Claimed Zero Day exploit in Samba.
davec-b at rogers.com
Sat Feb 6 13:58:28 MST 2010
Michael Gilbert wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Feb 2010 14:24:55 -0500 Michael Gilbert wrote:
>> On Sat, 06 Feb 2010 14:12:38 -0500 simo wrote:
>>>> It would be feature-complete for users and administrators to control whether a
>>>> remote user is trying to link outside his share because a user might want to
>>>> link a directory in his own share, and an administrator might want to link a
>>>> directory for users inside their shares.
>>> Unfortunately it is not possible to have your cake and eat it too. If
>>> you want unix extensions and you do not want to severely limit what can
>>> be done with it, then you must allow to create any symbolic link.
>> like i said before and concurred by Jeremy, the ideal (but potentially
>> very complex) solution is to detect when remote users attempt to jump to
>> a target outside of their authorized shares and prevent that.
> i've got a sinking feeling that symlinks are not be the only way to
> achieve this goal. i guess we'll see whether we get a new disclosure
> on that sometime soon.
Hard links created by people with shell accounts will
1) appear to be inside the user's share
2) refer to something that is elsewhere
$ ln /etc/passwd
$ ls -l ./passwd
-rw-r--r-- 2 root root 1759 2009-11-13 10:16 ./passwd
$ head -2 ./passwd
In general, the impedance mismatch here is both considerable and
hard to fix, as the concept of "outside your share" means "somewhere
else" in the Unix world: it isn't a concept that exists outside of a jail...
David Collier-Brown, | Always do right. This will gratify
System Programmer and Author | some people and astonish the rest
davecb at spamcop.net | -- Mark Twain
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