[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch v3-4-test updated
Karolin Seeger
kseeger at samba.org
Wed Sep 15 12:54:24 MDT 2010
The branch, v3-4-test has been updated
via ead6726 WHATSNEW: Prepare 3.4.9 release notes.
via bb3dc1e Fix bug #7669.
from 995e7e5 Fix bug 7636 - winbind internal error, backtrace.
http://gitweb.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v3-4-test
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit ead6726c5d1923c3ad309e6e3e0f84d32a263d42
Author: Karolin Seeger <kseeger at samba.org>
Date: Wed Sep 15 20:55:30 2010 +0200
WHATSNEW: Prepare 3.4.9 release notes.
Karolin
commit bb3dc1edc91e5fb5c9404ba49b0405a23b4ecb74
Author: Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
Date: Thu Sep 9 15:48:23 2010 +0200
Fix bug #7669.
Fix bug #7669 (buffer overflow in sid_parse() in Samba3 and dom_sid_parse in
Samba4).
CVE-2010-3069:
===========
Description
===========
All current released versions of Samba are vulnerable to
a buffer overrun vulnerability. The sid_parse() function
(and related dom_sid_parse() function in the source4 code)
do not correctly check their input lengths when reading a
binary representation of a Windows SID (Security ID). This
allows a malicious client to send a sid that can overflow
the stack variable that is being used to store the SID in the
Samba smbd server.
A connection to a file share is needed to exploit this
vulnerability, either authenticated or unauthenticated
(guest connection).
(cherry picked from commit df20a300758bc12286820e31fcf573bdfc2147bc)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
WHATSNEW.txt | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
libcli/security/dom_sid.c | 4 ++++
libcli/security/dom_sid.h | 4 ++++
source3/lib/util_sid.c | 3 +++
source3/libads/ldap.c | 4 +++-
source3/libsmb/cliquota.c | 4 +++-
source3/smbd/nttrans.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 385731f..5b25be3 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,19 +1,33 @@
=============================
Release Notes for Samba 3.4.9
- , 2010
+ September 14, 2010
=============================
-This is the latest stable release of Samba 3.4.
+This is a security release in order to address CVE-2010-3069.
+
-Major enhancements in Samba 3.4.9 include:
+o CVE-2010-3069:
+ All current released versions of Samba are vulnerable to
+ a buffer overrun vulnerability. The sid_parse() function
+ (and related dom_sid_parse() function in the source4 code)
+ do not correctly check their input lengths when reading a
+ binary representation of a Windows SID (Security ID). This
+ allows a malicious client to send a sid that can overflow
+ the stack variable that is being used to store the SID in the
+ Samba smbd server.
- o
Changes since 3.4.8
-------------------
+o Jeremy Allison <jra at samba.org>
+ * BUG 7669: Fix for CVE-2010-3069.
+
+
+o Andrew Bartlett <abartlet at samba.org>
+ * BUG 7669: Fix for CVE-2010-3069.
######################################################################
diff --git a/libcli/security/dom_sid.c b/libcli/security/dom_sid.c
index 0c88900..350a14f 100644
--- a/libcli/security/dom_sid.c
+++ b/libcli/security/dom_sid.c
@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ bool dom_sid_parse(const char *sidstr, struct dom_sid *ret)
if (sidstr[i] == '-') num_sub_auths++;
}
+ if (num_sub_auths > MAXSUBAUTHS) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
ret->sid_rev_num = rev;
ret->id_auth[0] = 0;
ret->id_auth[1] = 0;
diff --git a/libcli/security/dom_sid.h b/libcli/security/dom_sid.h
index e892535..748e009 100644
--- a/libcli/security/dom_sid.h
+++ b/libcli/security/dom_sid.h
@@ -40,5 +40,9 @@ bool dom_sid_in_domain(const struct dom_sid *domain_sid,
const struct dom_sid *sid);
char *dom_sid_string(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct dom_sid *sid);
+#ifndef MAXSUBAUTHS
+#define MAXSUBAUTHS 15 /* max sub authorities in a SID */
+#endif
+
#endif /*_DOM_SID_H_*/
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_sid.c b/source3/lib/util_sid.c
index 97284af..52e8448 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_sid.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_sid.c
@@ -408,6 +408,9 @@ bool sid_parse(const char *inbuf, size_t len, DOM_SID *sid)
sid->sid_rev_num = CVAL(inbuf, 0);
sid->num_auths = CVAL(inbuf, 1);
+ if (sid->num_auths > MAXSUBAUTHS) {
+ return false;
+ }
memcpy(sid->id_auth, inbuf+2, 6);
if (len < 8 + sid->num_auths*4)
return False;
diff --git a/source3/libads/ldap.c b/source3/libads/ldap.c
index 1fb541d..08b8311 100644
--- a/source3/libads/ldap.c
+++ b/source3/libads/ldap.c
@@ -2128,7 +2128,9 @@ static void dump_sid(ADS_STRUCT *ads, const char *field, struct berval **values)
for (i=0; values[i]; i++) {
DOM_SID sid;
fstring tmp;
- sid_parse(values[i]->bv_val, values[i]->bv_len, &sid);
+ if (!sid_parse(values[i]->bv_val, values[i]->bv_len, &sid)) {
+ continue;
+ }
printf("%s: %s\n", field, sid_to_fstring(tmp, &sid));
}
}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/cliquota.c b/source3/libsmb/cliquota.c
index e40dac3..2af5b22 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/cliquota.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cliquota.c
@@ -117,7 +117,9 @@ static bool parse_user_quota_record(const char *rdata, unsigned int rdata_count,
}
#endif /* LARGE_SMB_OFF_T */
- sid_parse(rdata+40,sid_len,&qt.sid);
+ if (!sid_parse(rdata+40,sid_len,&qt.sid)) {
+ return false;
+ }
qt.qtype = SMB_USER_QUOTA_TYPE;
diff --git a/source3/smbd/nttrans.c b/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
index 4bfbcd1..2834f08 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
@@ -2080,7 +2080,11 @@ static void call_nt_transact_ioctl(connection_struct *conn,
/* unknown 4 bytes: this is not the length of the sid :-( */
/*unknown = IVAL(pdata,0);*/
- sid_parse(pdata+4,sid_len,&sid);
+ if (!sid_parse(pdata+4,sid_len,&sid)) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return;
+ }
+
DEBUGADD(10, ("for SID: %s\n", sid_string_dbg(&sid)));
if (!sid_to_uid(&sid, &uid)) {
@@ -2336,7 +2340,10 @@ static void call_nt_transact_get_user_quota(connection_struct *conn,
break;
}
- sid_parse(pdata+8,sid_len,&sid);
+ if (!sid_parse(pdata+8,sid_len,&sid)) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return;
+ }
if (vfs_get_ntquota(fsp, SMB_USER_QUOTA_TYPE, &sid, &qt)!=0) {
ZERO_STRUCT(qt);
@@ -2517,7 +2524,11 @@ static void call_nt_transact_set_user_quota(connection_struct *conn,
}
#endif /* LARGE_SMB_OFF_T */
- sid_parse(pdata+40,sid_len,&sid);
+ if (!sid_parse(pdata+40,sid_len,&sid)) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return;
+ }
+
DEBUGADD(8,("SID: %s\n", sid_string_dbg(&sid)));
/* 44 unknown bytes left... */
--
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