[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch master updated
Alexander Bokovoy
ab at samba.org
Thu Nov 12 15:14:02 UTC 2020
The branch, master has been updated
via 8036bf9717f s3:smbd: Fix possible null pointer dereference in token_contains_name()
via 2a8b672652d auth_sam: use pdb_get_domain_info to look up DNS forest information
from dcd5a64ca74 selftest/subunithelper: also output as much of unterminated DETAILS
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=master
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 8036bf9717f83e83c3e4a9cf00fded42e9a5de15
Author: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 11 13:42:06 2020 +0100
s3:smbd: Fix possible null pointer dereference in token_contains_name()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14572
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab at samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Alexander Bokovoy <ab at samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 12 15:13:47 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
commit 2a8b672652dcbcf55ec59be537773d76f0f14d0a
Author: Alexander Bokovoy <ab at samba.org>
Date: Wed Nov 11 14:42:55 2020 +0200
auth_sam: use pdb_get_domain_info to look up DNS forest information
When Samba is used as a part of FreeIPA domain controller, Windows
clients for a trusted AD forest may try to authenticate (perform logon
operation) as a REALM\name user account.
Fix auth_sam plugins to accept DNS forest name if we are running on a DC
with PASSDB module providing domain information (e.g. pdb_get_domain_info()
returning non-NULL structure). Right now, only FreeIPA or Samba AD DC
PASSDB backends return this information but Samba AD DC configuration is
explicitly ignored by the two auth_sam (strict and netlogon3) modules.
Detailed logs below:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.281296, 1, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:482(ndr_print_function_debug)
netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
in: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
server_name : *
server_name : '\\master.ipa.test'
computer_name : *
computer_name : 'AD1'
credential : *
credential: struct netr_Authenticator
cred: struct netr_Credential
data : 529f4b087c5f6546
timestamp : Wed Nov 11 09:23:55 AM 2020 UTC
return_authenticator : *
return_authenticator: struct netr_Authenticator
cred: struct netr_Credential
data : 204f28f622010000
timestamp : Fri May 2 06:37:50 AM 1986 UTC
logon_level : NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation (6)
logon : *
logon : union netr_LogonLevel(case 6)
network : *
network: struct netr_NetworkInfo
identity_info: struct netr_IdentityInfo
domain_name: struct lsa_String
length : 0x0010 (16)
size : 0x01fe (510)
string : *
string : 'IPA.TEST'
parameter_control : 0x00002ae0 (10976)
0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED
0: MSV1_0_UPDATE_LOGON_STATISTICS
0: MSV1_0_RETURN_USER_PARAMETERS
0: MSV1_0_DONT_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT
1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PASSWORD_EXPIRY
1: MSV1_0_USE_CLIENT_CHALLENGE
0: MSV1_0_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT_ONLY
1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PROFILE_PATH
0: MSV1_0_TRY_SPECIFIED_DOMAIN_ONLY
1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
0: MSV1_0_DISABLE_PERSONAL_FALLBACK
1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_FORCE_GUEST
0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED
0: MSV1_0_USE_DOMAIN_FOR_ROUTING_ONLY
0: MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2
0: MSV1_0_S4U2SELF
0: MSV1_0_CHECK_LOGONHOURS_FOR_S4U
0: MSV1_0_SUBAUTHENTICATION_DLL_EX
logon_id : 0x0000000000884ef2 (8933106)
account_name: struct lsa_String
length : 0x000e (14)
size : 0x000e (14)
string : *
string : 'idmuser'
workstation: struct lsa_String
length : 0x0000 (0)
size : 0x0000 (0)
string : *
string : ''
challenge : 417207867bd33c74
nt: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
length : 0x00c0 (192)
size : 0x00c0 (192)
data : *
data: ARRAY(192)
[0000] A5 24 62 6E 31 DF 69 66 9E DC 54 D6 63 4C D6 2F .$bn1.if ..T.cL./
[0010] 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01 ........ P7.`....
[0020] 15 1B 38 4F 47 95 4D 62 00 00 00 00 02 00 0E 00 ..8OG.Mb ........
[0030] 57 00 49 00 4E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 01 00 W.I.N.2. 0.1.6...
[0040] 06 00 41 00 44 00 31 00 04 00 18 00 77 00 69 00 ..A.D.1. ....w.i.
[0050] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00 n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
[0060] 73 00 74 00 03 00 20 00 61 00 64 00 31 00 2E 00 s.t... . a.d.1...
[0070] 77 00 69 00 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 w.i.n.2. 0.1.6...
[0080] 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00 05 00 18 00 77 00 69 00 t.e.s.t. ....w.i.
[0090] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00 n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
[00A0] 73 00 74 00 07 00 08 00 50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01 s.t..... P7.`....
[00B0] 06 00 04 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ ........
lm: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
length : 0x0018 (24)
size : 0x0018 (24)
data : *
data : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
validation_level : 0x0006 (6)
flags : *
flags : 0x00000000 (0)
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_TO_FOREST_ROOT
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_CROSS_FOREST_HOP
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_TO_OTHER_DOMAIN
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_NTLM_REQUEST
In such case checks for a workgroup name will not match the DNS forest
name used in the username specification:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283055, 3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:200(auth_check_ntlm_password)
check_ntlm_password: Checking password for unmapped user [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[] with the new password interface
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283073, 3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:203(auth_check_ntlm_password)
check_ntlm_password: mapped user is: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283082, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:213(auth_check_ntlm_password)
check_ntlm_password: auth_context challenge created by fixed
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283091, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:216(auth_check_ntlm_password)
challenge is:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283099, 5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0)] ../../lib/util/util.c:678(dump_data)
[0000] 41 72 07 86 7B D3 3C 74 Ar..{.<t
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283113, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:209(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: Check auth for: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283123, 5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:234(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: IPA.TEST is not our domain name (DC for IPA)
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283131, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:249(auth_check_ntlm_password)
auth_check_ntlm_password: sam_netlogon3 had nothing to say
and overall authentication attempt will fail: auth_winbind will complain
that this domain is not a trusted one and refuse operating on it:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283784, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:742(process_request_send)
process_request_send: process_request: Handling async request smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283796, 3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:110(winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send)
[42677]: pam auth crap domain: [IPA.TEST] user: idmuser
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283810, 3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:409(find_auth_domain)
Authentication for domain [IPA.TEST] refused as it is not a trusted domain
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283825, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:810(process_request_done)
process_request_done: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283844, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:855(process_request_written)
process_request_written: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: delivered response to client
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
source3/auth/auth_sam.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
source3/smbd/share_access.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_sam.c b/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
index 3c12f959faf..e8e0d543f8c 100644
--- a/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "auth.h"
+#include "passdb.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
@@ -142,10 +143,28 @@ static NTSTATUS auth_samstrict_auth(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
break;
case ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC:
case ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC:
- if ( !is_local_name && !is_my_domain ) {
- DEBUG(6,("check_samstrict_security: %s is not one of my local names or domain name (DC)\n",
- effective_domain));
- return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+ if (!is_local_name && !is_my_domain) {
+ /* If we are running on a DC that has PASSDB module with domain
+ * information, check if DNS forest name is matching the domain
+ * name. This is the case of FreeIPA domain controller when
+ * trusted AD DCs attempt to authenticate FreeIPA users using
+ * the forest root domain (which is the only domain in FreeIPA).
+ */
+ struct pdb_domain_info *dom_info = NULL;
+
+ dom_info = pdb_get_domain_info(mem_ctx);
+ if ((dom_info != NULL) && (dom_info->dns_forest != NULL)) {
+ is_my_domain = strequal(user_info->mapped.domain_name,
+ dom_info->dns_forest);
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(dom_info);
+ if (!is_my_domain) {
+ DEBUG(6,("check_samstrict_security: %s is not one "
+ "of my local names or domain name (DC)\n",
+ effective_domain));
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+ }
}
break;
@@ -230,6 +249,24 @@ static NTSTATUS auth_sam_netlogon3_auth(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
}
is_my_domain = strequal(user_info->mapped.domain_name, lp_workgroup());
+ if (!is_my_domain) {
+ /* If we are running on a DC that has PASSDB module with domain
+ * information, check if DNS forest name is matching the domain
+ * name. This is the case of FreeIPA domain controller when
+ * trusted AD DCs attempt to authenticate FreeIPA users using
+ * the forest root domain (which is the only domain in FreeIPA).
+ */
+ struct pdb_domain_info *dom_info = NULL;
+ dom_info = pdb_get_domain_info(mem_ctx);
+
+ if ((dom_info != NULL) && (dom_info->dns_forest != NULL)) {
+ is_my_domain = strequal(user_info->mapped.domain_name,
+ dom_info->dns_forest);
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(dom_info);
+ }
+
if (!is_my_domain) {
DBG_INFO("%s is not our domain name (DC for %s)\n",
effective_domain, lp_workgroup());
diff --git a/source3/smbd/share_access.c b/source3/smbd/share_access.c
index 57754a0f766..694c0c290e8 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/share_access.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/share_access.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static bool token_contains_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
enum lsa_SidType type;
if (username != NULL) {
- size_t domain_len = strlen(domain);
+ size_t domain_len = domain != NULL ? strlen(domain) : 0;
/* Check if username starts with domain name */
if (domain_len > 0) {
--
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