LDAP connections, including possible integrity (sign) and privacy (seal)
+   protection.
+   Samba has support for an option called "client ldap sasl wrapping" since version
+   3.2.0. Its default value has changed from "plain" to "sign" with version 4.2.0.
+   Tools using the builtin LDAP client library do not obey the
+   "client ldap sasl wrapping" option. This applies to tools like:
+   "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Some of them have command line
+   options like "--sign" and "--encrypt". With the security update they will
+   also obey the "client ldap sasl wrapping" option as default.
+   In all cases, even if explicitly request via "client ldap sasl wrapping",
+   "--sign" or "--encrypt", the protection can be downgraded by a man in the
+   middle.
+   The LDAP server doesn't have an option to enforce strong authentication
+   yet. The security patches will introduce a new option called
+   "ldap server require strong auth", possible values are "no",
+   "allow_sasl_over_tls" and "yes".
+   As the default behavior was as "no" before, you may
+   have to explicitly change this option until all clients have
+   been adjusted to handle LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED errors.
+   Windows clients and Samba member servers already use
+   integrity protection.
+o  CVE-2016-2113:
+   Samba has support for TLS/SSL for some protocols:
+   ldap and http, but currently certificates are not
+   validated at all. While we have a "tls cafile" option,
+   the configured certificate is not used to validate
+   the server certificate.
+   This applies to ldaps:// connections triggered by tools like:
+   "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Note that it only applies
+   to the ldb tools when they are built as part of Samba or with Samba
+   extensions installed, which means the Samba builtin LDAP client library is
+   used.
+   It also applies to dcerpc client connections using ncacn_http (with https://),
+   which are only used by the openchange project. Support for ncacn_http
+   was introduced in version 4.2.0.
+   The security patches will introduce a new option called
+   "tls verify peer". Possible values are "no_check", "ca_only",
+   "ca_and_name_if_available", "ca_and_name" and "as_strict_as_possible".
+   If you use the self-signed certificates which are auto-generated
+   by Samba, you won't have a crl file and need to explicitly
+   set "tls verify peer = ca_and_name".
+o  CVE-2016-2114
+   Due to a regression introduced in Samba 4.0.0,
+   an explicit "server signing = mandatory" in the [global] section
+   of the smb.conf was not enforced for clients using the SMB1 protocol.
+   As a result it does not enforce smb signing and allows man in the middle attacks.
+   This problem applies to all possible server roles:
+   standalone server, member server, classic primary domain controller,
+   classic backup domain controller and active directory domain controller.
+   In addition, when Samba is configured with "server role = active directory domain controller"
+   the effective default for the "server signing" option should be "mandatory".
+   During the early development of Samba 4 we had a new experimental
+   file server located under source4/smb_server. But before
+   the final 4.0.0 release we switched back to the file server
+   under source3/smbd.
+   But the logic for the correct default of "server signing" was not
+   ported correctly ported.
+   Note that the default for server roles other than active directory domain
+   controller, is "off" because of performance reasons.
+o  CVE-2016-2115:
+   Samba has an option called "client signing", this is turned off by default
+   for performance reasons on file transfers.
+   This option is also used when using DCERPC with ncacn_np.
+   In order to get integrity protection for ipc related communication
+   by default the "client ipc signing" option is introduced.
+   The effective default for this new option is "mandatory".
+   In order to be compatible with more SMB server implementations,
+   the following additional options are introduced:
+   "client ipc min protocol" ("NT1" by default) and
+   "client ipc max protocol" (the highest support SMB2/3 dialect by default).
+   These options overwrite the "client min protocol" and "client max protocol"
+   options, because the default for "client max protocol" is still "NT1".
+   The reason for this is the fact that all SMB2/3 support SMB signing,
+   while there are still SMB1 implementations which don't offer SMB signing
+   by default (this includes Samba versions before 4.0.0).
+   Note that winbindd (in versions 4.2.0 and higher) enforces SMB signing
+   against active directory domain controllers despite of the
+   "client signing" and "client ipc signing" options.
+o  CVE-2016-2118 (a.k.a. BADLOCK):
+   The Security Account Manager Remote Protocol [MS-SAMR] and the
+   Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAD]
+   are both vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. Both are application level
+   protocols based on the generic DCE 1.1 Remote Procedure Call (DCERPC) protocol.
+   These protocols are typically available on all Windows installations
+   as well as every Samba server. They are used to maintain
+   the Security Account Manager Database. This applies to all
+   roles, e.g. standalone, domain member, domain controller.
+   Any authenticated DCERPC connection a client initiates against a server
+   can be used by a man in the middle to impersonate the authenticated user
+   against the SAMR or LSAD service on the server.
+   The client chosen application protocol, auth type (e.g. Kerberos or NTLMSSP)
+   and auth level (NONE, CONNECT, PKT_INTEGRITY, PKT_PRIVACY) do not matter
+   in this case. A man in the middle can change auth level to CONNECT
+   (which means authentication without message protection) and take over
+   the connection.
+   As a result, a man in the middle is able to get read/write access to the
+   Security Account Manager Database, which reveals all passwords
+   and any other potential sensitive information.
+   Samba running as an active directory domain controller is additionally
+   missing checks to enforce PKT_PRIVACY for the
+   Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol [MS-DRSR] (drsuapi)
+   and the BackupKey Remote Protocol [MS-BKRP] (backupkey).
+   The Domain Name Service Server Management Protocol [MS-DNSP] (dnsserver)
+   is not enforcing at least PKT_INTEGRITY.
+New smb.conf options
+  allow dcerpc auth level connect (G)
+    This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to be used with
+    DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication, but no per
+    message integrity nor privacy protection.
+    Some interfaces like samr, lsarpc and netlogon have a hard-coded default
+    of no and epmapper, mgmt and rpcecho have a hard-coded default of yes.
+    The behavior can be overwritten per interface name (e.g. lsarpc,
+    netlogon, samr, srvsvc, winreg, wkssvc ...) by using
+    'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = yes' as option.
+    This option yields precedence to the implementation specific restrictions.
+    E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
+    The dnsserver protocol requires DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
+    Default: allow dcerpc auth level connect = no
+    Example: allow dcerpc auth level connect = yes
+  client ipc signing (G)
+    This controls whether the client is allowed or required to use
+    SMB signing for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport. Possible
+    values are auto, mandatory and disabled.
+    When set to mandatory or default, SMB signing is required.
+    When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced and
+    if set to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.
+    Connections from winbindd to Active Directory Domain Controllers
+    always enforce signing.
+    Default: client ipc signing = default
+  client ipc max protocol (G)
+    The value of the parameter (a string) is the highest protocol level that will
+    be supported for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.
+    Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
+    in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.
+    The value default refers to the latest supported protocol, currently SMB3_11.
+    See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
+    The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.
+    Default: client ipc max protocol = default
+    Example: client ipc max protocol = SMB2_10
+  client ipc min protocol (G)
+    This setting controls the minimum protocol version that the will be
+    attempted to use for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.
+    Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
+    in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.
+    The value default refers to the higher value of NT1 and the
+    effective value of "client min protocol".
+    See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
+    The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.
+    Default: client ipc min protocol = default
+    Example: client ipc min protocol = SMB3_11
+  ldap server require strong auth (G)
+    The ldap server require strong auth defines whether the
+    ldap server requires ldap traffic to be signed or
+    signed and encrypted (sealed). Possible values are no,
+    allow_sasl_over_tls and yes.
+    A value of no allows simple and sasl binds over all transports.
+    A value of allow_sasl_over_tls allows simple and sasl binds (without sign or seal)
+    over TLS encrypted connections. Unencrypted connections only
+    allow sasl binds with sign or seal.
+    A value of yes allows only simple binds over TLS encrypted connections.
+    Unencrypted connections only allow sasl binds with sign or seal.
+    Default: ldap server require strong auth = yes
+  raw NTLMv2 auth (G)
+    This parameter determines whether or not smbd(8) will allow SMB1 clients
+    without extended security (without SPNEGO) to use NTLMv2 authentication.
+    If this option, lanman auth and ntlm auth are all disabled, then only
+    clients with SPNEGO support will be permitted. That means NTLMv2 is only
+    supported within NTLMSSP.
+    Default: raw NTLMv2 auth = no
+  tls verify peer (G)
+    This controls if and how strict the client will verify the peer's
+    certificate and name. Possible values are (in increasing order): no_check,
+    ca_only, ca_and_name_if_available, ca_and_name and as_strict_as_possible.
+    When set to no_check the certificate is not verified at all,
+    which allows trivial man in the middle attacks.
+    When set to ca_only the certificate is verified to be signed from a ca
+    specified in the "tls ca file" option. Setting "tls ca file" to a valid file
+    is required. The certificate lifetime is also verified. If the "tls crl file"
+    option is configured, the certificate is also verified against
+    the ca crl.
+    When set to ca_and_name_if_available all checks from ca_only are performed.
+    In addition, the peer hostname is verified against the certificate's
+    name, if it is provided by the application layer and not given as
+    an ip address string.
+    When set to ca_and_name all checks from ca_and_name_if_available are performed.
+    In addition the peer hostname needs to be provided and even an ip
+    address is checked against the certificate's name.
+    When set to as_strict_as_possible all checks from ca_and_name are performed.
+    In addition the "tls crl file" needs to be configured. Future versions
+    of Samba may implement additional checks.
+    Default: tls verify peer = as_strict_as_possible
+  tls priority (G) (backported from Samba 4.3 to Samba 4.2)
+    This option can be set to a string describing the TLS protocols to be
+    supported in the parts of Samba that use GnuTLS, specifically the AD DC.
+    The default turns off SSLv3, as this protocol is no longer considered
+    secure after CVE-2014-3566 (otherwise known as POODLE) impacted SSLv3 use
+    in HTTPS applications.
+    The valid options are described in the GNUTLS Priority-Strings
+    documentation at http://gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html
+    Default: tls priority = NORMAL:-VERS-SSL3.0
+Behavior changes
+o  The default auth level for authenticated binds has changed from
+   That means ncacn_ip_tcp:server is now implicitly the same
+   as ncacn_ip_tcp:server[sign] and offers a similar protection
+   as ncacn_np:server, which relies on smb signing.
+o  The following constraints are applied to SMB1 connections:
+   - "client lanman auth = yes" is now consistently
+     required for authenticated connections using the
+     SMB1 LANMAN2 dialect.
+   - "client ntlmv2 auth = yes" and "client use spnego = yes"
+     (both the default values), require extended security (SPNEGO)
+     support from the server. That means NTLMv2 is only used within
+     NTLMSSP.
+o  Tools like "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more obey the
+   default of "client ldap sasl wrapping = sign". Even with
+   "client ldap sasl wrapping = plain" they will automatically upgrade
+   to "sign" when getting LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED from the LDAP
+   server.
+Changes since 4.4.0:
+o  Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>

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