svn commit: samba r23668 - in branches: SAMBA_3_0/source/lib SAMBA_3_0_26/source/lib

Volker Lendecke Volker.Lendecke at SerNet.DE
Sun Jul 1 06:14:30 GMT 2007

On Sat, Jun 30, 2007 at 05:39:49PM -0700, Jeremy Allison wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 01, 2007 at 02:04:36AM +0200, Michael Adam wrote:
> > 
> > I did not create a security hole (kept at the worst): 
> > This block of code was just indented one additional level. 
> > num_ucs2 = length/2, length being passed to the function. 
> > So there is no danger of wrap here. - right?
> Where did length come from ? Please check length.

length is client-determined here, so definitely tainted (in
the perl sense). But still I don't see how this can wrap.
length and num_ucs2 are both unsigned, and right before the
malloc(num_ucs2+1) num_ucs2 was calculated as
num_ucs2=length/2. Maybe I'm not paranoid enough, but for
which values can this wrap?

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