Issues with Linux kernel oplocks

J. Bruce Fields bfields at fieldses.org
Tue Jul 23 14:32:16 MDT 2013


On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 01:25:52PM -0700, Jeremy Allison wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 03:35:12PM -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > 
> > >From 'man 2 fcntl':
> > 
> > 	Sending a signal to the owner process (group) specified by
> > 	F_SETOWN is subject to the same permissions checks as are
> > 	described for kill(2), where the sending process is the one that
> > 	employs F_SETOWN (but see BUGS below).
> > 
> > And 'man 2 kill':
> > 
> > 	For a process to have permission to send a signal it must either
> > 	be privileged (under Linux: have the CAP_KILL capability), or
> > 	the real or effective user ID of the sending process must equal
> > 	the real or saved set-user-ID of the target process.
> > 
> > I'm not sure what exactly the threat is here.  (An unprivileged process
> > being able to trigger a signal to a privileged process sharing the same
> > file descriptor?)  In any case it's clearly intentional.
> 
> But that is *clearly* a bug w.r.t. leases. The whole point of
> leases is that if a process running under uid 123 opens a file and requests a lease,
> when a process owned by uid 345 tries to open that file then the original process
> *must* get a signal.

Sure, but...

> Neither process has to be privileged, neither
> process has to have changed uids.
> 
> For leases to work this condition:
> 
> "the real or effective user ID of the sending process must equal
> the real or saved set-user-ID of the target process."
> 
> cannot be correct. Else you could only break leases between
> processes who are owned by the same uid - or from a privileged
> opener.

... you're confusing the lease-breaker and the lease-setter.

Note in the first quote above, "where the sending process is the one
that employs F_SETOWN".  (Or equivalently, I think, F_SETLEASE.)

--b.


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