[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch v4-9-stable updated
Karolin Seeger
kseeger at samba.org
Tue Oct 29 09:16:07 UTC 2019
The branch, v4-9-stable has been updated
via 0d69a39c463 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.9.15 release.
via 48aaaa5061c WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.9.15.
via 77b10b360f4 CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Correct behaviour of ranged_results when combined with dirsync
via bdb3e3f669b CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Demonstrate the correct interaction of ranged_results style attributes and dirsync
via ea39bdd6293 CVE-2019-14847 dsdb/modules/dirsync: ensure attrs exist (CID 1107212)
via 70078d4ddf3 CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: send full password to check password script
via e6de467a763 CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable password
via 167f78aa97a CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB2 client code from evil server returned names.
via fc6022b9b19 CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 client code from evil server returned names.
via 08c10ff906a VERSION: Bump version up to 4.9.15...
from 2250bc58aea VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.9.14 release.
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-9-stable
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0d69a39c463ea7da23f3b2d1aecedb2d6bbcfd15
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Thu Oct 24 12:37:23 2019 +0200
VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.9.15 release.
* Bug 14071: CVE-2019-10218: Client code can return filenames containing path
separators.
* Bug 12438: CVE-2019-14833: Samba AD DC check password script does not receive
the full password.
* Bug 14040: CVE-2019-14847: User with "get changes" permission can crash AD DC LDAP
server via dirsync.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
commit 48aaaa5061c134a28b5f439ede34df3a3fee6997
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Thu Oct 24 12:36:15 2019 +0200
WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.9.15.
* Bug 14071: CVE-2019-10218: Client code can return filenames containing path
separators.
* Bug 12438: CVE-2019-14833: Samba AD DC check password script does not receive
the full password.
* Bug 14040: CVE-2019-14847: User with "get changes" permission can crash AD DC LDAP
server via dirsync.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
commit 77b10b360f4ffb7ac90bc5fce0a80306515c1aca
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Oct 15 15:44:34 2019 +1300
CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Correct behaviour of ranged_results when combined with dirsync
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14040
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit bdb3e3f669bd991da819040e726e003e4e2b841d
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Oct 15 16:28:46 2019 +1300
CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Demonstrate the correct interaction of ranged_results style attributes and dirsync
Incremental results are provided by a flag on the dirsync control, not
by changing the attribute name.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14040
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit ea39bdd6293041af668f1bfdfea39a725733bad3
Author: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall at catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Fri May 3 17:27:51 2019 +1200
CVE-2019-14847 dsdb/modules/dirsync: ensure attrs exist (CID 1107212)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14040
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall at catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary at catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 23f72c4d712f8d1fec3d67a66d477709d5b0abe2)
commit 70078d4ddf3b842eeadee058dadeef82ec4edf0b
Author: Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
Date: Tue Aug 6 16:32:32 2019 +0200
CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: send full password to check password script
utf8_len represents the number of characters (not bytes) of the
password. If the password includes multi-byte characters it is required
to write the total number of bytes to the check password script.
Otherwise the last bytes of the password string would be ignored.
Therefore we rename utf8_len to be clear what it does and does
not represent.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit e6de467a763b93152eef27726957a32879268fb7
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Thu Sep 19 11:50:01 2019 +1200
CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable password
This shows that the "check password script" handling has a bug.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 167f78aa97af6502cb2027dc9dad40399b0a9c4f
Author: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Date: Tue Aug 6 12:08:09 2019 -0700
CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB2 client code from evil server returned names.
Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
commit fc6022b9b19473076c4236fdf4ac474f44ca73e2
Author: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Date: Mon Aug 5 13:39:53 2019 -0700
CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 client code from evil server returned names.
Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
commit 08c10ff906a44462c69493de3b998d6ed2c1b768
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Tue Oct 22 10:54:09 2019 +0200
VERSION: Bump version up to 4.9.15...
and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOT.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5942df0864495dbaea68d2f45b5a6d343f0556ba)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
VERSION | 2 +-
WHATSNEW.txt | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
selftest/target/Samba4.pm | 2 +-
source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c | 7 +++
source3/libsmb/clilist.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
source3/libsmb/proto.h | 3 +
source4/dsdb/common/util.c | 33 +++++++++--
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c | 15 +++--
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c | 25 +++++++-
source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py | 26 +++++++++
10 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 8f1bacd9ced..0a215dada54 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
########################################################
SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=9
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=14
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=15
########################################################
# If a official release has a serious bug #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index cf34f50129f..377a1aa7c1e 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,77 @@
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.9.15
+ October 29, 2019
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o CVE-2019-10218: Client code can return filenames containing path separators.
+o CVE-2019-14833: Samba AD DC check password script does not receive the full
+ password.
+o CVE-2019-14847: User with "get changes" permission can crash AD DC LDAP server
+ via dirsync.
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2019-10218:
+ Malicious servers can cause Samba client code to return filenames containing
+ path separators to calling code.
+
+o CVE-2019-14833:
+ When the password contains multi-byte (non-ASCII) characters, the check
+ password script does not receive the full password string.
+
+o CVE-2019-14847:
+ Users with the "get changes" extended access right can crash the AD DC LDAP
+ server by requesting an attribute using the range= syntax.
+
+For more details and workarounds, please refer to the security advisories.
+
+
+Changes since 4.9.14:
+---------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+ * BUG 14071: CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 and SMB2 client code
+ from evil server returned names.
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+ * BUG 12438: CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable
+ password.
+ * BUG 14040: CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Correct behaviour of ranged_results when
+ combined with dirsync.
+
+o Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
+ * BUG 12438: CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: Send full password to check password
+ script.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
==============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.9.14
October 22, 2019
@@ -77,8 +151,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
==============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.9.13
diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
index b565d466477..d7c22ce4e23 100755
--- a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
+++ b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
@@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ sub provision_chgdcpass($$)
my $extra_provision_options = undef;
# This environment disallows the use of this password
# (and also removes the default AD complexity checks)
- my $unacceptable_password = "widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
+ my $unacceptable_password = "Paßßword-widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
push (@{$extra_provision_options}, "--dns-backend=BIND9_DLZ");
my $ret = $self->provision($prefix,
"domain controller",
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
index 1cfa50ffbac..3cdf68dc24b 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
@@ -1017,6 +1017,13 @@ NTSTATUS cli_smb2_list(struct cli_state *cli,
goto fail;
}
+ /* Protect against server attack. */
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(cli->conn, status);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (dir_check_ftype((uint32_t)finfo->mode,
(uint32_t)attribute)) {
/*
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clilist.c b/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
index 5cb1fce4338..4f518339e2b 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
@@ -24,6 +24,66 @@
#include "trans2.h"
#include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if a returned directory name is safe.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS is_bad_name(bool windows_names, const char *name)
+{
+ const char *bad_name_p = NULL;
+
+ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '/');
+ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Windows and POSIX names can't have '/'.
+ * Server is attacking us.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+ }
+ if (windows_names) {
+ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '\\');
+ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Windows names can't have '\\'.
+ * Server is attacking us.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+ }
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if a returned directory name is safe. Disconnect if server is
+ sending bad names.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
+ const struct file_info *finfo)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ bool windows_names = true;
+
+ if (cli->requested_posix_capabilities & CIFS_UNIX_POSIX_PATHNAMES_CAP) {
+ windows_names = false;
+ }
+ if (finfo->name != NULL) {
+ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->name\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ if (finfo->short_name != NULL) {
+ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->short_name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->short_name\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
/****************************************************************************
Calculate a safe next_entry_offset.
****************************************************************************/
@@ -492,6 +552,13 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_list_old_recv(struct tevent_req *req, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
+ TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
+ return status;
+ }
}
*pfinfo = finfo;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -727,6 +794,14 @@ static void cli_list_trans_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
ff_eos = true;
break;
}
+
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!state->first && (state->mask[0] != '\0') &&
strcsequal(finfo->name, state->mask)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Error: Looping in FIND_NEXT as name %s has "
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index 2bd61b1d2c2..e708e911b97 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -722,6 +722,9 @@ NTSTATUS cli_posix_whoami(struct cli_state *cli,
/* The following definitions come from libsmb/clilist.c */
+NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
+ const struct file_info *finfo);
+
NTSTATUS cli_list_old(struct cli_state *cli,const char *Mask,uint16_t attribute,
NTSTATUS (*fn)(const char *, struct file_info *,
const char *, void *), void *state);
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/common/util.c b/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
index 18f700370a3..c7893bff43b 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
@@ -2088,21 +2088,36 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const uint32_t pwdProperties,
const uint32_t minPwdLength)
{
- const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
- size_t utf8_len = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
char *password_script = NULL;
+ const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
+
+ /*
+ * This looks strange because it is.
+ *
+ * The check for the number of characters in the password
+ * should clearly not be against the byte length, or else a
+ * single UTF8 character would count for more than one.
+ *
+ * We have chosen to use the number of 16-bit units that the
+ * password encodes to as the measure of length. This is not
+ * the same as the number of codepoints, if a password
+ * contains a character beyond the Basic Multilingual Plane
+ * (above 65535) it will count for more than one "character".
+ */
+
+ size_t password_characters_roughly = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
/* checks if the "minPwdLength" property is satisfied */
- if (minPwdLength > utf8_len) {
+ if (minPwdLength > password_characters_roughly) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT;
}
- /* checks the password complexity */
+ /* We might not be asked to check the password complexity */
if (!(pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_COMPLEX)) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
- if (utf8_len == 0) {
+ if (password_characters_roughly == 0) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_COMPLEX_ENOUGH;
}
@@ -2110,6 +2125,7 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if (password_script != NULL && *password_script != '\0') {
int check_ret = 0;
int error = 0;
+ ssize_t nwritten = 0;
struct tevent_context *event_ctx = NULL;
struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
struct samba_runcmd_state *run_cmd = NULL;
@@ -2134,7 +2150,12 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
tevent_timeval_current_ofs(10, 0),
100, 100, cmd, NULL);
run_cmd = tevent_req_data(req, struct samba_runcmd_state);
- if (write(run_cmd->fd_stdin, utf8_pw, utf8_len) != utf8_len) {
+ nwritten = write(run_cmd->fd_stdin,
+ utf8_blob->data,
+ utf8_blob->length);
+ if (nwritten != utf8_blob->length) {
+ close(run_cmd->fd_stdin);
+ run_cmd->fd_stdin = -1;
TALLOC_FREE(password_script);
TALLOC_FREE(event_ctx);
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_PASSWORD_FILTER_ERROR;
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c
index b5510eccd24..4ac5faad403 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c
@@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ skip:
attr = dsdb_attribute_by_lDAPDisplayName(dsc->schema,
el->name);
+ if (attr == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
keep = false;
if (attr->linkID & 1) {
@@ -994,7 +998,7 @@ static int dirsync_ldb_search(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req
}
/*
- * check if there's an extended dn control
+ * check if there's a dirsync control
*/
control = ldb_request_get_control(req, LDB_CONTROL_DIRSYNC_OID);
if (control == NULL) {
@@ -1323,11 +1327,12 @@ static int dirsync_ldb_search(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req
}
/*
- * Remove our control from the list of controls
+ * Mark dirsync control as uncritical (done)
+ *
+ * We need this so ranged_results knows how to behave with
+ * dirsync
*/
- if (!ldb_save_controls(control, req, NULL)) {
- return ldb_operr(ldb);
- }
+ control->critical = false;
dsc->schema = dsdb_get_schema(ldb, dsc);
/*
* At the begining we make the hypothesis that we will return a complete
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c
index 13bf3a2d0a9..98438799997 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
struct rr_context {
struct ldb_module *module;
struct ldb_request *req;
+ bool dirsync_in_use;
};
static struct rr_context *rr_init_context(struct ldb_module *module,
struct ldb_request *req)
{
- struct rr_context *ac;
-
- ac = talloc_zero(req, struct rr_context);
+ struct ldb_control *dirsync_control = NULL;
+ struct rr_context *ac = talloc_zero(req, struct rr_context);
if (ac == NULL) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module), "Out of Memory");
return NULL;
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ static struct rr_context *rr_init_context(struct ldb_module *module,
ac->module = module;
ac->req = req;
+ /*
+ * check if there's a dirsync control (as there is an
+ * interaction between these modules)
+ */
+ dirsync_control = ldb_request_get_control(req,
+ LDB_CONTROL_DIRSYNC_OID);
+ if (dirsync_control != NULL) {
+ ac->dirsync_in_use = true;
+ }
+
return ac;
}
@@ -82,6 +92,15 @@ static int rr_search_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
ares->response, ares->error);
}
+ if (ac->dirsync_in_use) {
+ /*
+ * We return full attribute values when mixed with
+ * dirsync
+ */
+ return ldb_module_send_entry(ac->req,
+ ares->message,
+ ares->controls);
+ }
/* LDB_REPLY_ENTRY */
temp_ctx = talloc_new(ac->req);
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py
index 136f4d3bba6..b6f7022a50b 100755
--- a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py
+++ b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from samba.tests.subunitrun import TestProgram, SubunitOptions
import samba.getopt as options
import base64
+import ldb
from ldb import LdbError, SCOPE_BASE
from ldb import Message, MessageElement, Dn
from ldb import FLAG_MOD_ADD, FLAG_MOD_DELETE
@@ -590,6 +591,31 @@ class SimpleDirsyncTests(DirsyncBaseTests):
class ExtendedDirsyncTests(SimpleDirsyncTests):
+ def test_dirsync_linkedattributes_range(self):
+ self.ldb_simple = self.get_ldb_connection(self.simple_user, self.user_pass)
+ res = self.ldb_admin.search(self.base_dn,
+ attrs=["member;range=1-1"],
+ expression="(name=Administrators)",
+ controls=["dirsync:1:0:0"])
+
+ self.assertTrue(len(res) > 0)
+ self.assertTrue(res[0].get("member;range=1-1") is None)
+ self.assertTrue(res[0].get("member") is not None)
+ self.assertTrue(len(res[0].get("member")) > 0)
+
+ def test_dirsync_linkedattributes_range_user(self):
+ self.ldb_simple = self.get_ldb_connection(self.simple_user, self.user_pass)
+ try:
+ res = self.ldb_simple.search(self.base_dn,
+ attrs=["member;range=1-1"],
+ expression="(name=Administrators)",
+ controls=["dirsync:1:0:0"])
+ except LdbError as e:
+ (num, _) = e.args
+ self.assertEquals(num, ldb.ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS)
+ else:
+ self.fail()
+
def test_dirsync_linkedattributes(self):
flag_incr_linked = 2147483648
self.ldb_simple = self.get_ldb_connection(self.simple_user, self.user_pass)
--
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