Can samba mitigate the vulnerability of NT hashes?

Stefan (metze) Metzmacher metze at samba.org
Thu Jan 10 01:57:37 MST 2013


> We use the following registry settings to improve NT-based systems (from a windows command prompt):
> 
> reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0 /v ntlmminclientsec /t REG_DWORD /d 0x20080000 /f
> reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0 /v ntlmminserversec /t REG_DWORD /d 0x20080000 /f
> rem lmcompatibilitylevel=5 send/accept ntlmv2 only
> reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v lmcompatibilitylevel /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f
> 
> These are used on XP, Windows7, WinServer 2003/2008.  
> If the client isn't forced to use your protocol of choice it will try, and hence be vulnerable, when it tries others.
> 
> On the samba 3.6.X PDC side, these complete the setup:
>  lanman auth = no
>  lm announce = no

"lm announce" has nothing to do with authentication...

metze

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