Claimed Zero Day exploit in Samba.
jra at samba.org
Fri Feb 5 13:16:33 MST 2010
On Fri, Feb 05, 2010 at 03:09:06PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:
> Jeremy Allison wrote:
> > As an example, given a share definition:
> > [tmp]
> > path = /tmp
> > read only = no
> > guest ok = yes
> > The administrator could add a symlink:
> > $ ln -s /etc/passwd /tmp/passwd
> > and SMB/CIFS clients would then see a file called "passwd"
> > within the [tmp] share that could be read and would allow
> > clients to read /etc/passwd.
> > All future versions of Samba will have the parameter
> > "wide links" set to "no" by default, and the manual
> > pages will be updated to explain this issue.
> while more secure (hardened) defaults are good, wouldn't it be more
> effective to tackle the root cause of the problem? i.e. on the samba
> server side, detect attempts by remote users to create symlinks to
> targets outside of their authorized shares and prevent that.
That code already exists and will be turned on when "wide links = no"
The problem is that's not what you want. There are valid reasons
for Linux / UNIX clients to create symlinks on a remote file system
that point to local files (/etc/passwd).
In the short term, "wide links = no" is what you need. I'm
addressing this in code (correct parameter checks) as well,
but that's obviously a longer term change.
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