[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch master updated
Stefan Metzmacher
metze at samba.org
Tue Dec 13 14:07:01 UTC 2022
The branch, master has been updated
via 987cba90573 CVE-2022-37966 python:/tests/krb5: call sys.path.insert(0, "bin/python") before any other imports
via d1999c152ac CVE-2022-37966 samba-tool: add 'domain trust modify' command
via cca3c024fc5 CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: apply restrictions of "kdc supported enctypes"
via 36d0a495159 CVE-2022-37966 param: Add support for new option "kdc supported enctypes"
via fa64f8fa8d9 CVE-2022-37966 param: let "kdc default domain supportedenctypes = 0" mean the default
via 7504a4d6fee CVE-2022-37966 param: don't explicitly initialize "kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys" to false/"no"
via fde745ec349 CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: announce PA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES like windows.
via 1dfa91682ef CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: test much more etype combinations
via c7c57620896 CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: add better PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES assert message
via 77bd3258f1d CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: add 'force_nt4_hash' for account creation of KDCBaseTest
via f434a30ee7c CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: ignore empty supplementalCredentials attributes
via d8fd6a22b67 CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: allow ticket/supported_etypes to be passed KdcTgsBaseTests._{as,tgs}_req()
via e0f89b7bc80 CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: fix some tests running against Windows 2022
via 4ebbe7e4075 CVE-2022-37966 s4:libnet: allow python bindings to force setting an nthash via SAMR level 18
via 271cd82cd68 CVE-2022-37966 s4:libnet: add support LIBNET_SET_PASSWORD_SAMR_HANDLE_18 to set nthash only
via 9e69289b099 CVE-2022-37966 s4:libnet: initialize libnet_SetPassword() arguments explicitly to zero by default.
via f1c5fa28c46 CVE-2022-37966 drsuapi.idl: add trustedDomain related ATTID values
via d7ea197ed1a CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: use the strongest possible keys
via 621b8c3927b CVE-2022-37966 s4:pydsdb: add ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
via b7260c89e0d CVE-2022-37966 s3:net_ads: let 'net ads enctypes list' pretty print AES256-SK and RESOURCE-SID-COMPRESSION-DISABLED
via 4cedaa643bf CVE-2022-37966 s3:net_ads: no longer reference des encryption types
via 40b47c194d7 CVE-2022-37966 s3:libnet: no longer reference des encryption types
via a683507e560 CVE-2022-37966 s3:libads: no longer reference des encryption types
via 16b805c8f37 CVE-2022-37966 lib/krb5_wrap: no longer reference des encryption types
via f3fe1f2ce64 CVE-2022-37966 s3:net_ads: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
via 1a36c348d7a CVE-2022-37966 s3:libnet: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
via 2bd27955ce1 CVE-2022-37966 s3:libads: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
via c9b10ee32c7 CVE-2022-37966 lib/krb5_wrap: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
via a80f8e1b826 CVE-2022-37966 system_mitkrb5: require support for aes enctypes
via 9da028c46f7 CVE-2022-37966 wafsamba: add support for CHECK_VARIABLE(mandatory=True)
via 6b46b764fc5 CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: also limit the krbtgt history to their strongest keys
via 4bb50c868c8 CVE-2022-37966 kdc: Assume trust objects support AES by default
via 975e43fc455 CVE-2022-37966 kdc: Implement new Kerberos session key behaviour since ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK was added
via 44802c46b18 CVE-2022-37966 selftest: Run S4U tests against FL2003 DC
via 371d7e63fcb CVE-2022-37966 selftest: Add tests for Kerberos session key behaviour since ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK was added
via a7a0b9ad075 CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Test different preauth etypes with Protected Users group
via 086646865ee CVE-2022-37966 samba-tool: Declare explicitly RC4 support of trust objects
via 6b155b22e6a CVE-2022-37966 samba-tool: Fix 'domain trust create' documentation
via d6b3d68efc2 CVE-2022-37966 third_party/heimdal: Fix error message typo
via ee18bc29b8e CVE-2022-37966 param: Add support for new option "kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys"
via d861d4eb28b CVE-2022-37966 param: Add support for new option "kdc default domain supportedenctypes"
via a50a2be622a CVE-2022-37967 Add new PAC checksum
via 538315a2aa6 CVE-2022-37966 HEIMDAL: Look up the server keys to combine with clients etype list to select a session key
via 177334c0423 CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Add a test requesting tickets with various encryption types
via e0a91dddc4a CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Add 'etypes' parameter to _tgs_req()
via 50e075d2db2 CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Split out _tgs_req() into base class
via c7cd6889177 CVE-2022-37966 selftest: Allow krb5 tests to run against an IP by using the target_hostname binding string
via 0248907e349 CVE-2022-37966 libcli/auth: let netlogon_creds_cli_warn_options() about "kerberos encryption types=legacy"
via c0c25cc0217 CVE-2022-37966 testparm: warn about 'kerberos encryption types = legacy'
via a4f6f51cbed CVE-2022-37966 docs-xml/smbdotconf: "kerberos encryption types = legacy" should not be used
via 4d540473c3d CVE-2022-38023 testparm: warn about unsecure schannel related options
via f964c0c3572 CVE-2022-38023 testparm: warn about server/client schannel != yes
via b3ed90a0541 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: implement "server schannel require seal[:COMPUTERACCOUNT]"
via 3c57608e110 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add a per connection cache to dcesrv_netr_check_schannel()
via 7732a4b0bde CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: add "server schannel require seal[:COMPUTERACCOUNT]" options
via 689507457f5 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: make sure all dcesrv_netr_LogonSamLogon*() calls go through dcesrv_netr_check_schannel()
via f43dc4f0bd6 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: split out dcesrv_netr_check_schannel() function
via 7ae3735810c CVE-2022-38023 selftest:Samba4: avoid global 'allow nt4 crypto = yes' and 'reject md5 clients = no'
via 43df4be3595 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: debug 'reject md5 servers' and 'allow nt4 crypto' misconfigurations
via 2ad302b4225 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: document "server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"
via bd429d02598 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: document "allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no"
via 69b36541606 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add 'server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no' and 'allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = yes'
via b09f51eefc3 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: defer downgrade check until we found the account in our SAM
via c8e53394b98 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: change 'reject md5 clients' default to yes
via 4c7f84798ac CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: require aes if weak crypto is disabled
via b6339fd1dcb CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: split out dcesrv_netr_ServerAuthenticate3_check_downgrade()
via cfd55a22cda CVE-2022-38023 s4:torture: use NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES by default
via 63c96ea6c02 CVE-2022-38023 selftest:Samba4: avoid global 'server schannel = auto'
via 16ee03efc19 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: improve CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon) debug messages
via ec62151a2fb CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: re-order checking in dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
via 0e6a2ba83ef CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add talloc_stackframe() to dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
via 7baabbe9819 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add a lp_ctx variable to dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
via e060ea5b3ed CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: 'server schannel != yes' warning to dcesrv_interface_netlogon_bind
via 1c6c1129905 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: change 'reject md5 servers' default to yes
via d60828f6391 CVE-2022-38023 s3:winbindd: also allow per domain "winbind sealed pipes:DOMAIN" and "require strong key:DOMAIN"
via 1fdf1d55a5d CVE-2022-38023 s3:net: add and use net_warn_member_options() helper
via 7e7adf86e59 CVE-2022-38023 libcli/auth: add/use netlogon_creds_cli_warn_options()
via 992f39a2c8a CVE-2022-38023 libcli/auth: pass lp_ctx to netlogon_creds_cli_set_global_db()
via 830e865ba56 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml: improve wording for several options: "yields precedence" -> "is over-riden"
via 8ec62694a94 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml: improve wording for several options: "takes precedence" -> "overrides"
via 22128c718ca selftest: make filter-subunit much more efficient for large knownfail lists
from 5259926de71 s4/torture/smb2: avoid possibly closing undefined handle
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=master
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 987cba90573f955fe9c781830daec85ad4d5bf92
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 14:14:32 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:/tests/krb5: call sys.path.insert(0, "bin/python") before any other imports
This allows the tests to be executed without an explicit
PYTHONPATH="bin/python".
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 13 14:06:14 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
commit d1999c152acdf939b4cd7eb446dd9921d3edae29
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Dec 6 12:55:45 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 samba-tool: add 'domain trust modify' command
For now it only allows the admin to modify
the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes values.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
commit cca3c024fc514bee79bb60a686e470605cc98d6f
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 09:39:19 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: apply restrictions of "kdc supported enctypes"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 36d0a495159f72633f1f41deec979095417a1727
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 14:13:36 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 param: Add support for new option "kdc supported enctypes"
This allows admins to disable enctypes completely if required.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit fa64f8fa8d92167ed15d1109af65bbb4daab4bad
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 09:05:51 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 param: let "kdc default domain supportedenctypes = 0" mean the default
In order to allow better upgrades we need the default value for smb.conf to the
same even if the effective default value of the software changes in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 7504a4d6fee7805aac7657b9dab88c48353d6db4
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 09:02:41 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 param: don't explicitly initialize "kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys" to false/"no"
This is not squashed in order to allow easier backports...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit fde745ec3491a4fd7b23e053a67093a2ccaf0905
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Thu Mar 24 15:44:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: announce PA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES like windows.
We need to take the value from the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
attribute and only take the default if there's no value or
if the value is 0.
For krbtgt and DC accounts we need to force support for
ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 and AES encryption types and add the related bits
in addtition. (Note for krbtgt msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is
completely ignored the hardcoded value is the default, so there's
no AES256-SK for krbtgt).
For UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY on the account we reset
the value to 0, these accounts are in fact disabled completely,
as they always result in KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
Then we try to get all encryption keys marked in
supported_enctypes, and the available_enctypes
is a reduced set depending on what keys are
actually stored in the database.
We select the supported session key enctypes by the available
keys and in addition based on AES256-SK as well as the
"kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys" option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 1dfa91682efd3b12d7d6af75287efb12ebd9e526
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 17:11:01 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: test much more etype combinations
This tests work out the difference between
- msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value or it's default
- software defined extra flags for DC accounts
- accounts with only an nt hash being stored
- the resulting value in the KRB5_PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES announcement
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit c7c576208960e336da276e251ad7a526e1b3ed45
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 20:59:52 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: add better PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES assert message
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 77bd3258f1db0ddf4639a83a81a1aad3ee52c87d
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 16:42:58 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: add 'force_nt4_hash' for account creation of KDCBaseTest
This will allow us to create tests accounts with only an nt4 hash
stored, without any aes keys.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit f434a30ee7c40aac4a223fcabac9ddd160a155a5
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 20:27:14 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: ignore empty supplementalCredentials attributes
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit d8fd6a22b67a2b3ae03a2e428cc4987f07af6e29
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 14:15:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: allow ticket/supported_etypes to be passed KdcTgsBaseTests._{as,tgs}_req()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit e0f89b7bc8025db615dccf096aab4ca87e655368
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 09:48:09 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 python:tests/krb5: fix some tests running against Windows 2022
I'm using the following options:
SERVER=172.31.9.218 DC_SERVER=w2022-118.w2022-l7.base \
SMB_CONF_PATH=/dev/null STRICT_CHECKING=1 \
DOMAIN=W2022-L7 REALM=W2022-L7.BASE \
ADMIN_USERNAME=Administrator ADMIN_PASSWORD=A1b2C3d4 \
CLIENT_USERNAME=Administrator CLIENT_PASSWORD=A1b2C3d4 CLIENT_AS_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES=28 CLIENT_KVNO=2 \
FULL_SIG_SUPPORT=1 TKT_SIG_SUPPORT=1 FORCED_RC4=1
in order to run these:
python/samba/tests/krb5/as_req_tests.py -v --failfast AsReqKerberosTests
python/samba/tests/krb5/etype_tests.py -v --failfast EtypeTests
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 4ebbe7e40754eeb1c8f221dd59018c3e681ab2ab
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 15:45:56 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:libnet: allow python bindings to force setting an nthash via SAMR level 18
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 271cd82cd681d723572fcaeed24052dc98a83612
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Thu Mar 24 14:09:50 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:libnet: add support LIBNET_SET_PASSWORD_SAMR_HANDLE_18 to set nthash only
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 9e69289b099b47e0352ef67ef7e6529d11688e9a
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 29 15:42:27 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:libnet: initialize libnet_SetPassword() arguments explicitly to zero by default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit f1c5fa28c460f7e011049606b1b9ef96443e5e1f
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Thu Feb 3 16:27:15 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 drsuapi.idl: add trustedDomain related ATTID values
For now this is only for debugging in order to see
DRSUAPI_ATTID_msDS_SupportedEncryptionTypes in the replication meta
data.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit d7ea197ed1a9903f601030e6466cc822f9b8f794
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 7 18:03:45 2017 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: use the strongest possible keys
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 621b8c3927b63776146940b183b03b3ea77fd2d7
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:27:14 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:pydsdb: add ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit b7260c89e0df18822fa276e681406ec4d3921caa
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 22 09:48:45 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:net_ads: let 'net ads enctypes list' pretty print AES256-SK and RESOURCE-SID-COMPRESSION-DISABLED
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 4cedaa643bf95ef2628f1b631feda833bb2e7da1
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:20:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:net_ads: no longer reference des encryption types
We no longer have support for des encryption types in the kerberos
libraries anyway.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 40b47c194d7c41fbc6515b6029d5afafb0911232
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:20:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:libnet: no longer reference des encryption types
We no longer have support for des encryption types in the kerberos
libraries anyway.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit a683507e560a499336c50b88abcd853d49618bf4
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:20:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:libads: no longer reference des encryption types
We no longer have support for des encryption types in the kerberos
libraries anyway.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 16b805c8f376e0992a8bbb359d6bd8f0f96229db
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:20:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 lib/krb5_wrap: no longer reference des encryption types
We no longer have support for des encryption types in the kerberos
libraries anyway.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit f3fe1f2ce64ed36be5b001fb4fea92428e73e4e3
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:19:48 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:net_ads: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
aes encryption types are always supported.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 1a36c348d7a984bed8d0f3de5bf9bebd1cb3c47a
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:19:48 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:libnet: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
aes encryption types are always supported.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 2bd27955ce1000c13b468934eed8b0fdeb66e3bf
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:18:02 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s3:libads: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
aes encryption types are always supported.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit c9b10ee32c7e91521d024477a28fb7a622e4eb04
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:16:51 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 lib/krb5_wrap: remove unused ifdef HAVE_ENCTYPE_AES*
aes encryption types are always supported.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit a80f8e1b826ee3f9bbb22752464a73b97c2a612d
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:12:47 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 system_mitkrb5: require support for aes enctypes
This will never fail as we already require a version that supports aes,
but this makes it clearer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 9da028c46f70db60a80d47f5dadbec194510211f
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 23 15:12:14 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 wafsamba: add support for CHECK_VARIABLE(mandatory=True)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 6b46b764fc5760d3bf83bb1ea5fa398d993cf68d
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Sun Dec 4 21:05:39 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 s4:kdc: also limit the krbtgt history to their strongest keys
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 4bb50c868c8ed14372cb7d27e53cdaba265fc33d
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Tue Nov 22 11:32:34 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 kdc: Assume trust objects support AES by default
As part of matching the behaviour of Windows, assume that trust objects
support AES256, but not RC4, if not specified otherwise.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 975e43fc45531fdea14b93a3b1529b3218a177e6
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 1 15:20:47 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 kdc: Implement new Kerberos session key behaviour since ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK was added
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this
CVE to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available. We
set the etypes available for session keys depending on the encryption
types that are supported by the principal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit 44802c46b18caf3c7f9f2fb1b66025fc30e22ac5
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Wed Nov 23 16:05:04 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 selftest: Run S4U tests against FL2003 DC
This shows that changes around RC4 encryption types do not break older
functional levels where only RC4 keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 371d7e63fcb966ab54915a3dedb888d48adbf0c0
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Fri Nov 18 12:11:39 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 selftest: Add tests for Kerberos session key behaviour since ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK was added
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this CVE
to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit a7a0b9ad0757d6586905d64bc645a8946fe5c10e
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Mon Nov 21 18:05:36 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Test different preauth etypes with Protected Users group
Extend the RC4 Protected Users tests to use different preauth etypes.
This helps test the nuances of the new expected behaviour and allows the
tests to continue passing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 086646865eef247a54897f5542495a2105563a5e
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Mon Nov 21 13:47:06 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 samba-tool: Declare explicitly RC4 support of trust objects
As we will assume, as part of the fixes for CVE-2022-37966, that trust
objects with no msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute support AES
keys, RC4 support must now be explicitly indicated.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 6b155b22e6afa52ce29cc475840c1d745b0f1f5e
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Mon Nov 21 13:45:22 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 samba-tool: Fix 'domain trust create' documentation
This option does the opposite of what the documentation claims.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit d6b3d68efc296190a133b4e38137bdfde39257f4
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Mon Nov 21 14:01:47 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 third_party/heimdal: Fix error message typo
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit ee18bc29b8ef6a3f09070507cc585467e55a1628
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 18 13:44:28 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 param: Add support for new option "kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys"
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit d861d4eb28bd4c091955c11669edcf867b093a6f
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Tue Nov 15 18:14:36 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 param: Add support for new option "kdc default domain supportedenctypes"
This matches the Windows registry key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\KDC\DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit a50a2be622afaa7a280312ea12f5eb9c9a0c41da
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Wed Nov 9 13:45:13 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37967 Add new PAC checksum
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15231
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit 538315a2aa6d03b7639b49eb1576efa8755fefec
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 1 14:47:12 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 HEIMDAL: Look up the server keys to combine with clients etype list to select a session key
We need to select server, not client, to compare client etypes against.
(It is not useful to compare the client-supplied encryption types with
the client's own long-term keys.)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit 177334c04230d0ad74bfc2b6825ffbebd5afb9af
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Tue Oct 25 19:32:27 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Add a test requesting tickets with various encryption types
The KDC should leave the choice of ticket encryption type up to the
target service, and admit no influence from the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit e0a91dddc4a6c70d7425c2c6836dcf2dd6d9a2de
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Wed Oct 26 14:29:54 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Add 'etypes' parameter to _tgs_req()
This lets us select the encryption types we claim to support in the
request body.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 50e075d2db21e9f23d686684ea3df9454b6b560e
Author: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Wed Oct 26 14:26:01 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 tests/krb5: Split out _tgs_req() into base class
We will use it for testing our handling of encryption types.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit c7cd6889177e8c705bb637172a60a5cf26734a3f
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 1 12:34:57 2022 +1300
CVE-2022-37966 selftest: Allow krb5 tests to run against an IP by using the target_hostname binding string
This makes it easier to test against a server that is not accessible via DNS.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit 0248907e34945153ff2be62dc11d75c956a05932
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 5 21:45:08 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 libcli/auth: let netlogon_creds_cli_warn_options() about "kerberos encryption types=legacy"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit c0c25cc0217b082c12330a8c47869c8428a20d0c
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 5 21:36:23 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 testparm: warn about 'kerberos encryption types = legacy'
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit a4f6f51cbed53775cdfedc7eec2f28c7beb875cc
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 5 21:31:37 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-37966 docs-xml/smbdotconf: "kerberos encryption types = legacy" should not be used
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 4d540473c3d43d048a30dd63efaeae9ff87b2aeb
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Dec 6 13:36:17 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 testparm: warn about unsecure schannel related options
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit f964c0c357214637f80d0089723b9b11d1b38f7e
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 15:13:47 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 testparm: warn about server/client schannel != yes
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15260
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit b3ed90a0541a271a7c6d4bee1201fa47adc3c0c1
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 14:05:30 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: implement "server schannel require seal[:COMPUTERACCOUNT]"
By default we'll now require schannel connections with
privacy/sealing/encryption.
But we allow exceptions for specific computer/trust accounts.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15260
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 3c57608e1109c1d6e8bb8fbad2ef0b5d79d00e1a
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Dec 2 14:31:26 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add a per connection cache to dcesrv_netr_check_schannel()
It's enough to warn the admin once per connection.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 7732a4b0bde1d9f98a0371f17d22648495329470
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 16:53:35 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: add "server schannel require seal[:COMPUTERACCOUNT]" options
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 689507457f5e6666488732f91a355a2183fb1662
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 17:15:36 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: make sure all dcesrv_netr_LogonSamLogon*() calls go through dcesrv_netr_check_schannel()
We'll soon add some additional contraints in dcesrv_netr_check_schannel(),
which are also required for dcesrv_netr_LogonSamLogonEx().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit f43dc4f0bd60d4e127b714565147f82435aa4f07
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 16:57:24 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: split out dcesrv_netr_check_schannel() function
This will allow us to reuse the function in other places.
As it will also get some additional checks soon.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 7ae3735810c2db32fa50f309f8af3c76ffa29768
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 14:57:20 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 selftest:Samba4: avoid global 'allow nt4 crypto = yes' and 'reject md5 clients = no'
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = yes and
server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no
in order to allow legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 43df4be35950f491864ae8ada05d51b42a556381
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 13:13:36 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: debug 'reject md5 servers' and 'allow nt4 crypto' misconfigurations
This allows the admin to notice what's wrong in order to adjust the
configuration if required.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 2ad302b42254e3c2800aaf11669fe2e6d55fa8a1
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 14:02:11 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: document "server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit bd429d025981b445bf63935063e8e302bfab3f9b
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 13:31:14 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: document "allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 69b36541606d7064de9648cd54b35adfdf8f0e8f
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 13:13:36 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add 'server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no' and 'allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = yes'
This makes it more flexible when we change the global default to
'reject md5 servers = yes'.
'allow nt4 crypto = no' is already the default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit b09f51eefc311bbb1525efd1dc7b9a837f7ec3c2
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 10:31:08 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: defer downgrade check until we found the account in our SAM
We'll soon make it possible to use 'reject md5 servers:CLIENTACCOUNT$ = no',
which means we'll need use the account name from our SAM.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit c8e53394b98b128ed460a6111faf05dfbad980d1
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Thu Nov 24 18:26:18 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: change 'reject md5 clients' default to yes
AES is supported by Windows Server >= 2008R2, Windows (Client) >= 7 and Samba >= 4.0,
so there's no reason to allow md5 clients by default.
However some third party domain members may need it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 4c7f84798acd1e3218209d66d1a92e9f42954d51
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 10:10:33 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: require aes if weak crypto is disabled
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit b6339fd1dcbe903e73efeea074ab0bd04ef83561
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 25 09:54:17 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: split out dcesrv_netr_ServerAuthenticate3_check_downgrade()
We'll soon make it possible to use 'reject md5 servers:CLIENTACCOUNT$ = no',
which means we'll need the downgrade detection in more places.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit cfd55a22cda113fbb2bfa373b54091dde1ea6e66
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Mon Nov 28 15:02:13 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:torture: use NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES by default
For generic tests we should use the best available features.
And AES will be required by default soon.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 63c96ea6c02981795e67336401143f2a8836992c
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 12:26:01 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 selftest:Samba4: avoid global 'server schannel = auto'
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no in order to allow
legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 16ee03efc194d9c1c2c746f63236b977a419918d
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 12:37:03 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: improve CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon) debug messages
In order to avoid generating useless debug messages during make test,
we will use 'CVE_2020_1472:warn_about_unused_debug_level = 3'
and 'CVE_2020_1472:error_debug_level = 2' in order to avoid schannel warnings.
Review with: git show -w
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit ec62151a2fb49ecbeaa3bf924f49a956832b735e
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 12:37:03 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: re-order checking in dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 0e6a2ba83ef1be3c6a0f5514c21395121621a145
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 12 14:03:50 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add talloc_stackframe() to dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 7baabbe9819cd5a2714e7ea4e57a0c23062c0150
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 12 14:03:50 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: add a lp_ctx variable to dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit e060ea5b3edbe3cba492062c9605f88fae212ee0
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Dec 6 10:56:29 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: 'server schannel != yes' warning to dcesrv_interface_netlogon_bind
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 1c6c1129905d0c7a60018e7bf0f17a0fd198a584
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Thu Nov 24 18:22:23 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: change 'reject md5 servers' default to yes
AES is supported by Windows >= 2008R2 and Samba >= 4.0 so there's no
reason to allow md5 servers by default.
Note the change in netlogon_creds_cli_context_global() is only cosmetic,
but avoids confusion while reading the code. Check with:
git show -U35 libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit d60828f6391307a59abaa02b72b6a8acf66b2fef
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 14:59:36 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:winbindd: also allow per domain "winbind sealed pipes:DOMAIN" and "require strong key:DOMAIN"
This avoids advising insecure defaults for the global options.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 1fdf1d55a5dd550bdb16d037b5dc995c33c1a67a
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 16:16:05 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:net: add and use net_warn_member_options() helper
This makes sure domain member related 'net' commands print warnings
about unsecure smb.conf options.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 7e7adf86e59e8a673fbe87de46cef0d62221e800
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 14:47:33 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 libcli/auth: add/use netlogon_creds_cli_warn_options()
This warns the admin about insecure options
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 992f39a2c8a58301ceeb965f401e29cd64c5a209
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 30 14:46:59 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 libcli/auth: pass lp_ctx to netlogon_creds_cli_set_global_db()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
commit 830e865ba5648f6520bc552ffd71b61f754b8251
Author: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
Date: Tue Dec 6 16:05:26 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml: improve wording for several options: "yields precedence" -> "is over-riden"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 8ec62694a94c346e6ba8f3144a417c9984a1c8b9
Author: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
Date: Tue Dec 6 16:00:36 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml: improve wording for several options: "takes precedence" -> "overrides"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 22128c718cadd34af892df102bd52df6a6b03303
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Dec 6 17:16:00 2022 +1300
selftest: make filter-subunit much more efficient for large knownfail lists
By compiling the knownfail lists ahead of time we change a 20min test
into a 90sec test.
This could be improved further by combining this into a single regular expression,
but this is enough for now. The 'reason' is thankfully not used.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15258
Pair-programmed-with: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow at samba.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
buildtools/wafsamba/samba_autoconf.py | 4 +-
docs-xml/manpages/samba-tool.8.xml | 5 +
docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/allownt4crypto.xml | 85 +-
docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/rejectmd5clients.xml | 101 +-
.../security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml | 2 +-
docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientschannel.xml | 2 +-
.../security/kdcdefaultdomainsupportedenctypes.xml | 42 +
.../security/kdcforceenablerc4weaksessionkeys.xml | 24 +
.../smbdotconf/security/kdcsupportedenctypes.xml | 40 +
.../security/kerberosencryptiontypes.xml | 12 +-
docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml | 47 +-
.../security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml | 118 ++
docs-xml/smbdotconf/winbind/rejectmd5servers.xml | 9 +-
docs-xml/smbdotconf/winbind/requirestrongkey.xml | 4 +-
lib/krb5_wrap/krb5_samba.c | 6 -
lib/param/loadparm.c | 147 ++
libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c | 88 +-
libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.h | 4 +-
librpc/idl/drsuapi.idl | 9 +
librpc/idl/krb5pac.idl | 4 +-
librpc/idl/netlogon.idl | 1 +
librpc/idl/security.idl | 1 +
python/samba/drs_utils.py | 12 +-
python/samba/netcmd/domain.py | 130 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/alias_tests.py | 6 +-
.../samba/tests/krb5/as_canonicalization_tests.py | 5 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/as_req_tests.py | 19 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/claims_tests.py | 10 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/compatability_tests.py | 22 +
python/samba/tests/krb5/etype_tests.py | 597 ++++++++
python/samba/tests/krb5/fast_tests.py | 21 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/group_tests.py | 9 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/kdc_base_test.py | 131 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/kdc_tgs_tests.py | 467 ++++--
python/samba/tests/krb5/kpasswd_tests.py | 8 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/lockout_tests.py | 11 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/nt_hash_tests.py | 8 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/pac_align_tests.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/protected_users_tests.py | 55 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/raw_testcase.py | 126 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/rfc4120_constants.py | 1 +
python/samba/tests/krb5/rodc_tests.py | 8 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/s4u_tests.py | 122 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/salt_tests.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/spn_tests.py | 8 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_ccache.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_idmap_nss.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_ldap.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_min_domain_uid.py | 7 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_rpc.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/krb5/test_smb.py | 6 +-
python/samba/tests/usage.py | 1 +
selftest/knownfail_mit_kdc | 1601 +++++++++++++++++++-
selftest/subunithelper.py | 32 +-
selftest/target/Samba4.pm | 126 +-
source3/libads/kerberos.c | 6 +-
source3/libads/kerberos_keytab.c | 4 -
source3/libnet/libnet_join.c | 9 +-
source3/param/loadparm.c | 3 +
source3/rpc_client/cli_netlogon.c | 2 +-
source3/utils/destroy_netlogon_creds_cli.c | 2 +-
source3/utils/net.c | 6 +
source3/utils/net_ads.c | 27 +-
source3/utils/net_dom.c | 2 +
source3/utils/net_join.c | 2 +
source3/utils/net_offlinejoin.c | 2 +
source3/utils/net_proto.h | 2 +
source3/utils/net_rpc.c | 10 +
source3/utils/net_util.c | 14 +
source3/utils/testparm.c | 89 +-
source3/winbindd/winbindd_cm.c | 41 +-
source4/dsdb/pydsdb.c | 1 +
source4/kdc/db-glue.c | 251 ++-
source4/kdc/kdc-heimdal.c | 23 +-
source4/kdc/pac-glue.c | 24 +
source4/kdc/sdb.c | 91 ++
source4/kdc/sdb.h | 12 +
source4/kdc/sdb_to_hdb.c | 28 +-
source4/kdc/wdc-samba4.c | 2 +-
source4/libnet/libnet_join.c | 4 +-
source4/libnet/libnet_passwd.c | 75 +
source4/libnet/libnet_passwd.h | 7 +
source4/libnet/py_net.c | 18 +-
source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 1044 +++++++++++--
source4/selftest/tests.py | 36 +-
source4/torture/ntp/ntp_signd.c | 2 +-
source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c | 4 +-
source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c | 24 +-
source4/torture/rpc/netlogon_crypto.c | 2 +-
source4/torture/rpc/remote_pac.c | 14 +-
source4/torture/rpc/samba3rpc.c | 15 +-
third_party/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c | 45 +-
third_party/heimdal/kdc/krb5tgs.c | 8 +-
third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c | 4 +-
third_party/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 | 3 +-
third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c | 2 +-
third_party/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c | 169 ++-
wscript_configure_system_mitkrb5 | 4 +-
98 files changed, 5810 insertions(+), 663 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcdefaultdomainsupportedenctypes.xml
create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcforceenablerc4weaksessionkeys.xml
create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcsupportedenctypes.xml
create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml
create mode 100755 python/samba/tests/krb5/etype_tests.py
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/buildtools/wafsamba/samba_autoconf.py b/buildtools/wafsamba/samba_autoconf.py
index f3168f94a51..2e00f52230f 100644
--- a/buildtools/wafsamba/samba_autoconf.py
+++ b/buildtools/wafsamba/samba_autoconf.py
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ def CHECK_TYPE_IN(conf, t, headers=None, alternate=None, define=None, cflags='')
@conf
def CHECK_VARIABLE(conf, v, define=None, always=False,
- headers=None, msg=None, lib=None):
+ headers=None, msg=None, lib=None,
+ mandatory=False):
'''check for a variable declaration (or define)'''
if define is None:
define = 'HAVE_%s' % v.upper()
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@ def CHECK_VARIABLE(conf, v, define=None, always=False,
lib=lib,
headers=headers,
define=define,
+ mandatory=mandatory,
always=always)
diff --git a/docs-xml/manpages/samba-tool.8.xml b/docs-xml/manpages/samba-tool.8.xml
index 965b9d6357c..6dd25a11c59 100644
--- a/docs-xml/manpages/samba-tool.8.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/manpages/samba-tool.8.xml
@@ -701,6 +701,11 @@
<para>Create a domain or forest trust.</para>
</refsect3>
+<refsect3>
+ <title>domain trust modify <replaceable>DOMAIN</replaceable> <replaceable>options</replaceable> [options]</title>
+ <para>Modify a domain or forest trust.</para>
+</refsect3>
+
<refsect3>
<title>domain trust delete <replaceable>DOMAIN</replaceable> <replaceable>options</replaceable> [options]</title>
<para>Delete a domain trust.</para>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/allownt4crypto.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/allownt4crypto.xml
index 03dc8fa93f7..ee63e6cc245 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/allownt4crypto.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/allownt4crypto.xml
@@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
<samba:parameter name="allow nt4 crypto"
context="G"
type="boolean"
+ deprecated="1"
xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
<description>
+ <para>
+ This option is deprecated and will be removed in future,
+ as it is a security problem if not set to "no" (which will be
+ the hardcoded behavior in future).
+ </para>
+
<para>This option controls whether the netlogon server (currently
only in 'active directory domain controller' mode), will
- reject clients which does not support NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS
+ reject clients which do not support NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS
nor NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES.</para>
<para>This option was added with Samba 4.2.0. It may lock out clients
@@ -18,8 +25,82 @@
<para>"allow nt4 crypto = yes" allows weak crypto to be negotiated, maybe via downgrade attacks.</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the 'reject md5 clients' option.</para>
+ <para><emphasis>Avoid using this option!</emphasis> Use explicit '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">yes</smbconfoption>' instead!
+ Which is available with the patches for
+ <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">CVE-2022-38023</ulink>
+ see <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240</ulink></para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log an error in the log files at log level 0
+ if legacy a client is rejected or allowed without an explicit,
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">yes</smbconfoption>' option
+ for the client. The message will indicate
+ the explicit '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">yes</smbconfoption>'
+ line to be added, if the legacy client software requires it. (The log level can be adjusted with
+ '<smbconfoption name="CVE_2022_38023:error_debug_level">1</smbconfoption>'
+ in order to complain only at a higher log level).
+ </para>
+
+ <para>This allows admins to use "yes" only for a short grace period,
+ in order to collect the explicit
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">yes</smbconfoption>' options.</para>
+
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the effective value of 'yes' from
+ the '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/>'
+ and/or '<smbconfoption name="reject md5 clients"/>' options.</para>
</description>
<value type="default">no</value>
</samba:parameter>
+
+<samba:parameter name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT"
+ context="G"
+ type="string"
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+
+ <para>If you still have legacy domain members which required 'allow nt4 crypto = yes',
+ it is possible to specify an explicit exception per computer account
+ by using 'allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = yes' as option.
+ Note that COMPUTERACCOUNT has to be the sAMAccountName value of
+ the computer account (including the trailing '$' sign).
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log a complaint in the log files at log level 0
+ about the security problem if the option is set to "yes",
+ but the related computer does not require it.
+ (The log level can be adjusted with
+ '<smbconfoption name="CVE_2022_38023:warn_about_unused_debug_level">1</smbconfoption>'
+ in order to complain only at a higher log level).
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log a warning in the log files at log level 5,
+ if a setting is still needed for the specified computer account.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ See <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">CVE-2022-38023</ulink>,
+ <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240</ulink>.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>This option overrides the <smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto"/> option.</para>
+
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the effective value of 'yes' from
+ the '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/>'
+ and/or '<smbconfoption name="reject md5 clients"/>' options.</para>
+ <para>Which means '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">yes</smbconfoption>'
+ is only useful in combination with '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>'</para>
+
+ <programlisting>
+ allow nt4 crypto:LEGACYCOMPUTER1$ = yes
+ server reject md5 schannel:LEGACYCOMPUTER1$ = no
+ allow nt4 crypto:NASBOX$ = yes
+ server reject md5 schannel:NASBOX$ = no
+ allow nt4 crypto:LEGACYCOMPUTER2$ = yes
+ server reject md5 schannel:LEGACYCOMPUTER2$ = no
+ </programlisting>
+</description>
+
+</samba:parameter>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/rejectmd5clients.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/rejectmd5clients.xml
index 41684ef1080..fe7701d9277 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/rejectmd5clients.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/logon/rejectmd5clients.xml
@@ -1,17 +1,110 @@
<samba:parameter name="reject md5 clients"
context="G"
type="boolean"
+ deprecated="1"
xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
<description>
+ <para>
+ This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future release,
+ as it is a security problem if not set to "yes" (which will be
+ the hardcoded behavior in the future).
+ </para>
+
<para>This option controls whether the netlogon server (currently
only in 'active directory domain controller' mode), will
reject clients which does not support NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES.</para>
- <para>You can set this to yes if all domain members support aes.
- This will prevent downgrade attacks.</para>
+ <para>Support for NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES was added in Windows
+ starting with Server 2008R2 and Windows 7, it's available in Samba
+ starting with 4.0, however third party domain members like NetApp ONTAP
+ still uses RC4 (HMAC-MD5), see
+ <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html</ulink>
+ for more details.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>The default changed from 'no' to 'yes', with the patches for
+ <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">CVE-2022-38023</ulink>
+ see <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240</ulink>.
+ </para>
+
+ <para><emphasis>Avoid using this option!</emphasis> Use an explicit per machine account
+ '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/>' instead!
+ Which is available with the patches for
+ <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">CVE-2022-38023</ulink>
+ see <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240</ulink>.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log an error in the log files at log level 0
+ if legacy a client is rejected or allowed without an explicit,
+ '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>' option
+ for the client. The message will indicate
+ the explicit '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>'
+ line to be added, if the legacy client software requires it. (The log level can be adjusted with
+ '<smbconfoption name="CVE_2022_38023:error_debug_level">1</smbconfoption>'
+ in order to complain only at a higher log level).
+ </para>
+
+ <para>This allows admins to use "no" only for a short grace period,
+ in order to collect the explicit
+ '<smbconfoption name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>' options.</para>
+
+ <para>When set to 'yes' this option overrides the
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/>' and
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto"/>' options and implies
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>'.
+ </para>
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">yes</value>
+</samba:parameter>
+
+<samba:parameter name="server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"
+ context="G"
+ type="string"
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+
+ <para>If you still have legacy domain members or trusted domains,
+ which required "reject md5 clients = no" before,
+ it is possible to specify an explicit exception per computer account
+ by setting 'server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no'.
+ Note that COMPUTERACCOUNT has to be the sAMAccountName value of
+ the computer account (including the trailing '$' sign).
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log a complaint in the log files at log level 0
+ about the security problem if the option is set to "no",
+ but the related computer does not require it.
+ (The log level can be adjusted with
+ '<smbconfoption name="CVE_2022_38023:warn_about_unused_debug_level">1</smbconfoption>'
+ in order to complain only at a higher log level).
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log a warning in the log files at log level 5
+ if a setting is still needed for the specified computer account.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ See <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-38023.html">CVE-2022-38023</ulink>,
+ <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240</ulink>.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>This option overrides the <smbconfoption name="reject md5 clients"/> option.</para>
+
+ <para>When set to 'yes' this option overrides the
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/>' and
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto"/>' options and implies
+ '<smbconfoption name="allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>'.
+ </para>
- <para>This option takes precedence to the 'allow nt4 crypto' option.</para>
+ <programlisting>
+ server reject md5 schannel:LEGACYCOMPUTER1$ = no
+ server reject md5 schannel:NASBOX$ = no
+ server reject md5 schannel:LEGACYCOMPUTER2$ = no
+ </programlisting>
</description>
-<value type="default">no</value>
</samba:parameter>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
index 03531adbfb3..8bccab391cc 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
<para>The behavior can be overwritten per interface name (e.g. lsarpc, netlogon, samr, srvsvc,
winreg, wkssvc ...) by using 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = yes' as option.</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the implementation specific restrictions.
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the implementation specific restrictions.
E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
The dnsserver protocol requires DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
</para>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientschannel.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientschannel.xml
index 5b07da95050..d124ad48181 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientschannel.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientschannel.xml
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
<para>Note that for active directory domains this is hardcoded to
<smbconfoption name="client schannel">yes</smbconfoption>.</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the <smbconfoption name="require strong key"/> option.</para>
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the <smbconfoption name="require strong key"/> option.</para>
</description>
<value type="default">yes</value>
<value type="example">auto</value>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcdefaultdomainsupportedenctypes.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcdefaultdomainsupportedenctypes.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..984611167b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcdefaultdomainsupportedenctypes.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+<samba:parameter name="kdc default domain supported enctypes"
+ type="integer"
+ context="G"
+ handler="handle_kdc_default_domain_supported_enctypes"
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+ <para>
+ Set the default value of <constant>msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes</constant> for service accounts in Active Directory that are missing this value or where <constant>msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes</constant> is set to 0.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ This allows Samba administrators to match the configuration flexibility provided by the
+ <constant>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\KDC\DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes</constant> Registry Value on Windows.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Unlike the Windows registry key (which only takes an base-10 number), in Samba this may also be expressed in hexadecimal or as a list of Kerberos encryption type names.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Specified values are ORed together bitwise, and those currently supported consist of:
+ </para><itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>arcfour-hmac-md5</constant>, <constant>rc4-hmac</constant>, <constant>0x4</constant>, or <constant>4</constant></para>
+ <para>Known on Windows as Kerberos RC4 encryption</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96</constant>, <constant>aes128-cts</constant>, <constant>0x8</constant>, or <constant>8</constant></para>
+ <para>Known on Windows as Kerberos AES 128 bit encryption</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96</constant>, <constant>aes256-cts</constant>, <constant>0x10</constant>, or <constant>16</constant></para>
+ <para>Known on Windows as Kerberos AES 256 bit encryption</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96-sk</constant>, <constant>aes256-cts-sk</constant>, <constant>0x20</constant>, or <constant>32</constant></para>
+ <para>Allow AES session keys. When this is set, it indicates to the KDC that AES session keys can be used, even when <constant>aes256-cts</constant> and <constant>aes128-cts</constant> are not set. This allows use of AES keys against hosts otherwise only configured with RC4 for ticket keys (which is the default).</para>
+ </listitem>
+</itemizedlist>
+
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">0<comment>maps to what the software supports currently: arcfour-hmac-md5 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96-sk</comment></value>
+</samba:parameter>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcforceenablerc4weaksessionkeys.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcforceenablerc4weaksessionkeys.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1cb46d74a36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcforceenablerc4weaksessionkeys.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+<samba:parameter name="kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys"
+ type="boolean"
+ context="G"
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+ <para>
+ <constant>RFC8429</constant> declares that
+ <constant>rc4-hmac</constant> Kerberos ciphers are weak and
+ there are known attacks on Active Directory use of this
+ cipher suite.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ However for compatibility with Microsoft Windows this option
+ allows the KDC to assume that regardless of the value set in
+ a service account's
+ <constant>msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes</constant> attribute
+ that a <constant>rc4-hmac</constant> Kerberos session key (as distinct from the ticket key, as
+ found in a service keytab) can be used if the potentially
+ older client requests it.
+ </para>
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">no</value>
+</samba:parameter>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcsupportedenctypes.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcsupportedenctypes.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5e028bbb2be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kdcsupportedenctypes.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+<samba:parameter name="kdc supported enctypes"
+ type="integer"
+ context="G"
+ handler="handle_kdc_supported_enctypes"
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+ <para>
+ On an active directory domain controller, this is the list of supported encryption types for local running kdc.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ This allows Samba administrators to remove support for weak/unused encryption types, similar
+ the configuration flexibility provided by the <constant>Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos</constant>
+ GPO/Local Policies/Security Options Value, which results in the
+ <constant>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Kerberos\Parameters\SupportedEncryptionTypes</constant> Registry Value on Windows.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Unlike the Windows registry key (which only takes an base-10 number), in Samba this may also be expressed as hexadecimal or a list of Kerberos encryption type names.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ Specified values are ORed together bitwise, and those currently supported consist of:
+ </para><itemizedlist>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>arcfour-hmac-md5</constant>, <constant>rc4-hmac</constant>, <constant>0x4</constant>, or <constant>4</constant></para>
+ <para>Known on Windows as Kerberos RC4 encryption</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96</constant>, <constant>aes128-cts</constant>, <constant>0x8</constant>, or <constant>8</constant></para>
+ <para>Known on Windows as Kerberos AES 128 bit encryption</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para><constant>aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96</constant>, <constant>aes256-cts</constant>, <constant>0x10</constant>, or <constant>16</constant></para>
+ <para>Known on Windows as Kerberos AES 256 bit encryption</para>
+ </listitem>
+</itemizedlist>
+
+</description>
+
+<value type="default">0<comment>maps to what the software supports currently: arcfour-hmac-md5 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96</comment></value>
+</samba:parameter>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kerberosencryptiontypes.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kerberosencryptiontypes.xml
index 2c3c6c5d5fc..a245af55f5f 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kerberosencryptiontypes.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/kerberosencryptiontypes.xml
@@ -37,15 +37,9 @@
</para>
<para>When set to <constant>legacy</constant>, only RC4-HMAC-MD5
- is allowed. Avoiding AES this way has one a very specific use.
- Normally, the encryption type is negotiated between the peers.
- However, there is one scenario in which a Windows read-only domain
- controller (RODC) advertises AES encryption, but then proxies the
- request to a writeable DC which may not support AES encryption,
- leading to failure of the handshake. Setting this parameter to
- <constant>legacy</constant> would cause samba not to negotiate AES
- encryption. It is assumed of course that the weaker legacy
- encryption types are acceptable for the setup.
+ is allowed. AVOID using this option, because of
+ <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-37966.html">CVE-2022-37966</ulink> see
+ <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237</ulink>.
</para>
</description>
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml
index cd2543113f3..5c69f0f64df 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml
@@ -12,18 +12,36 @@
the hardcoded behavior in future).
</para>
- <para>
- Samba will complain in the log files at log level 0,
- about the security problem if the option is not set to "yes".
+ <para><emphasis>Avoid using this option!</emphasis> Use explicit '<smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>' instead!
</para>
+
+ <para>
+ Samba will log an error in the log files at log level 0
+ if legacy a client is rejected or allowed without an explicit,
+ '<smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>' option
+ for the client. The message will indicate
+ the explicit '<smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>'
+ line to be added, if the legacy client software requires it. (The log level can be adjusted with
+ '<smbconfoption name="CVE_2020_1472:error_debug_level">1</smbconfoption>'
+ in order to complain only at a higher log level).
+ </para>
+
<para>
- See CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon) https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
+ This allows admins to use "auto" only for a short grace period,
+ in order to collect the explicit
+ '<smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT">no</smbconfoption>' options.
</para>
- <para>If you still have legacy domain members use the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.
+ <para>
+ See <ulink url="https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2020-1472.html">CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)</ulink>,
+ <ulink url="https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497">https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497</ulink>.
</para>
- <para>This option yields precedence to the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.</para>
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.</para>
+
+ <para>This option is over-ridden by the effective value of 'yes' from
+ the '<smbconfoption name="server schannel require seal:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/>'
+ and/or '<smbconfoption name="server schannel require seal"/>' options.</para>
</description>
@@ -48,6 +66,9 @@
about the security problem if the option is not set to "no",
but the related computer is actually using the netlogon
secure channel (schannel) feature.
+ (The log level can be adjusted with
+ '<smbconfoption name="CVE_2020_1472:warn_about_unused_debug_level">1</smbconfoption>'
+ in order to complain only at a higher log level).
</para>
<para>
@@ -56,15 +77,25 @@
</para>
<para>
- See CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon) https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
--
Samba Shared Repository
More information about the samba-cvs
mailing list