[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch master updated

Stefan Metzmacher metze at samba.org
Fri Jan 20 17:29:05 MST 2012


The branch, master has been updated
       via  e175d25 s3-libsmb: Always allow SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS to be defined
       via  58916c0 s3-libsmb: Remove unused smb_tran_enc_state_gss and gssapi headers
       via  41ed715 s3-libsmb: use struct gensec_security directly
       via  06f7105 s3-libcli Change krb5 smb sealing to call via gensec and gensec_gse
       via  30b1e72 s4:auth/gensec: make sure GSS_C_CONF_FLAG implies GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
       via  7fe1897 s3-gse: make sure GSS_C_CONF_FLAG implies GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
       via  6f0f10c s3-gse: implement fill_mem_keytab_from_[system|dedicated]_keytab
       via  6158ea1 s3-gse: create memory keytab in gse_krb5_get_server_keytab()
       via  f86ab29 s3-gse: fix SECRETS_AND_KEYTAB fallback in gse_krb5_get_server_keytab()
       via  4e444f0 s3:kerberos_verify: ads_dedicated_keytab_verify_ticket() only needs read access
       via  a7275e5 s3:smbd/proto.h: remove unused do_map_to_guest() prototype
      from  88daf79 build: Add -lz to wbinfo to fix build on some hosts

http://gitweb.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=master


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit e175d25c68a83b6caf675cdc7f82e12cb5cad1f3
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 14 12:03:27 2012 +1100

    s3-libsmb: Always allow SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS to be defined
    
    Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
    
    Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
    Autobuild-Date: Sat Jan 21 01:28:54 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104

commit 58916c047d4e0441c878489f14581993bc65f130
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 14 12:01:12 2012 +1100

    s3-libsmb: Remove unused smb_tran_enc_state_gss and gssapi headers
    
    Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>

commit 41ed715d42434c5eba2fc4cd9fe267c5179330da
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 14 12:00:53 2012 +1100

    s3-libsmb: use struct gensec_security directly
    
    This is rather than via a now one-element union.
    
    Andrew Bartlett
    
    Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>

commit 06f7105490ecd387f726d540b33c8eba960e9cfb
Author: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 13 20:34:10 2012 +1100

    s3-libcli Change krb5 smb sealing to call via gensec and gensec_gse
    
    This also fixes the support for smb sealing with krb5 in make test, as
    this now relies on secrets.tdb rather than /etc/krb5.keytab.
    
    Andrew Bartlett
    
    Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>

commit 30b1e72556c0104fcedd95b8211e65056d1cac2e
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 20 15:56:17 2012 +0100

    s4:auth/gensec: make sure GSS_C_CONF_FLAG implies GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
    
    metze

commit 7fe189749edf5c081be6f3a350072caa0c8b3d98
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 20 15:55:55 2012 +0100

    s3-gse: make sure GSS_C_CONF_FLAG implies GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
    
    metze

commit 6f0f10c798639923eb0500751fdcef3930d1ebea
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 20 09:31:55 2012 +0100

    s3-gse: implement fill_mem_keytab_from_[system|dedicated]_keytab
    
    metze

commit 6158ea1abd1aa12785022bfd1fa23924f144b45b
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 20 11:51:59 2012 +0100

    s3-gse: create memory keytab in gse_krb5_get_server_keytab()
    
    The other functions just add entries to it.
    
    metze

commit f86ab2947040f8e0cd6fd73da31ebe33ac18d2eb
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 20 11:50:20 2012 +0100

    s3-gse: fix SECRETS_AND_KEYTAB fallback in gse_krb5_get_server_keytab()
    
    metze

commit 4e444f00618161e11d13495d1402886c7e93866c
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 20 12:20:47 2012 +0100

    s3:kerberos_verify: ads_dedicated_keytab_verify_ticket() only needs read access
    
    metze

commit a7275e57fd5a0404e6369b821ead51f2f01ffb45
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze at samba.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 14 12:30:21 2012 +0100

    s3:smbd/proto.h: remove unused do_map_to_guest() prototype
    
    metze

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 libcli/smb/smb_seal.c               |  200 +------------------------
 libcli/smb/smb_seal.h               |   28 +---
 selftest/knownfail                  |    3 -
 source3/libads/kerberos_verify.c    |    2 +-
 source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c         |    6 +
 source3/librpc/crypto/gse_krb5.c    |  289 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 source3/libsmb/clifsinfo.c          |  150 +++++++------------
 source3/smbd/proto.h                |    4 -
 source3/smbd/seal.c                 |  235 +++++------------------------
 source4/auth/gensec/gensec_gssapi.c |    1 +
 10 files changed, 367 insertions(+), 551 deletions(-)


Changeset truncated at 500 lines:

diff --git a/libcli/smb/smb_seal.c b/libcli/smb/smb_seal.c
index a6cfffb..a56dc60 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smb_seal.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smb_seal.c
@@ -169,150 +169,6 @@ static NTSTATUS common_gensec_encrypt_buffer(struct gensec_security *gensec,
 
 /******************************************************************************
  Generic code for client and server.
- gss-api decrypt an incoming buffer. We insist that the size of the
- unwrapped buffer must be smaller or identical to the incoming buffer.
-******************************************************************************/
-
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-static NTSTATUS common_gss_decrypt_buffer(struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss *gss_state, char *buf)
-{
-	gss_ctx_id_t gss_ctx = gss_state->gss_ctx;
-	OM_uint32 ret = 0;
-	OM_uint32 minor = 0;
-	int flags_got = 0;
-	gss_buffer_desc in_buf, out_buf;
-	size_t buf_len = smb_len_nbt(buf) + 4; /* Don't forget the 4 length bytes. */
-
-	if (buf_len < 8) {
-		return NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
-	}
-
-	in_buf.value = buf + 8;
-	in_buf.length = buf_len - 8;
-
-	ret = gss_unwrap(&minor,
-			gss_ctx,
-			&in_buf,
-			&out_buf,
-			&flags_got,		/* did we get sign+seal ? */
-			(gss_qop_t *) NULL);
-
-	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-		NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-		char *gss_err;
-
-		gss_err = gssapi_error_string(talloc_tos(),
-					      ret, minor,
-					      GSS_C_NULL_OID);
-		DEBUG(0,("common_gss_decrypt_buffer: gss_unwrap failed. "
-			 "Error [%d/%d] - %s - %s\n",
-			 ret, minor, nt_errstr(status),
-			 gss_err ? gss_err : "<unknown>"));
-		talloc_free(gss_err);
-
-		return status;
-	}
-
-	if (out_buf.length > in_buf.length) {
-		DEBUG(0,("common_gss_decrypt_buffer: gss_unwrap size (%u) too large (%u) !\n",
-			(unsigned int)out_buf.length,
-			(unsigned int)in_buf.length ));
-		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out_buf);
-		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-	}
-
-	memcpy(buf + 8, out_buf.value, out_buf.length);
-	/* Reset the length and overwrite the header. */
-	smb_setlen_nbt(buf, out_buf.length + 4);
-
-	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out_buf);
-	return NT_STATUS_OK;
-}
-
-/******************************************************************************
- Generic code for client and server.
- gss-api encrypt an outgoing buffer. Return the alloced encrypted pointer in buf_out.
-******************************************************************************/
-
-static NTSTATUS common_gss_encrypt_buffer(struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss *gss_state,
-					uint16_t enc_ctx_num,
-					char *buf,
-					char **ppbuf_out)
-{
-	gss_ctx_id_t gss_ctx = gss_state->gss_ctx;
-	OM_uint32 ret = 0;
-	OM_uint32 minor = 0;
-	int flags_got = 0;
-	gss_buffer_desc in_buf, out_buf;
-	size_t buf_len = smb_len_nbt(buf) + 4; /* Don't forget the 4 length bytes. */
-
-	*ppbuf_out = NULL;
-
-	if (buf_len < 8) {
-		return NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
-	}
-
-	in_buf.value = buf + 8;
-	in_buf.length = buf_len - 8;
-
-	ret = gss_wrap(&minor,
-			gss_ctx,
-			true,			/* we want sign+seal. */
-			GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
-			&in_buf,
-			&flags_got,		/* did we get sign+seal ? */
-			&out_buf);
-
-	if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-		NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-		char *gss_err;
-
-		gss_err = gssapi_error_string(talloc_tos(),
-					      ret, minor,
-					      GSS_C_NULL_OID);
-		DEBUG(0,("common_gss_encrypt_buffer: gss_unwrap failed. "
-			 "Error [%d/%d] - %s - %s\n",
-			 ret, minor, nt_errstr(status),
-			 gss_err ? gss_err : "<unknown>"));
-		talloc_free(gss_err);
-
-		return status;
-	}
-
-	if (!flags_got) {
-		/* Sign+seal not supported. */
-		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out_buf);
-		return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-	}
-
-	/* Ya see - this is why I *hate* gss-api. I don't
-	 * want to have to malloc another buffer of the
-	 * same size + 8 bytes just to get a continuous
-	 * header + buffer, but gss won't let me pass in
-	 * a pre-allocated buffer. Bastards (and you know
-	 * who you are....). I might fix this by
-	 * going to "encrypt_and_send" passing in a file
-	 * descriptor and doing scatter-gather write with
-	 * TCP cork on Linux. But I shouldn't have to
-	 * bother :-*(. JRA.
-	 */
-
-	*ppbuf_out = (char *)malloc(out_buf.length + 8); /* We know this can't wrap. */
-	if (!*ppbuf_out) {
-		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out_buf);
-		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
-	}
-
-	memcpy(*ppbuf_out+8, out_buf.value, out_buf.length);
-	smb_set_enclen(*ppbuf_out, out_buf.length + 4, enc_ctx_num);
-
-	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out_buf);
-	return NT_STATUS_OK;
-}
-#endif
-
-/******************************************************************************
- Generic code for client and server.
  Encrypt an outgoing buffer. Return the alloced encrypted pointer in buf_out.
 ******************************************************************************/
 
@@ -324,16 +180,7 @@ NTSTATUS common_encrypt_buffer(struct smb_trans_enc_state *es, char *buffer, cha
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 	}
 
-	switch (es->smb_enc_type) {
-		case SMB_TRANS_ENC_NTLM:
-			return common_gensec_encrypt_buffer(es->s.gensec_security, es->enc_ctx_num, buffer, buf_out);
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-		case SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS:
-			return common_gss_encrypt_buffer(es->s.gss_state, es->enc_ctx_num, buffer, buf_out);
-#endif
-		default:
-			return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-	}
+	return common_gensec_encrypt_buffer(es->gensec_security, es->enc_ctx_num, buffer, buf_out);
 }
 
 /******************************************************************************
@@ -349,38 +196,9 @@ NTSTATUS common_decrypt_buffer(struct smb_trans_enc_state *es, char *buf)
 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
 	}
 
-	switch (es->smb_enc_type) {
-		case SMB_TRANS_ENC_NTLM:
-			return common_gensec_decrypt_buffer(es->s.gensec_security, buf);
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-		case SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS:
-			return common_gss_decrypt_buffer(es->s.gss_state, buf);
-#endif
-		default:
-			return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-	}
+	return common_gensec_decrypt_buffer(es->gensec_security, buf);
 }
 
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-/******************************************************************************
- Shutdown a gss encryption state.
-******************************************************************************/
-
-static void common_free_gss_state(struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss **pp_gss_state)
-{
-	OM_uint32 minor = 0;
-	struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss *gss_state = *pp_gss_state;
-
-	if (gss_state->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
-		gss_release_cred(&minor, &gss_state->creds);
-	}
-	if (gss_state->gss_ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
-		gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &gss_state->gss_ctx, NULL);
-	}
-	SAFE_FREE(*pp_gss_state);
-}
-#endif
-
 /******************************************************************************
  Shutdown an encryption state.
 ******************************************************************************/
@@ -393,19 +211,9 @@ void common_free_encryption_state(struct smb_trans_enc_state **pp_es)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (es->smb_enc_type == SMB_TRANS_ENC_NTLM) {
-		if (es->s.gensec_security) {
-			TALLOC_FREE(es->s.gensec_security);
-		}
-	}
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-	if (es->smb_enc_type == SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS) {
-		/* Free the gss context handle. */
-		if (es->s.gss_state) {
-			common_free_gss_state(&es->s.gss_state);
-		}
+	if (es->gensec_security) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(es->gensec_security);
 	}
-#endif
 	SAFE_FREE(es);
 	*pp_es = NULL;
 }
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smb_seal.h b/libcli/smb/smb_seal.h
index 9f9a806..081208e 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smb_seal.h
+++ b/libcli/smb/smb_seal.h
@@ -20,39 +20,17 @@
 #ifndef _HEADER_SMB_CRYPT_H
 #define _HEADER_SMB_CRYPT_H
 
-#if HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
-#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
-#elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
-#elif HAVE_GSSAPI_H
-#include <gssapi.h>
-#endif
-
 /* Transport encryption state. */
 enum smb_trans_enc_type {
-		SMB_TRANS_ENC_NTLM
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-		, SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS
-#endif
-};
-
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss {
-        gss_ctx_id_t gss_ctx;
-        gss_cred_id_t creds;
+		SMB_TRANS_ENC_NTLM,
+		SMB_TRANS_ENC_GSS
 };
-#endif
 
 struct smb_trans_enc_state {
         enum smb_trans_enc_type smb_enc_type;
         uint16_t enc_ctx_num;
         bool enc_on;
-        union {
-                struct gensec_security *gensec_security;
-#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_KRB5)
-                struct smb_tran_enc_state_gss *gss_state;
-#endif
-        } s;
+	struct gensec_security *gensec_security;
 };
 
 /* The following definitions come from smb_seal.c  */
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail b/selftest/knownfail
index b0246e7..4a9f99e 100644
--- a/selftest/knownfail
+++ b/selftest/knownfail
@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@
 ^samba3.blackbox.rpcclient over ncacn_np with \[spnego,smb2,bigendian\]
 ^samba3.blackbox.rpcclient over ncacn_np with \[spnego,connect,smb2\]
 ^samba3.blackbox.rpcclient over ncacn_np with \[spnego,connect,smb2,bigendian\]
-# GSSAPI/krb5 encrypted CIFS fails in the test environment at the moment
-^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_krb5 -e.smbclient
-^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_krb5 old ccache -e.smbclient
 # these show that we still have some differences between our system
 # with our internal iconv because it passes except when we bypass our
 # internal iconv modules
diff --git a/source3/libads/kerberos_verify.c b/source3/libads/kerberos_verify.c
index 6fa8f43..0c44db9 100644
--- a/source3/libads/kerberos_verify.c
+++ b/source3/libads/kerberos_verify.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static bool ads_dedicated_keytab_verify_ticket(krb5_context context,
 
 	ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
 
-	ret = smb_krb5_open_keytab(context, lp_dedicated_keytab_file(), true,
+	ret = smb_krb5_open_keytab(context, lp_dedicated_keytab_file(), false,
 	    &keytab);
 	if (ret) {
 		DEBUG(1, ("smb_krb5_open_keytab failed (%s)\n",
diff --git a/source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c b/source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c
index 7cf1165..5bd2740 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/crypto/gse.c
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gse_context_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
 		gse_ctx->gss_want_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
 	}
 	if (do_seal) {
+		gse_ctx->gss_want_flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG;
 		gse_ctx->gss_want_flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG;
 	}
 
@@ -548,6 +549,11 @@ static NTSTATUS gse_verify_server_auth_flags(struct gse_context *gse_ctx)
 		if (!(gse_ctx->gss_got_flags & GSS_C_CONF_FLAG)) {
 			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
 		}
+
+		/* GSS_C_CONF_FLAG implies GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG */
+		if (!(gse_ctx->gss_got_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* GSS_C_DCE_STYLE */
diff --git a/source3/librpc/crypto/gse_krb5.c b/source3/librpc/crypto/gse_krb5.c
index 81a9a07..c1eea7f 100644
--- a/source3/librpc/crypto/gse_krb5.c
+++ b/source3/librpc/crypto/gse_krb5.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ out:
 #define SRV_MEM_KEYTAB_NAME "MEMORY:cifs_srv_keytab"
 #define CLEARTEXT_PRIV_ENCTYPE -99
 
-static krb5_error_code get_mem_keytab_from_secrets(krb5_context krbctx,
-						   krb5_keytab *keytab)
+static krb5_error_code fill_mem_keytab_from_secrets(krb5_context krbctx,
+						    krb5_keytab *keytab)
 {
 	krb5_error_code ret;
 	char *pwd = NULL;
@@ -194,16 +194,6 @@ static krb5_error_code get_mem_keytab_from_secrets(krb5_context krbctx,
 	}
 	pwd_len = strlen(pwd);
 
-	if (*keytab == NULL) {
-		/* create memory keytab */
-		ret = krb5_kt_resolve(krbctx, SRV_MEM_KEYTAB_NAME, keytab);
-		if (ret) {
-			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": Failed to get memory "
-				  "keytab!\n"));
-			return ret;
-		}
-	}
-
 	ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
 	ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
 
@@ -331,57 +321,300 @@ out:
 		krb5_free_principal(krbctx, princ);
 	}
 
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code fill_mem_keytab_from_system_keytab(krb5_context krbctx,
+							  krb5_keytab *mkeytab)
+{
+	krb5_error_code ret = 0;
+	krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
+	krb5_kt_cursor kt_cursor;
+	krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
+	char *valid_princ_formats[7] = { NULL, NULL, NULL,
+					 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+	char *entry_princ_s = NULL;
+	fstring my_name, my_fqdn;
+	int i;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Generate the list of principal names which we expect
+	 * clients might want to use for authenticating to the file
+	 * service.  We allow name$,{host,cifs}/{name,fqdn,name.REALM}. */
+
+	fstrcpy(my_name, lp_netbios_name());
+
+	my_fqdn[0] = '\0';
+	name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, lp_netbios_name());
+
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[0],
+			"%s$@%s", my_name, lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[1],
+			"host/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[2],
+			"host/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[3],
+			"host/%s.%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm(), lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[4],
+			"cifs/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[5],
+			"cifs/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	err = asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[6],
+			"cifs/%s.%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm(), lp_realm());
+	if (err == -1) {
+		ret = ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
+	ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
+
+	ret = smb_krb5_open_keytab(krbctx, NULL, false, &keytab);
+	if (ret) {
+		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": smb_krb5_open_keytab failed (%s)\n",
+			  error_message(ret)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Iterate through the keytab.  For each key, if the principal
+	 * name case-insensitively matches one of the allowed formats,
+	 * copy it to the memory keytab.
+	 */
+
+	ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krbctx, keytab, &kt_cursor);
 	if (ret) {
-		if (*keytab) {
-			krb5_kt_close(krbctx, *keytab);
-			*keytab = NULL;
+		DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": krb5_kt_start_seq_get failed (%s)\n",
+			  error_message(ret)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while ((krb5_kt_next_entry(krbctx, keytab,
+				   &kt_entry, &kt_cursor) == 0)) {
+		ret = smb_krb5_unparse_name(talloc_tos(), krbctx,
+					    kt_entry.principal,
+					    &entry_princ_s);
+		if (ret) {
+			DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": smb_krb5_unparse_name "
+				  "failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(valid_princ_formats); i++) {
+
+			if (!strequal(entry_princ_s, valid_princ_formats[i])) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(krbctx, *mkeytab, &kt_entry);
+			if (ret) {
+				DEBUG(1, (__location__ ": smb_krb5_unparse_name "
+					  "failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
+				goto out;
+			}
 		}
+
+		/* Free the name we parsed. */
+		TALLOC_FREE(entry_princ_s);
+
+		/* Free the entry we just read. */
+		smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(krbctx, &kt_entry);
+		ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
+	}
+	krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krbctx, keytab, &kt_cursor);
+
+	ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
+


-- 
Samba Shared Repository


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