Now that the badlock bug and fixes are available, it is too much for some companies

[Uri Simchoni]

On 04/14/2016 09:58 AM, Andrew Bartlett wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-04-13 at 11:52 -0700, Richard Sharpe wrote:
> 
>>
>> I am suggesting it as an interim solution that mitigates the risk
>> while we get the complete solution through the organization because
>> QA
>> is going to require a long testing cycle because of the amount of
>> code
>> change that it involves.
>>
> 
> Do you enforce SMB signing in your product?  If not, MITM attacks
> against SMB (and so ncacn_np) are much easier to do than exploiting
> this issue.  The reason the release came with so many other fixes is
> that only with them all fixed and signing required on all protocols doe
> s it make sense.
> 
> The rest is a pile of correctness stuff that is worthwhile, but put
> another way, if the front door is unlocked, checking the deadbolt on
> the patio isn't much help.
> 
> Andrew Bartlett
> 
... But even without SMB signing, the SAMR pipe usually has (and after
the patch - always has?) its own integrity/confidentiality provided by
RPC, isn't it? I mean, if I try to change the password of a local user
on an SMB server, everything is encrypted (and the way I understood
badlock, an MITM could prevent this encryption, and without SMB signing
as an additional security measure, hijack the connection and configure
local users at will)

Uri