Password sync

[Simo Sorce]

Jeremy Allison wrote:
> 
> Paul J Collins wrote:
> 
> > NT's password format is neither insecure nor trivial.  It is a one-way
> > hash.
> 
> This is true, but the implementation is badly flawed.
> There is no salt - meaning if two users pick the same
> password it will be an identical hash.
> 
> The second problem is not the NT password hash but the
> legacy lanman hash which is usually stored with the
> more secure NT hash.
> 
> The lanman hash *is* trivial and brute forcible, and
> this makes the security of the NT hash irrelevent, as
> you only need to brute force the lanman one.
> 
Correct me if I'm wrong.

The problem is not only the Lm hash.
The problem is that what goes on the network is the hash (NT hash, LM
hash it does not matter).
And this is check against the stored hash to check they are equal.
Now I have a switched network and my smbpasswd is not readable, but if
someone get the hands on a username/hash pair how much time do you thimk
it will need to patch samba to accept as parameter the hash an use it
directly instead of the password.
In this scenario I does not even need to know the password, I HAVE A
CLEAR PASSWORD EQUIVALENT.

Again, Correct me if I'm wrong, meanwhile I never store sensitive data
on CIFS/SMB reacheable machines.

If there anyone interested, is there anyone working or knowing a method
to replace msgina.dll (the module that do the authentication method) to
use with samba PDC and that does not break Domain/Profiles/Permissions
behaviours?
I've tested nisgina but as my users really leaps from a machine to
another any time It will not work very well (and I do not like much
plain NIS as well 8] ).

Regards,
Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce - Integrazione Sistemi Unix/Windows - Politecnico di Milano
E-mail: simo.sorce at polimi.it
Tel.int: 02 2399 2425 - Fax.int. 02 2399 2451
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