Tighten up password security for 3.2?

[Andrew Bartlett]

I wondered if, given we are bumping the release version number to 3.2,
if we should tighten up some of the defaults for Samba 3.2?
(Particularly given the precedent with Vista also tightening up on what
it will send). 

I'm wondering if we should refuse to send plaintext and LM passwords by
default?  Currently users passwords could be exposed on the network,
either as plaintext or as an LM response, if someone spoofs a server and
doesn't negotiate NTLMSSP (and the right options).

The base work for this was done ages ago, when i added in the client
plaintext auth and client lanman auth parameters, so it's just a matter
of changing defaults.

This would break connections to standalone Win9X servers, and Samba
servers still configured in plaintext mode.  Everything else has
understood NTLM for years. 

Likewise we might want to look at only accepting NTLM and NTLMv2 on the
server side (again, as a default).

Thoughts?

Andrew Bartlett
-- 
Andrew Bartlett
http://samba.org/~abartlet/
Authentication Developer, Samba Team           http://samba.org
Samba Developer, Red Hat Inc.
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