Extended request in kludge acl

Nadezhda Ivanova nivanova at samba.org
Thu Jul 8 03:40:00 MDT 2010

Hi Andrew,
We had some discussion with Matthias on IRC, and we came up with 3 ways to
solve the problem.
One way is to keep the control and apply the patch as it is. I really do not
like it because of reasons listed in previous mails. Another is to use an
extended operation, which would complicate things and is yet another way to
bypass security checks.
The third way, which I am most in favor of, is for the samr to actually
start providing both passwords on a password change, so we can use the
standard flow of things. It just seems wrong to me to use sambd_set_password
instead of a function that will provide both, and then introduce internal
hacks to handle the problem.

What do you think?


On Thu, Jul 8, 2010 at 10:45 AM, Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw at samba.org>wrote:

> Could we discuss this on IRC with Andrew?
> Matthias
> Nadezhda Ivanova wrote:
>> Hi Matthias,
>> I thought some more about the patch and I have missed something very
>> important.
>> This patch makes it so given the control we actually execute a reset
>> operation with the permissions of a change operation. However, every user
>> account actually is given permission to change every other accoun't
>> password. There is an ACE that comes from the defaultSd that gives this
>> right to EVERYONE. The only thing that we count on after that is that the
>> user knows the correct old password to verify identity. With the replace its
>> different, permission has to be granted. So what you are proposing is to
>> essentially allow everyone to reset a user's password with samr, which
>> worries me A LOT. Maybe there is something I am missing on the samr side.
>> Sorry I did not think of this earlier...
>> Regards,
>> Nadya
>> On Thu, Jul 8, 2010 at 10:20 AM, Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw at samba.org<mailto:
>> mdw at samba.org>> wrote:
>>    Andrew,
>>    Andrew Bartlett wrote:
>>        On Thu, 2010-07-08 at 08:12 +0200, Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer
>>        wrote:
>>          The approach you suggest would also work, but would not have
>>        as strict a
>>        control over the transaction, as you would not be in the
>>        transaction
>>        when the old pw was checked.   (I'm not sure this matters in
>>        practice,
>>        given you could have the same race on multiple DCs anyway).
>>    Well, we have only one search/read request and then one modify
>>    one. I think it should be safe to split them up in two distinct
>>    transactions since the latter one (mainly the code in
>>    "password_hash" module) has to be performed in an atomic manner.
>>        Like the AS_SYSTEM control, this control is a little
>>        dangerous, and
>>        would have to be carefully restricted.  Please ensure the kpasswd
>>        password change code handles this too.
>>    The control is strictly private. You cannot set it over the LDAP
>>    protocol. But anyway I'm fine to rechange the code when we do
>>    support extended operations ACLs. The kpasswd patch does naturally
>>    also exist - it's here:
>> http://repo.or.cz/w/Samba/mdw.git/commitdiff/11f24a9a72d4c47359662ee5ba63433ac11e4b2c
>> .
>>    The code was tested manually and by "make test" and it does work.
>>    I hope you are fine about pushing it.
>>    Matthias

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