Claimed Zero Day exploit in Samba.
michael.s.gilbert at gmail.com
Sat Feb 6 12:58:55 MST 2010
On Sat, 06 Feb 2010 14:31:29 -0500 simo wrote:
> On Sat, 2010-02-06 at 14:24 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:
> > On Sat, 06 Feb 2010 14:12:38 -0500 simo wrote:
> > > > It would be feature-complete for users and administrators to control whether a
> > > > remote user is trying to link outside his share because a user might want to
> > > > link a directory in his own share, and an administrator might want to link a
> > > > directory for users inside their shares.
> > >
> > > Unfortunately it is not possible to have your cake and eat it too. If
> > > you want unix extensions and you do not want to severely limit what can
> > > be done with it, then you must allow to create any symbolic link.
> > like i said before and concurred by Jeremy, the ideal (but potentially
> > very complex) solution is to detect when remote users attempt to jump to
> > a target outside of their authorized shares and prevent that.
> You are describing the option "wide links = no" as far as I can
> understand. Unless you mean to consider as "authorized", file system
> areas that are exposed by other shares. In that case I'd say that is
> indeed too complex to build something that will work correctly in all
it may be a matter of automatically denying all unauthorized paths,
and providing a way for the local admin to allow specific paths.
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