[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch v4-5-test updated

Karolin Seeger kseeger at samba.org
Wed Sep 20 11:04:46 UTC 2017


The branch, v4-5-test has been updated
       via  aba4994 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.15...
       via  f84484a Merge tag 'samba-4.5.14' into v4-5-test
       via  f261c9a VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOTS for the 4.5.14 release.
       via  bb90fee WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.5.14.
       via  b5178cb selftest: make samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*follow.symlinks.*no as flapping
       via  a43b36f CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from writing server memory to file.
       via  157f2a7 CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of cli_state_is_encryption_on()
       via  282a1d1 CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function
       via  609e6b0 CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if authentication was not requested
       via  f30ea84 CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
       via  dc24ef0 CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials: cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
       via  5d296e6 CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED in gpo_connect_server()
       via  f82c235 CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
       via  f14a94b CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
      from  5c645ed VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.14...

https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-5-test


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit aba4994bd071bdef8c623632ee248cb99d68ed05
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date:   Wed Sep 20 13:03:53 2017 +0200

    VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.15...
    
    and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOTS.
    
    Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>

commit f84484ac9dc52062cefd0ab055670985d394588d
Merge: 5c645ed f261c9a
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date:   Wed Sep 20 13:03:09 2017 +0200

    Merge tag 'samba-4.5.14' into v4-5-test
    
    samba: tag release samba-4.5.14

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 VERSION                         |  2 +-
 WHATSNEW.txt                    | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 auth/credentials/credentials.c  | 16 +++++++++
 libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c       |  5 +++
 libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h       |  1 +
 libgpo/gpo_fetch.c              |  2 +-
 selftest/flapping               |  1 +
 source3/lib/util_cmdline.c      |  3 ++
 source3/libsmb/clidfs.c         |  6 ++--
 source3/libsmb/clientgen.c      | 13 +++++++
 source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c |  2 +-
 source3/libsmb/proto.h          |  1 +
 source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c       |  2 +-
 source3/smbd/reply.c            | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 14 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)


Changeset truncated at 500 lines:

diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 199992e..e5753d2 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 ########################################################
 SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
 SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=5
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=14
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=15
 
 ########################################################
 # If a official release has a serious bug              #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index f3fccf7..ea845c3 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,78 @@
                    ==============================
+                   Release Notes for Samba 4.5.14
+                         September 20, 2017
+                   ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o  CVE-2017-12150 (SMB1/2/3 connections may not require signing where they
+   should)
+o  CVE-2017-12151 (SMB3 connections don't keep encryption across DFS redirects)
+o  CVE-2017-12163 (Server memory information leak over SMB1)
+
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o  CVE-2017-12150:
+   A man in the middle attack may hijack client connections.
+
+o  CVE-2017-12151:
+   A man in the middle attack can read and may alter confidential
+   documents transferred via a client connection, which are reached
+   via DFS redirect when the original connection used SMB3.
+
+o  CVE-2017-12163:
+   Client with write access to a share can cause server memory contents to be
+   written into a file or printer.
+
+For more details and workarounds, please see the security advisories:
+
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12150.html
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12151.html
+   o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12163.html
+
+
+Changes since 4.5.13:
+---------------------
+
+o  Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+   * BUG 13020: CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+     writing server memory to file.
+
+o  Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+   * BUG 12996: CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs
+     redirects.
+   * BUG 12997: CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing
+     when they should.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored.  All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+                   ==============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.5.13
                            August 31, 2017
                    ==============================
@@ -61,8 +135,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
 ======================================================================
 
 
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 
                    ==============================
                    Release Notes for Samba 4.5.12
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
index bfa397c..194b5c2 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
 #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
 #include "tevent.h"
 #include "param/param.h"
@@ -347,6 +348,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre
 
 _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred) 
 {
+	uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
+
 	if (cred->bind_dn) {
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -374,6 +377,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
 		return true;
 	}
 
+	gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
 	return false;
 }
 
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
index 43294be..9d801c9 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
 	return false;
 }
 
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+	return conn->mandatory_signing;
+}
+
 void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
 {
 	set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
index 55d3f78..f320500 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 
 enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
 
 void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
 const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644
--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
 			ads->auth.password,
 			CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
 			CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
-			Undefined);
+			SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
 		DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
 				"failed to connect: %s\n",
diff --git a/selftest/flapping b/selftest/flapping
index 50fdf1e..8ea36e9 100644
--- a/selftest/flapping
+++ b/selftest/flapping
@@ -34,3 +34,4 @@
 ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_tar.* # fails very, very often on sn-devel
 ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.sending a message to the remote server # flakey on sn-devel-104 and sn-devel-144
 ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.creating a good symlink and deleting it by path # flakey on sn-devel-104 and sn-devel-144
+^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*follow.symlinks.*no # fails sometimes on sn-devel
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
index 80c3ecd..539fa55 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
 
 int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
 {
+	if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
+		return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+	}
 	return auth_info->signing_state;
 }
 
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
index 16b21bd..d9c9e27 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
 		/* If a password was not supplied then
 		 * try again with a null username. */
 		if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
+			force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
 			get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
+			get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) ||
 			!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup(c, "",
 				    		"", 0,
 						"", 0,
@@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
 			     "IPC$",
 			     dfs_auth_info,
 			     false,
-			     smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+			     cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
 			     smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
 			     0,
 			     0x20,
@@ -1010,7 +1012,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
 				dfs_refs[count].share,
 				dfs_auth_info,
 				false,
-				smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+				cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
 				smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
 				0,
 				0x20,
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
index 2b53a93..e675f95 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
@@ -334,6 +334,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
 	return cli->smb1.pid;
 }
 
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+	if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+		return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
+	}
+
+	if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
+}
+
 bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
 {
 	uint32_t tid;
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
index a956058..74adade 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
 
                 for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
                         num_servers++;
-                        if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
+                        if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
                                 return (void *)false;
                         }
                 }
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index 340cd22..f276b74 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid);
 uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
 bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint32_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
 uint32_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t tid);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
index 0c5d7e9..97aa39e 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args,
 		cli_credentials_get_username(cli_creds),
 		cli_credentials_get_domain(cli_creds),
 		cli_credentials_get_password(cli_creds),
-		0, 0);
+		0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
 	if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
 		return -1;
 	}
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 82dcbba..a40ff81 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -4489,6 +4489,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
 	}
 
 	/* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
+	/*
+	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
 	if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 		error_to_writebrawerr(req);
@@ -4589,6 +4592,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
 			exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
 		}
 
+		/*
+		 * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
+		 * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
+		 * bytes available - we just read from the client.
+		 */
 		nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
 		if (nwritten == -1) {
 			TALLOC_FREE(buf);
@@ -4670,6 +4678,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
 	size_t numtowrite;
+	size_t remaining;
 	off_t startpos;
 	const char *data;
 	NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -4702,6 +4711,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -4783,6 +4803,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
 {
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
 	size_t numtowrite;
+	size_t remaining;
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
 	off_t startpos;
 	const char *data;
@@ -4823,6 +4844,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
 	startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!fsp->print_file) {
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
 			(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -5049,6 +5081,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
 			goto out;
 		}
 	} else {
+		/*
+		 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+		 */
 		if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite ||
 				smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) {
 			reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
@@ -5477,6 +5512,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
 {
 	connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
 	size_t numtowrite;
+	size_t remaining;
 	ssize_t nwritten = -1;
 	NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
 	off_t startpos;
@@ -5510,6 +5546,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
 	mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4));
 	data = (const char *)req->buf + 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+	 * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
+	remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+	if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (fsp->print_file == NULL) {
 		init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
 		    (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -6105,6 +6152,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
 
 	numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1);
 
+	/*
+	 * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+	 */
 	if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) {
 		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
 		END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);


-- 
Samba Shared Repository



More information about the samba-cvs mailing list