[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch v4-11-stable updated
Karolin Seeger
kseeger at samba.org
Tue Oct 29 09:14:09 UTC 2019
The branch, v4-11-stable has been updated
via df2b97d12e6 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.11.2 release.
via 3815f9bfda8 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.11.2.
via e33b8c56510 CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Correct behaviour of ranged_results when combined with dirsync
via 4087d16945f CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Demonstrate the correct interaction of ranged_results style attributes and dirsync
via b3a71bf847e CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: send full password to check password script
via e0e8830b88e CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable password
via 914c985e66a CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB2 client code from evil server returned names.
via 07df3dfa6bf CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 client code from evil server returned names.
via 193d6f5e8cc VERSION: Bump version up to 4.11.2...
from be4cb417135 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for Samba 4.11.1.
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-11-stable
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit df2b97d12e6d5d36dc152896a21ba44bc7531654
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Thu Oct 24 10:52:52 2019 +0200
VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.11.2 release.
* Bug 14071: CVE-2019-10218: Client code can return filenames containing path
separators.
* Bug 12438: CVE-2019-14833: Samba AD DC check password script does not receive
the full password.
* Bug 14040: CVE-2019-14847: User with "get changes" permission can crash AD DC LDAP
server via dirsync.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
commit 3815f9bfda8137f33b5f24e81cc61d1027a01748
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Thu Oct 24 10:42:16 2019 +0200
WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.11.2.
* Bug 14071: CVE-2019-10218: Client code can return filenames containing path
separators.
* Bug 12438: CVE-2019-14833: Samba AD DC check password script does not receive
the full password.
* Bug 14040: CVE-2019-14847: User with "get changes" permission can crash AD DC
LDAP server via dirsync.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
commit e33b8c5651032b82ffa3631b37ddb93f2bfe3b8d
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Oct 15 15:44:34 2019 +1300
CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Correct behaviour of ranged_results when combined with dirsync
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14040
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 4087d16945f97479b46a2d5fbfc883f813959fd9
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Oct 15 16:28:46 2019 +1300
CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Demonstrate the correct interaction of ranged_results style attributes and dirsync
Incremental results are provided by a flag on the dirsync control, not
by changing the attribute name.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14040
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit b3a71bf847e3797582a2c657720726694fe424ba
Author: Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
Date: Tue Aug 6 16:32:32 2019 +0200
CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: send full password to check password script
utf8_len represents the number of characters (not bytes) of the
password. If the password includes multi-byte characters it is required
to write the total number of bytes to the check password script.
Otherwise the last bytes of the password string would be ignored.
Therefore we rename utf8_len to be clear what it does and does
not represent.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit e0e8830b88e45e3e954b1e5074cef8c8bf5406a8
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Thu Sep 19 11:50:01 2019 +1200
CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable password
This shows that the "check password script" handling has a bug.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12438
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
commit 914c985e66adc63d54b3e17dab324f376f84e349
Author: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Date: Tue Aug 6 12:08:09 2019 -0700
CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB2 client code from evil server returned names.
Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
commit 07df3dfa6bf081c3f2ad7777995325d834ad3129
Author: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Date: Mon Aug 5 13:39:53 2019 -0700
CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 client code from evil server returned names.
Disconnect with NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if so.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14071
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
commit 193d6f5e8cc074370bafa282218e1991506a9edc
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Fri Oct 18 11:03:16 2019 +0200
VERSION: Bump version up to 4.11.2...
and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOT.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b8309398beab679cd4068da497661ce33616edc)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
VERSION | 2 +-
WHATSNEW.txt | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
selftest/target/Samba4.pm | 2 +-
source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c | 7 +++
source3/libsmb/clilist.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
source3/libsmb/proto.h | 3 +
source4/dsdb/common/util.c | 30 ++++++++--
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c | 11 ++--
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c | 25 +++++++-
source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py | 26 +++++++++
10 files changed, 241 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 61c76acaef7..e4636c3dc96 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
########################################################
SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=11
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=1
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=2
########################################################
# If a official release has a serious bug #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 2e61702b71b..8c6db3b3034 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,77 @@
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.11.2
+ October 29, 2019
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o CVE-2019-10218: Client code can return filenames containing path separators.
+o CVE-2019-14833: Samba AD DC check password script does not receive the full
+ password.
+o CVE-2019-14847: User with "get changes" permission can crash AD DC LDAP server
+ via dirsync.
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2019-10218:
+ Malicious servers can cause Samba client code to return filenames containing
+ path separators to calling code.
+
+o CVE-2019-14833:
+ When the password contains multi-byte (non-ASCII) characters, the check
+ password script does not receive the full password string.
+
+o CVE-2019-14847:
+ Users with the "get changes" extended access right can crash the AD DC LDAP
+ server by requesting an attribute using the range= syntax.
+
+For more details and workarounds, please refer to the security advisories.
+
+
+Changes since 4.11.1:
+---------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+ * BUG 14071: CVE-2019-10218 - s3: libsmb: Protect SMB1 and SMB2 client code
+ from evil server returned names.
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+ * BUG 12438: CVE-2019-14833: Use utf8 characters in the unacceptable
+ password.
+ * BUG 14040: CVE-2019-14847 dsdb: Correct behaviour of ranged_results when
+ combined with dirsync.
+
+o Björn Baumbach <bb at sernet.de>
+ * BUG 12438: CVE-2019-14833 dsdb: Send full password to check password
+ script.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
==============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.11.1
October 18, 2019
@@ -81,8 +155,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
==============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.11.0
diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
index 02cdfc18bad..195e9b88044 100755
--- a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
+++ b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
@@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ sub provision_chgdcpass($$)
print "PROVISIONING CHGDCPASS...\n";
# This environment disallows the use of this password
# (and also removes the default AD complexity checks)
- my $unacceptable_password = "widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
+ my $unacceptable_password = "Paßßword-widk3Dsle32jxdBdskldsk55klASKQ";
my $extra_smb_conf = "
check password script = $self->{srcdir}/selftest/checkpassword_arg1.sh ${unacceptable_password}
allow dcerpc auth level connect:lsarpc = yes
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
index 535beaab841..3fa322c243b 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cli_smb2_fnum.c
@@ -1442,6 +1442,13 @@ NTSTATUS cli_smb2_list(struct cli_state *cli,
goto fail;
}
+ /* Protect against server attack. */
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(cli->conn, status);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (dir_check_ftype((uint32_t)finfo->mode,
(uint32_t)attribute)) {
/*
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clilist.c b/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
index 5cb1fce4338..4f518339e2b 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clilist.c
@@ -24,6 +24,66 @@
#include "trans2.h"
#include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if a returned directory name is safe.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static NTSTATUS is_bad_name(bool windows_names, const char *name)
+{
+ const char *bad_name_p = NULL;
+
+ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '/');
+ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Windows and POSIX names can't have '/'.
+ * Server is attacking us.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+ }
+ if (windows_names) {
+ bad_name_p = strchr(name, '\\');
+ if (bad_name_p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Windows names can't have '\\'.
+ * Server is attacking us.
+ */
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
+ }
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Check if a returned directory name is safe. Disconnect if server is
+ sending bad names.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
+ const struct file_info *finfo)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ bool windows_names = true;
+
+ if (cli->requested_posix_capabilities & CIFS_UNIX_POSIX_PATHNAMES_CAP) {
+ windows_names = false;
+ }
+ if (finfo->name != NULL) {
+ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->name\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ if (finfo->short_name != NULL) {
+ status = is_bad_name(windows_names, finfo->short_name);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DBG_ERR("bad finfo->short_name\n");
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
/****************************************************************************
Calculate a safe next_entry_offset.
****************************************************************************/
@@ -492,6 +552,13 @@ static NTSTATUS cli_list_old_recv(struct tevent_req *req, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
+
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
+ TALLOC_FREE(finfo);
+ return status;
+ }
}
*pfinfo = finfo;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -727,6 +794,14 @@ static void cli_list_trans_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
ff_eos = true;
break;
}
+
+ status = is_bad_finfo_name(state->cli, finfo);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ smbXcli_conn_disconnect(state->cli->conn, status);
+ tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!state->first && (state->mask[0] != '\0') &&
strcsequal(finfo->name, state->mask)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Error: Looping in FIND_NEXT as name %s has "
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index 6a647da58c8..48855d7112c 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -760,6 +760,9 @@ NTSTATUS cli_posix_whoami(struct cli_state *cli,
/* The following definitions come from libsmb/clilist.c */
+NTSTATUS is_bad_finfo_name(const struct cli_state *cli,
+ const struct file_info *finfo);
+
NTSTATUS cli_list_old(struct cli_state *cli,const char *Mask,uint16_t attribute,
NTSTATUS (*fn)(const char *, struct file_info *,
const char *, void *), void *state);
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/common/util.c b/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
index e521ed09999..3ebec827404 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/common/util.c
@@ -2036,21 +2036,36 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const uint32_t pwdProperties,
const uint32_t minPwdLength)
{
- const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
- size_t utf8_len = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
char *password_script = NULL;
+ const char *utf8_pw = (const char *)utf8_blob->data;
+
+ /*
+ * This looks strange because it is.
+ *
+ * The check for the number of characters in the password
+ * should clearly not be against the byte length, or else a
+ * single UTF8 character would count for more than one.
+ *
+ * We have chosen to use the number of 16-bit units that the
+ * password encodes to as the measure of length. This is not
+ * the same as the number of codepoints, if a password
+ * contains a character beyond the Basic Multilingual Plane
+ * (above 65535) it will count for more than one "character".
+ */
+
+ size_t password_characters_roughly = strlen_m(utf8_pw);
/* checks if the "minPwdLength" property is satisfied */
- if (minPwdLength > utf8_len) {
+ if (minPwdLength > password_characters_roughly) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT;
}
- /* checks the password complexity */
+ /* We might not be asked to check the password complexity */
if (!(pwdProperties & DOMAIN_PASSWORD_COMPLEX)) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
- if (utf8_len == 0) {
+ if (password_characters_roughly == 0) {
return SAMR_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_COMPLEX_ENOUGH;
}
@@ -2058,6 +2073,7 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if (password_script != NULL && *password_script != '\0') {
int check_ret = 0;
int error = 0;
+ ssize_t nwritten = 0;
struct tevent_context *event_ctx = NULL;
struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
int cps_stdin = -1;
@@ -2120,7 +2136,9 @@ enum samr_ValidationStatus samdb_check_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
cps_stdin = samba_runcmd_export_stdin(req);
- if (write(cps_stdin, utf8_pw, utf8_len) != utf8_len) {
+ nwritten = write(cps_stdin, utf8_blob->data,
+ utf8_blob->length);
+ if (nwritten != utf8_blob->length) {
close(cps_stdin);
cps_stdin = -1;
TALLOC_FREE(password_script);
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c
index 00f24bd6d59..96cec7774cf 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/dirsync.c
@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ static int dirsync_ldb_search(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req
}
/*
- * check if there's an extended dn control
+ * check if there's a dirsync control
*/
control = ldb_request_get_control(req, LDB_CONTROL_DIRSYNC_OID);
if (control == NULL) {
@@ -1343,11 +1343,12 @@ static int dirsync_ldb_search(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req
}
/*
- * Remove our control from the list of controls
+ * Mark dirsync control as uncritical (done)
+ *
+ * We need this so ranged_results knows how to behave with
+ * dirsync
*/
- if (!ldb_save_controls(control, req, NULL)) {
- return ldb_operr(ldb);
- }
+ control->critical = false;
dsc->schema = dsdb_get_schema(ldb, dsc);
/*
* At the begining we make the hypothesis that we will return a complete
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c
index 13bf3a2d0a9..98438799997 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/ranged_results.c
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
struct rr_context {
struct ldb_module *module;
struct ldb_request *req;
+ bool dirsync_in_use;
};
static struct rr_context *rr_init_context(struct ldb_module *module,
struct ldb_request *req)
{
- struct rr_context *ac;
-
- ac = talloc_zero(req, struct rr_context);
+ struct ldb_control *dirsync_control = NULL;
+ struct rr_context *ac = talloc_zero(req, struct rr_context);
if (ac == NULL) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb_module_get_ctx(module), "Out of Memory");
return NULL;
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ static struct rr_context *rr_init_context(struct ldb_module *module,
ac->module = module;
ac->req = req;
+ /*
+ * check if there's a dirsync control (as there is an
+ * interaction between these modules)
+ */
+ dirsync_control = ldb_request_get_control(req,
+ LDB_CONTROL_DIRSYNC_OID);
+ if (dirsync_control != NULL) {
+ ac->dirsync_in_use = true;
+ }
+
return ac;
}
@@ -82,6 +92,15 @@ static int rr_search_callback(struct ldb_request *req, struct ldb_reply *ares)
ares->response, ares->error);
}
+ if (ac->dirsync_in_use) {
+ /*
+ * We return full attribute values when mixed with
+ * dirsync
+ */
+ return ldb_module_send_entry(ac->req,
+ ares->message,
+ ares->controls);
+ }
/* LDB_REPLY_ENTRY */
temp_ctx = talloc_new(ac->req);
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py
index 8b46357c670..78117bc364b 100755
--- a/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py
+++ b/source4/dsdb/tests/python/dirsync.py
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from samba.tests.subunitrun import TestProgram, SubunitOptions
import samba.getopt as options
import base64
+import ldb
from ldb import LdbError, SCOPE_BASE
from ldb import Message, MessageElement, Dn
from ldb import FLAG_MOD_ADD, FLAG_MOD_DELETE
@@ -588,6 +589,31 @@ class SimpleDirsyncTests(DirsyncBaseTests):
class ExtendedDirsyncTests(SimpleDirsyncTests):
+ def test_dirsync_linkedattributes_range(self):
+ self.ldb_simple = self.get_ldb_connection(self.simple_user, self.user_pass)
+ res = self.ldb_admin.search(self.base_dn,
+ attrs=["member;range=1-1"],
+ expression="(name=Administrators)",
+ controls=["dirsync:1:0:0"])
+
+ self.assertTrue(len(res) > 0)
+ self.assertTrue(res[0].get("member;range=1-1") is None)
+ self.assertTrue(res[0].get("member") is not None)
+ self.assertTrue(len(res[0].get("member")) > 0)
+
+ def test_dirsync_linkedattributes_range_user(self):
+ self.ldb_simple = self.get_ldb_connection(self.simple_user, self.user_pass)
+ try:
+ res = self.ldb_simple.search(self.base_dn,
+ attrs=["member;range=1-1"],
+ expression="(name=Administrators)",
+ controls=["dirsync:1:0:0"])
+ except LdbError as e:
+ (num, _) = e.args
+ self.assertEquals(num, ldb.ERR_INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS_RIGHTS)
+ else:
+ self.fail()
+
def test_dirsync_linkedattributes(self):
flag_incr_linked = 2147483648
self.ldb_simple = self.get_ldb_connection(self.simple_user, self.user_pass)
--
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