Heimdal upgrade, really happening this time

Stefan Metzmacher metze at samba.org
Mon Aug 9 08:53:34 UTC 2021

Am 09.08.21 um 03:37 schrieb Andrew Bartlett:
> On Mon, 2021-08-09 at 11:12 +1200, Andrew Bartlett via samba-technical
> wrote:
>> On Fri, 2021-07-09 at 22:29 +1200, Andrew Bartlett via samba-
>> technical
>> wrote:
>>> We now have a mostly-working branch of current Heimdal on current
>>> Samba, compiling on all our supported system, which is pretty
>>> impressive.
>> I just wanted to wrap back to the list with an update.  Thanks to
>> some
>> great work with Luke Howard recently, host of our pull requests with
>> Heimdal have either been merged or will be shortly (as in, I made the
>> requested changes and expect them to be accepted).
>> This means that we are actually fairly close to upstream Heimdal,
>> closer than we ever have been I dare to suggest.
>> The remaining changes outstanding are:
>> ...
> There are also, which were on the Samba side, the attached.
> I'm not really sure about them - I think
> source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
> ctx->flags.canonicalize = 1
> is trying to do the same as the Samba-side commit:
> testprogs/blackbox/ --enterprise --canonicalize
> Is that the case, and so could we drop the Heimdal side now?

I don't think enterprise principals will work without canonicalize
and we have also non-blackbox cases we need to handle.

Just try and check if all our tests still work.
It seems our C code uses krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize(),
so we may not need that patch.

> I also don't know what 
> source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/mcache.c anonymous resolving
> is for or fixes.  Can you shed some light on this?

This needed in order to have memory credential caches, which are not
part of the global credential cache collection, but are still available
to be opened by explicit name, which is the exact usage we need for any
in memory caches.

The whole global credential cache collection magic seems to be very dangerous
for application like samba, which need to use kerberos on behalf of different unrelated identities.

We already had very strange things happen with MIT, which where very hard to debug,
setenv("KRB5CCNAME", "MEMORY:libads", 1) completely ignores the ':libads' part!
It always iterates over *all* caches with a "MEMORY:" prefix and use the first cache
that has a tgt in the used realm, which may means we authenticate as a completely
unexpected user (maybe administrator), while we want to do an LDAP operation
on behalf of the local machine account.


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: OpenPGP_signature
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 833 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://lists.samba.org/pipermail/samba-technical/attachments/20210809/c83e3a3c/OpenPGP_signature.sig>

More information about the samba-technical mailing list