[SCM] Samba Shared Repository - branch master updated
Michael Adam
obnox at samba.org
Thu Jan 7 03:40:54 MST 2010
The branch, master has been updated
via 7248873... s3:auth:check_sam_security: improve calling and logging of pdb_update_sam_account
via 5ad1b7e... s3:auth:check_sam_security: fix a leading tab/ws mixup
via 970317c... s3:auth:check_sam_security: create (and use) a common exit point
via de4fb80... s3:auth:check_sam_security: null out sampass after it has been stolen.
via 3634859... s3:auth:sam_password_ok: take username, acct_ctrl and nt/lm hashes, not sampass
via c0f404a... s3:auth: use data_blob_null instead of data_blob(NULL, 0) in sam_password_ok()
via 0172587... s3:auth:sam_password_ok: fix allocation of a data blob.
via 7ac18c7... s3:auth:sam_password_ok: enhance readability (imho) by adding some pointers
via b5fcb34... s3:check_sam_security: untangle assignment from statement
via 53a1ed9... s3: Factor password_in_history() out of check_passwd_history()
via be05d71... Simplify E_md5hash a bit
via 5e2fc28... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwhistory==NULL can not happen anymore
via 2a11f3b... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwHistLen==0 was checked above
via ec0998a... s3: Add a paranoia check to pdb_set_plaintext_passwd()
via a3f5222... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd() by removing a redundant condition
via 7633837... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: memcpy deals fine with 0 bytes
via 864ed92... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd by using talloc_zero_array
via e729025... s3: Make use of talloc_array in pdb_set_plaintext_passwd()
via 7ba0064... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd() a bit
via ca6c1cd... s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd() slightly
via 3d83949... s3: Fix a typo
via 147a2c0... s3: Avoid a memset(, 0, ) call
from 2fad148... s3:pdb_set_pw_history: free the old history before setting the new.
http://gitweb.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=master
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 7248873b48ac28c40809c949da0e7325ca63aef0
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Jan 6 13:53:10 2010 +0100
s3:auth:check_sam_security: improve calling and logging of pdb_update_sam_account
Log what went wrongl, and also call pdb_update_sam_account inside
become_root/unbecome_root: do the logging outside.
Michael
commit 5ad1b7e0c5aa7c8e0a0d55c2456e9d6354dc9bcc
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Jan 6 13:40:58 2010 +0100
s3:auth:check_sam_security: fix a leading tab/ws mixup
Michael
commit 970317c413eae52af9976e5652362412dd3038e3
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Jan 6 12:36:56 2010 +0100
s3:auth:check_sam_security: create (and use) a common exit point
for use after sam_password_ok() has been called.
Michael
commit de4fb80beec59999dd9ce074d4fff0b310fb08da
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Jan 6 12:32:51 2010 +0100
s3:auth:check_sam_security: null out sampass after it has been stolen.
So that a later talloc_free would not harm. I could have used
talloc_move instead of talloc steal in make_server_info_sam(),
but this would have required a change of the signature.
Michael
commit 36348594505a5e7934d20d3b614f51023ae5740a
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Mon Jan 4 18:15:24 2010 +0100
s3:auth:sam_password_ok: take username, acct_ctrl and nt/lm hashes, not sampass
This is in preparation to extending check_sam_security to also check
against the password history before updating the bad password count.
This way, sam_password_ok can more easily be reused for that purpose.
Michael
commit c0f404a2e46187424915a073142a0a218b48ec2c
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Mon Jan 4 15:37:24 2010 +0100
s3:auth: use data_blob_null instead of data_blob(NULL, 0) in sam_password_ok()
This way it is more explicit that there is no allocated data here
that may leak.
Michael
commit 0172587d8d56e1163c27014e1e092580d0158e10
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Dec 30 15:37:23 2009 +0100
s3:auth:sam_password_ok: fix allocation of a data blob.
data_blob(mem_ctx, 16) does not use mem_ctx as a talloc ctx but
copies 16 bytes from mem_ctx into the newly allocated data blob.
This can not have been intentional. A blank uint8_t array of
length 16 is allocated by passing NULL instead of mem_ctx.
And using data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16) adds the allocated
blank 16 byte array to mem_ctx - so this is what must have been
intended.
Michael
commit 7ac18c743b50b8cd63284326bd648675db63c557
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Dec 30 15:35:50 2009 +0100
s3:auth:sam_password_ok: enhance readability (imho) by adding some pointers
and removing bool variables and several checks.
Michael
commit b5fcb34d6cd20c852208d2b8b785b2870c6d65db
Author: Michael Adam <obnox at samba.org>
Date: Wed Dec 30 12:46:22 2009 +0100
s3:check_sam_security: untangle assignment from statement
Michael
commit 53a1ed9b6caa7b8ea2c5b4f1cae6faba19e09708
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 20:54:33 2009 +0100
s3: Factor password_in_history() out of check_passwd_history()
commit be05d71b9e3fe3c73ada46f7bb7745bf19633716
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 19:29:36 2009 +0100
Simplify E_md5hash a bit
commit 5e2fc28b639a3944c272bbc5664e3da209c81365
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 19:18:09 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwhistory==NULL can not happen anymore
commit 2a11f3b3d7b4a009ddfa70511ad2ce3b84aa0539
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 19:16:58 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwHistLen==0 was checked above
commit ec0998ada5eebf5cae63719ef14097639ffef258
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 19:12:50 2009 +0100
s3: Add a paranoia check to pdb_set_plaintext_passwd()
commit a3f522202ddc09d444e800ad1da2078975de01c1
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 18:50:38 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd() by removing a redundant condition
if (current_history_len != pwHistLen) {
if (current_history_len < pwHistLen) {
}
}
The second "if" is a bit pointless here
commit 7633837026d56ee723ffb603c9bd884ff6c69ef3
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 18:44:38 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: memcpy deals fine with 0 bytes
commit 864ed92954315600ddcef69b21face95c06224a4
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 18:43:03 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd by using talloc_zero_array
commit e7290255f5ba1dd913bb3d40e71654cff1cfe4cf
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 18:39:19 2009 +0100
s3: Make use of talloc_array in pdb_set_plaintext_passwd()
commit 7ba006430f427a1f28300d29a5c045a552d2382c
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 18:24:04 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd() a bit
Remove an indentation by the early return in
+ if (pwHistLen == 0) {
+ /* Set the history length to zero. */
+ pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, NULL, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
+ return true;
+ }
commit ca6c1cdd5faa1c2ff067b53f2ad6b811fe9d79bb
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 18:13:28 2009 +0100
s3: Simplify pdb_set_plaintext_passwd() slightly
No functional change, this just removes an indentation level by the early
"return True;" in
+ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * No password history for non-user accounts
+ */
+ return true;
+ }
Volker
commit 3d8394986a8fc1df599a2496b0677ece354f35b3
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 17:51:39 2009 +0100
s3: Fix a typo
commit 147a2c057cfcf459391c67e05ce2d0be561f0382
Author: Volker Lendecke <vl at samba.org>
Date: Mon Dec 14 17:43:56 2009 +0100
s3: Avoid a memset(, 0, ) call
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c | 8 +--
source3/auth/auth_sam.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
source3/include/proto.h | 3 +
source3/passdb/pdb_get_set.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c | 69 ++++++++++++++---------
5 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 142 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
index a3182cd..f7c60e7 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
@@ -100,13 +100,9 @@ bool E_md4hash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
void E_md5hash(const uint8_t salt[16], const uint8_t nthash[16], uint8_t hash_out[16])
{
struct MD5Context tctx;
- uint8_t array[32];
-
- memset(hash_out, '\0', 16);
- memcpy(array, salt, 16);
- memcpy(&array[16], nthash, 16);
MD5Init(&tctx);
- MD5Update(&tctx, array, 32);
+ MD5Update(&tctx, salt, 16);
+ MD5Update(&tctx, nthash, 16);
MD5Final(hash_out, &tctx);
}
diff --git a/source3/auth/auth_sam.c b/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
index f0500b3..e7b9f2b 100644
--- a/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_sam.c
@@ -33,21 +33,23 @@
static NTSTATUS sam_password_ok(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct samu *sampass,
+ const char *username,
+ uint32_t acct_ctrl,
+ const uint8_t *lm_pw,
+ const uint8_t *nt_pw,
const auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
{
- uint32 acct_ctrl;
- const uint8 *lm_pw, *nt_pw;
- struct samr_Password lm_hash, nt_hash, client_lm_hash, client_nt_hash;
- const char *username = pdb_get_username(sampass);
- bool got_lm = false, got_nt = false;
+ struct samr_Password _lm_hash, _nt_hash, _client_lm_hash, _client_nt_hash;
+ struct samr_Password *lm_hash = NULL;
+ struct samr_Password *nt_hash = NULL;
+ struct samr_Password *client_lm_hash = NULL;
+ struct samr_Password *client_nt_hash = NULL;
- *user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
- *lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+ *lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
- acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
if (acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ) {
if (lp_null_passwords()) {
DEBUG(3,("Account for user '%s' has no password and null passwords are allowed.\n", username));
@@ -58,34 +60,35 @@ static NTSTATUS sam_password_ok(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
}
}
- lm_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass);
- nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
if (lm_pw) {
- memcpy(lm_hash.hash, lm_pw, sizeof(lm_hash.hash));
+ memcpy(_lm_hash.hash, lm_pw, sizeof(_lm_hash.hash));
+ lm_hash = &_lm_hash;
}
if (nt_pw) {
- memcpy(nt_hash.hash, nt_pw, sizeof(nt_hash.hash));
+ memcpy(_nt_hash.hash, nt_pw, sizeof(_nt_hash.hash));
+ nt_hash = &_nt_hash;
}
- if (user_info->lm_interactive_pwd.data && sizeof(client_lm_hash.hash) == user_info->lm_interactive_pwd.length) {
- memcpy(client_lm_hash.hash, user_info->lm_interactive_pwd.data, sizeof(lm_hash.hash));
- got_lm = true;
+ if (user_info->lm_interactive_pwd.data && sizeof(_client_lm_hash.hash) == user_info->lm_interactive_pwd.length) {
+ memcpy(_client_lm_hash.hash, user_info->lm_interactive_pwd.data, sizeof(_lm_hash.hash));
+ client_lm_hash = &_client_lm_hash;
}
- if (user_info->nt_interactive_pwd.data && sizeof(client_nt_hash.hash) == user_info->nt_interactive_pwd.length) {
- memcpy(client_nt_hash.hash, user_info->nt_interactive_pwd.data, sizeof(nt_hash.hash));
- got_nt = true;
+ if (user_info->nt_interactive_pwd.data && sizeof(_client_nt_hash.hash) == user_info->nt_interactive_pwd.length) {
+ memcpy(_client_nt_hash.hash, user_info->nt_interactive_pwd.data, sizeof(_nt_hash.hash));
+ client_nt_hash = &_client_nt_hash;
}
- if (got_lm || got_nt) {
- *user_sess_key = data_blob(mem_ctx, 16);
+
+ if (client_lm_hash || client_nt_hash) {
+ *user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
if (!user_sess_key->data) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_pw, user_sess_key->data);
return hash_password_check(mem_ctx, lp_lanman_auth(),
- got_lm ? &client_lm_hash : NULL,
- got_nt ? &client_nt_hash : NULL,
+ client_lm_hash,
+ client_nt_hash,
username,
- lm_pw ? &lm_hash: NULL,
- nt_pw ? &nt_hash : NULL);
+ lm_hash,
+ nt_hash);
} else {
return ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx, lp_lanman_auth(),
lp_ntlm_auth(),
@@ -95,8 +98,8 @@ static NTSTATUS sam_password_ok(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
username,
user_info->smb_name,
user_info->client_domain,
- lm_pw ? &lm_hash: NULL,
- nt_pw ? &nt_hash : NULL,
+ lm_hash,
+ nt_hash,
user_sess_key, lm_sess_key);
}
}
@@ -297,6 +300,10 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
DATA_BLOB user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
bool updated_autolock = False, updated_badpw = False;
+ uint32_t acct_ctrl;
+ const char *username;
+ const uint8_t *nt_pw;
+ const uint8_t *lm_pw;
if (!user_info || !auth_context) {
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
@@ -305,7 +312,8 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
/* the returned struct gets kept on the server_info, by means
of a steal further down */
- if ( !(sampass = samu_new( mem_ctx )) ) {
+ sampass = samu_new(mem_ctx);
+ if (sampass == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
@@ -322,16 +330,22 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
+ acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
+ username = pdb_get_username(sampass);
+ nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
+ lm_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass);
+
/* see if autolock flag needs to be updated */
- if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL)
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_NORMAL)
pdb_update_autolock_flag(sampass, &updated_autolock);
/* Quit if the account was locked out. */
- if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
- DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", pdb_get_username(sampass)));
+ if (acct_ctrl & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
+ DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", username));
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
}
- nt_status = sam_password_ok(auth_context, mem_ctx, sampass,
+ nt_status = sam_password_ok(auth_context, mem_ctx,
+ username, acct_ctrl, lm_pw, nt_pw,
user_info, &user_sess_key, &lm_sess_key);
/* Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
@@ -341,7 +355,7 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
- pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) &ACB_NORMAL &&
+ acct_ctrl & ACB_NORMAL &&
NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
{
pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass);
@@ -351,18 +365,21 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
&updated_badpw);
}
if (updated_autolock || updated_badpw){
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
become_root();
- if(!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(pdb_update_sam_account(sampass)))
- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry.\n"));
+ status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
unbecome_root();
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
+ }
}
- data_blob_free(&user_sess_key);
- data_blob_free(&lm_sess_key);
- TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
- return nt_status;
+ goto done;
}
- if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
+ if ((acct_ctrl & ACB_NORMAL) &&
(pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){
pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
@@ -370,30 +387,32 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
}
if (updated_autolock || updated_badpw){
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
become_root();
- if(!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(pdb_update_sam_account(sampass)))
- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry.\n"));
+ status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
unbecome_root();
- }
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
+ }
+ }
nt_status = sam_account_ok(mem_ctx, sampass, user_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
- data_blob_free(&user_sess_key);
- data_blob_free(&lm_sess_key);
- return nt_status;
+ goto done;
}
become_root();
nt_status = make_server_info_sam(server_info, sampass);
unbecome_root();
+ sampass = NULL;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0,("check_sam_security: make_server_info_sam() failed with '%s'\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- data_blob_free(&user_sess_key);
- data_blob_free(&lm_sess_key);
- return nt_status;
+ goto done;
}
(*server_info)->user_session_key =
@@ -408,6 +427,10 @@ static NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const struct auth_context *auth_context,
(*server_info)->nss_token |= user_info->was_mapped;
+done:
+ TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
+ data_blob_free(&user_sess_key);
+ data_blob_free(&lm_sess_key);
return nt_status;
}
diff --git a/source3/include/proto.h b/source3/include/proto.h
index 5b16120..c0ca96b 100644
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
@@ -6116,6 +6116,9 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user,
uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
enum samPwdChangeReason *reject_reason);
+bool password_in_history(uint8_t nt_pw[NT_HASH_LEN],
+ uint32_t pw_history_len,
+ const uint8_t *pw_history);
NTSTATUS check_password_complexity(const char *username,
const char *password,
enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason);
diff --git a/source3/passdb/pdb_get_set.c b/source3/passdb/pdb_get_set.c
index da65440..005cf46 100644
--- a/source3/passdb/pdb_get_set.c
+++ b/source3/passdb/pdb_get_set.c
@@ -981,6 +981,9 @@ bool pdb_set_plaintext_passwd(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
{
uchar new_lanman_p16[LM_HASH_LEN];
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
+ uchar *pwhistory;
+ uint32 pwHistLen;
+ uint32 current_history_len;
if (!plaintext)
return False;
@@ -1010,68 +1013,75 @@ bool pdb_set_plaintext_passwd(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
if (!pdb_set_pass_last_set_time (sampass, time(NULL), PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
- /* Store the password history. */
- if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) {
- uchar *pwhistory;
- uint32 pwHistLen;
- pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHistLen);
- if (pwHistLen != 0){
- uint32 current_history_len;
- /* We need to make sure we don't have a race condition here - the
- account policy history length can change between when the pw_history
- was first loaded into the struct samu struct and now.... JRA. */
- pwhistory = (uchar *)pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, ¤t_history_len);
-
- if (current_history_len != pwHistLen) {
- /* After closing and reopening struct samu the history
- values will sync up. We can't do this here. */
-
- /* current_history_len > pwHistLen is not a problem - we
- have more history than we need. */
-
- if (current_history_len < pwHistLen) {
- /* Ensure we have space for the needed history. */
- uchar *new_history = (uchar *)TALLOC(sampass,
- pwHistLen*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
- if (!new_history) {
- return False;
- }
-
- /* And copy it into the new buffer. */
- if (current_history_len) {
- memcpy(new_history, pwhistory,
- current_history_len*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
- }
- /* Clearing out any extra space. */
- memset(&new_history[current_history_len*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN],
- '\0', (pwHistLen-current_history_len)*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
- /* Finally replace it. */
- pwhistory = new_history;
- }
- }
- if (pwhistory && pwHistLen){
- /* Make room for the new password in the history list. */
- if (pwHistLen > 1) {
- memmove(&pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN],
- pwhistory, (pwHistLen -1)*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN );
- }
- /* Create the new salt as the first part of the history entry. */
- generate_random_buffer(pwhistory, PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN);
-
- /* Generate the md5 hash of the salt+new password as the second
- part of the history entry. */
-
- E_md5hash(pwhistory, new_nt_p16, &pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN]);
- pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, pwhistory, pwHistLen, PDB_CHANGED);
- } else {
- DEBUG (10,("pdb_get_set.c: pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwhistory was NULL!\n"));
- }
- } else {
- /* Set the history length to zero. */
- pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, NULL, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
+ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * No password history for non-user accounts
+ */
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHistLen);
+
+ if (pwHistLen == 0) {
+ /* Set the history length to zero. */
+ pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, NULL, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to make sure we don't have a race condition here -
+ * the account policy history length can change between when
+ * the pw_history was first loaded into the struct samu struct
+ * and now.... JRA.
+ */
+ pwhistory = (uchar *)pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, ¤t_history_len);
+
+ if ((current_history_len != 0) && (pwhistory == NULL)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwhistory == NULL!\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (current_history_len < pwHistLen) {
+ /*
+ * Ensure we have space for the needed history. This
+ * also takes care of an account which did not have
+ * any history at all so far, i.e. pwhistory==NULL
+ */
+ uchar *new_history = talloc_zero_array(
+ sampass, uchar,
+ pwHistLen*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
+
+ if (!new_history) {
+ return False;
}
+
+ memcpy(new_history, pwhistory,
+ current_history_len*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
+
+ pwhistory = new_history;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make room for the new password in the history list.
+ */
+ if (pwHistLen > 1) {
+ memmove(&pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN], pwhistory,
+ (pwHistLen-1)*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN );
}
+ /*
+ * Create the new salt as the first part of the history entry.
+ */
+ generate_random_buffer(pwhistory, PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN);
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the md5 hash of the salt+new password as the
+ * second part of the history entry.
+ */
+ E_md5hash(pwhistory, new_nt_p16, &pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN]);
+
+ pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, pwhistory, pwHistLen, PDB_CHANGED);
+
return True;
}
diff --git a/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c b/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c
index 2da36b2..c858c2d 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c
@@ -1008,6 +1008,41 @@ static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user,
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
+bool password_in_history(uint8_t nt_pw[NT_HASH_LEN],
+ uint32_t pw_history_len,
+ const uint8_t *pw_history)
+{
+ static const uint8_t zero_md5_nt_pw[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN] = { 0, };
+ int i;
+
+ dump_data(100, nt_pw, NT_HASH_LEN);
+ dump_data(100, pw_history, PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN * pw_history_len);
+
+ for (i=0; i<pw_history_len; i++) {
+ uint8_t new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN];
+ const uint8_t *current_salt;
+ const uint8_t *old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash;
+
+ current_salt = &pw_history[i*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN];
+ old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash = current_salt + PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN;
+
+ if (memcmp(zero_md5_nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
+ /* Ignore zero valued entries. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Create salted versions of new to compare. */
+ E_md5hash(current_salt, nt_pw, new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash);
+
+ if (memcmp(new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
+ SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/***********************************************************
This routine takes the given password and checks it against
the password history. Returns True if this password has been
@@ -1017,11 +1052,8 @@ static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user,
static bool check_passwd_history(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
{
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
- uchar zero_md5_nt_pw[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN];
const uint8 *nt_pw;
const uint8 *pwhistory;
- bool found = False;
- int i;
uint32 pwHisLen, curr_pwHisLen;
pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHisLen);
@@ -1048,30 +1080,13 @@ static bool check_passwd_history(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
return True;
}
- dump_data(100, new_nt_p16, NT_HASH_LEN);
- dump_data(100, pwhistory, PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN*pwHisLen);
-
- memset(zero_md5_nt_pw, '\0', SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN);
- for (i=0; i<pwHisLen; i++) {
- uchar new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN];
- const uchar *current_salt = &pwhistory[i*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN];
- const uchar *old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash = &pwhistory[(i*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN)+
- PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN];
- if (!memcmp(zero_md5_nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash, SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN)) {
- /* Ignore zero valued entries. */
- continue;
- }
- /* Create salted versions of new to compare. */
- E_md5hash(current_salt, new_nt_p16, new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash);
--
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