[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch v4-0-stable updated
Karolin Seeger
kseeger at samba.org
Tue Mar 11 11:57:25 MDT 2014
The branch, v4-0-stable has been updated
via bc0f537 VERSION: Disable git snapshots for the 4.0.16 release.
via 2cd17b5 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.0.16.
via 109d63a CVE-2013-6442: s3:smbcacls - ensure we don't lose an existing ACL when setting owner or group owner.
via f580c8c CVE-2013-4496:Revert remainder of ce895609b04380bfc41e4f8fddc84bd2f9324340
via 8fee6bd CVE-2013-4496:samr: Remove ChangePasswordUser
via 139b90d CVE-2013-4496:s3:auth: fix memory leak in the ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT case.
via a597c31 CVE-2013-4496:s3-samr: Block attempts to crack passwords via repeated password changes
via adfa17e VERSION: Bump version number up to 4.0.16...
from e005eb7 VERSION: Disable git snapshots for the 4.0.15 release.
http://gitweb.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-0-stable
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit bc0f537280d7b34c717629312015170344289e5c
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Tue Mar 11 12:00:52 2014 +0100
VERSION: Disable git snapshots for the 4.0.16 release.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
CVE-2013-4496: Enforce password lockout for SAMR password
changes.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10327
CVE-2013-6442: ensure we don't lose an existing ACL when
setting owner or group owner.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
commit 2cd17b566c55eb88eb2081f78300a9493469bfcb
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Tue Mar 11 11:42:21 2014 +0100
WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.0.16.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
CVE-2013-4496: Password lockout not enforced for SAMR password
changes.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10327
CVE-2013-6442: smbcacls --chown | --chgrp dacl regression
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
commit 109d63a4f2f81c06948b8c0db15ff3f35276d24e
Author: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Date: Wed Dec 18 13:56:18 2013 -0800
CVE-2013-6442: s3:smbcacls - ensure we don't lose an existing ACL when setting owner or group owner.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10327
Bug 10327 - CVE-2013-6442: smbcacls --chown | --chgrp dacl regression
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit f580c8c3a6eb5a296a91633dc6ce3e0e84f7a877
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Thu Nov 28 06:50:01 2013 +1300
CVE-2013-4496:Revert remainder of ce895609b04380bfc41e4f8fddc84bd2f9324340
Part of this was removed when ChangePasswordUser was unimplemented,
but remove the remainder of this flawed commit. Fully check the
password first, as extract_pw_from_buffer() already does a partial
check of the password because it needs a correct old password to
correctly decrypt the length.
Andrew Bartlett
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit 8fee6bd909714a487841001bcc82bf8f8665ca06
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 5 16:16:46 2013 +1300
CVE-2013-4496:samr: Remove ChangePasswordUser
This old password change mechanism does not provide the plaintext to
validate against password complexity, and it is not used by modern
clients.
The missing features in both implementations (by design) were:
- the password complexity checks (no plaintext)
- the minimum password length (no plaintext)
Additionally, the source3 version did not check:
- the minimum password age
- pdb_get_pass_can_change() which checks the security
descriptor for the 'user cannot change password' setting.
- the password history
- the output of the 'passwd program' if 'unix passwd sync = yes'.
Finally, the mechanism was almost useless, as it was incorrectly
only made available to administrative users with permission
to reset the password. It is removed here so that it is not
mistakenly reinstated in the future.
Andrew Bartlett
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
commit 139b90d29a1b05a3c376c9c9be11c967967e2be3
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 5 14:04:20 2013 +0100
CVE-2013-4496:s3:auth: fix memory leak in the ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT case.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
commit a597c3118f6ec0fb544843ec2df697458501c95f
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date: Fri Nov 1 14:55:44 2013 +1300
CVE-2013-4496:s3-samr: Block attempts to crack passwords via repeated password changes
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn at samba.org>
commit adfa17e44666ba6bdf848d9217578198dbb6015c
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Sun Feb 16 21:01:42 2014 +0100
VERSION: Bump version number up to 4.0.16...
and re-enable git snapshots.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d7ec8a7b1d39f5a93e58d22720d0a333079254)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
VERSION | 2 +-
WHATSNEW.txt | 70 +++++++-
source3/auth/check_samsec.c | 1 +
source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c | 55 ++++++
source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 111 +-----------
source3/smbd/lanman.c | 254 --------------------------
source3/utils/smbcacls.c | 2 +-
source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c | 214 ++++-----------------
source4/torture/rpc/samr.c | 6 +
9 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 534 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 8ec36a3..ee93681 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
########################################################
SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=0
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=15
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=16
########################################################
# If a official release has a serious bug #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index f602152..654a252 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,70 @@
==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.0.16
+ March 11, 2014
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address
+CVE-2013-4496 (Password lockout not enforced for SAMR password changes) and
+CVE-2013-6442 (smbcacls can remove a file or directory ACL by mistake).
+
+o CVE-2013-4496:
+ Samba versions 3.4.0 and above allow the administrator to implement
+ locking out Samba accounts after a number of bad password attempts.
+
+ However, all released versions of Samba did not implement this check for
+ password changes, such as are available over multiple SAMR and RAP
+ interfaces, allowing password guessing attacks.
+
+o CVE-2013-6442:
+ Samba versions 4.0.0 and above have a flaw in the smbcacls command. If
+ smbcacls is used with the "-C|--chown name" or "-G|--chgrp name"
+ command options it will remove the existing ACL on the object being
+ modified, leaving the file or directory unprotected.
+
+
+Changes since 4.0.15:
+---------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+ * BUG 10327: CVE-2013-6442: ensure we don't lose an existing ACL when
+ setting owner or group owner.
+
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+ * BUG 10245: CVE-2013-4496: Enforce password lockout for SAMR password
+ changes.
+
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
+ * BUG 10245: CVE-2013-4496: Enforce password lockout for SAMR password
+ changes.
+
+
+######################################################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the Samba 4.0 product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+ ==============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.0.15
February 18, 2014
==============================
@@ -75,8 +141,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
==============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.0.14
diff --git a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
index 7ed8cc2..94f30b1 100644
--- a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
+++ b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
/* Quit if the account was locked out. */
if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", username));
+ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
}
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
index db1f459..1c9c33a 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
@@ -1106,6 +1106,8 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
struct samu *sampass = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
bool ret = false;
+ bool updated_badpw = false;
+ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
@@ -1121,6 +1123,13 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
+ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */
+ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
+ DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", user));
+ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
+ }
+
nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
old_lm_hash_encrypted,
@@ -1129,6 +1138,52 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
sampass,
&new_passwd);
+ /*
+ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
+ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
+ */
+ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(sampass,
+ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status));
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
+ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
+ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
+ {
+ increment_bad_pw_count = true;
+ }
+
+ if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
+ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass);
+ updated_badpw = true;
+ } else {
+ pdb_update_bad_password_count(sampass,
+ &updated_badpw);
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
+ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){
+ pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
+ pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
+ updated_badpw = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (updated_badpw) {
+ NTSTATUS update_status;
+ become_root();
+ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
+ unbecome_root();
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(update_status)));
+ }
+ }
+
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return nt_status;
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
index 1065f2a..2c9eff2 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
@@ -1713,114 +1713,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupNames(struct pipes_struct *p,
}
/****************************************************************
- _samr_ChangePasswordUser
+ _samr_ChangePasswordUser.
+
+ So old it is just not worth implementing
+ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password
+ complexity checking and cannot update other services that use a
+ plaintext password via passwd chat/pam password change/ldap password
+ sync.
****************************************************************/
NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p,
struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r)
{
- NTSTATUS status;
- bool ret = false;
- struct samr_user_info *uinfo;
- struct samu *pwd;
- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash;
- struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd;
-
- uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle,
- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL,
- struct samr_user_info, &status);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- return status;
- }
-
- DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n",
- sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid)));
-
- if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) {
- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
- }
-
- become_root();
- ret = pdb_getsampwsid(pwd, &uinfo->sid);
- unbecome_root();
-
- if (!ret) {
- TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
- }
-
- {
- const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass;
-
- lm_pass = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(pwd);
- nt_pass = pdb_get_nt_passwd(pwd);
-
- if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) {
- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
- goto out;
- }
-
- memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash));
- memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash));
- }
-
- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */
- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present ||
- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted ||
- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) {
- /* we should really handle a change with lm not
- present */
- status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */
- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash);
- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */
- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash);
- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash);
- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) {
- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
- check the nt cross hash */
- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross) {
- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present
- check the lm cross hash */
- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross) {
- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash);
- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) {
- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd(pwd, new_ntPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED) ||
- !pdb_set_lanman_passwd(pwd, new_lmPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED)) {
- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
- goto out;
- }
-
- status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd);
- out:
- TALLOC_FREE(pwd);
-
- return status;
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
/*******************************************************************
diff --git a/source3/smbd/lanman.c b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
index e6b9530..1b734a7 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/lanman.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/lanman.c
@@ -2948,259 +2948,6 @@ static bool api_NetRemoteTOD(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
}
/****************************************************************************
- Set the user password.
-*****************************************************************************/
-
-static bool api_SetUserPassword(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn,
- connection_struct *conn,uint64_t vuid,
- char *param, int tpscnt,
- char *data, int tdscnt,
- int mdrcnt,int mprcnt,
- char **rdata,char **rparam,
- int *rdata_len,int *rparam_len)
-{
- char *np = get_safe_str_ptr(param,tpscnt,param,2);
- char *p = NULL;
- fstring user;
- fstring pass1,pass2;
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_tos();
- NTSTATUS status, result;
- struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL;
- struct policy_handle connect_handle, domain_handle, user_handle;
- struct lsa_String domain_name;
- struct dom_sid2 *domain_sid;
- struct lsa_String names;
- struct samr_Ids rids;
- struct samr_Ids types;
- struct samr_Password old_lm_hash;
- struct samr_Password new_lm_hash;
- int errcode = NERR_badpass;
- uint32_t rid;
- int encrypted;
- int min_pwd_length;
- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL;
-
- /* Skip 2 strings. */
- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,np);
- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
-
- if (!np || !p) {
- return False;
- }
-
- /* Do we have a string ? */
- if (skip_string(param,tpscnt,p) == NULL) {
- return False;
- }
- pull_ascii_fstring(user,p);
-
- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p);
- if (!p) {
- return False;
- }
-
- memset(pass1,'\0',sizeof(pass1));
- memset(pass2,'\0',sizeof(pass2));
- /*
- * We use 31 here not 32 as we're checking
- * the last byte we want to access is safe.
- */
- if (!is_offset_safe(param,tpscnt,p,31)) {
- return False;
- }
- memcpy(pass1,p,16);
- memcpy(pass2,p+16,16);
-
- encrypted = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+32,0,-1);
- if (encrypted == -1) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
- goto out;
- }
-
- min_pwd_length = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+34,0,-1);
- if (min_pwd_length == -1) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM);
- goto out;
- }
-
- *rparam_len = 4;
- *rparam = smb_realloc_limit(*rparam,*rparam_len);
- if (!*rparam) {
- return False;
- }
-
- *rdata_len = 0;
-
- DEBUG(3,("Set password for <%s> (encrypted: %d, min_pwd_length: %d)\n",
- user, encrypted, min_pwd_length));
-
- ZERO_STRUCT(connect_handle);
- ZERO_STRUCT(domain_handle);
- ZERO_STRUCT(user_handle);
-
- status = rpc_pipe_open_interface(mem_ctx, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id,
- conn->session_info,
- conn->sconn->remote_address,
- conn->sconn->msg_ctx,
- &cli);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- DEBUG(0,("api_SetUserPassword: could not connect to samr: %s\n",
- nt_errstr(status)));
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
- goto out;
- }
-
- b = cli->binding_handle;
-
- status = dcerpc_samr_Connect2(b, mem_ctx,
- lp_netbios_name(),
- SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER |
- SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS |
- SAMR_ACCESS_LOOKUP_DOMAIN,
- &connect_handle,
- &result);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
- goto out;
- }
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
- goto out;
- }
-
- init_lsa_String(&domain_name, get_global_sam_name());
-
- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupDomain(b, mem_ctx,
- &connect_handle,
- &domain_name,
- &domain_sid,
- &result);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
- goto out;
- }
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
- goto out;
- }
-
- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenDomain(b, mem_ctx,
- &connect_handle,
- SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT,
- domain_sid,
- &domain_handle,
- &result);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
- goto out;
- }
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
- goto out;
- }
-
- init_lsa_String(&names, user);
-
- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupNames(b, mem_ctx,
- &domain_handle,
- 1,
- &names,
- &rids,
- &types,
- &result);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status));
- goto out;
- }
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result));
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (rids.count != 1) {
- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_NO_SUCH_USER);
- goto out;
- }
- if (rids.count != types.count) {
--
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