svn commit: samba r10454 - branches/SAMBA_3_0/source/lib trunk/source/lib

[jerry at samba.org]

Author: jerry
Date: 2005-09-23 15:23:16 +0000 (Fri, 23 Sep 2005)
New Revision: 10454

WebSVN: http://websvn.samba.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi?view=rev&root=samba&rev=10454

Log:
* prevent privilege code from storing an empty SID
  (and filter it out if one is already there)
* Fix LUID value match in privilege_set_to_se_priv()
  (fix jmcd's bug report).



Modified:
   branches/SAMBA_3_0/source/lib/privileges.c
   trunk/source/lib/privileges.c


Changeset:
Modified: branches/SAMBA_3_0/source/lib/privileges.c
===================================================================
--- branches/SAMBA_3_0/source/lib/privileges.c	2005-09-23 15:08:17 UTC (rev 10453)
+++ branches/SAMBA_3_0/source/lib/privileges.c	2005-09-23 15:23:16 UTC (rev 10454)
@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@
 	if ( !tdb )
 		return False;
 
+	if ( !sid || (sid->num_auths == 0) ) {
+		DEBUG(0,("set_privileges: Refusing to store empty SID!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
 	/* PRIV_<SID> (NULL terminated) as the key */
 	
 	fstr_sprintf( keystr, "%s%s", PRIVPREFIX, sid_string_static(sid) );
@@ -498,6 +503,12 @@
 		
 	fstrcpy( sid_string, &key.dptr[strlen(PRIVPREFIX)] );
 
+	/* this is a last ditch safety check to preventing returning
+	   and invalid SID (i've somehow run into this on development branches) */
+
+	if ( strcmp( "S-0-0", sid_string ) == 0 )
+		return 0;
+
 	if ( !string_to_sid(&sid, sid_string) ) {
 		DEBUG(0,("travsersal_fn_enum__acct: Could not convert SID [%s]\n",
 			sid_string));
@@ -812,11 +823,28 @@
 /*******************************************************************
 *******************************************************************/
 
-BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
+static BOOL luid_to_se_priv( LUID *luid, SE_PRIV *mask )
 {
 	int i;
 	uint32 num_privs = count_all_privileges();
 	
+	for ( i=0; i<num_privs; i++ ) {
+		if ( luid->low == privs[i].luid.low ) {
+			se_priv_copy( mask, &privs[i].se_priv );
+			return True;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return False;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+*******************************************************************/
+
+BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
+{
+	int i;
+	
 	ZERO_STRUCTP( mask );
 	
 	for ( i=0; i<privset->count; i++ ) {
@@ -828,12 +856,8 @@
 		if ( privset->set[i].luid.high != 0 )
 			return False;
 		
-		/* make sure :LUID.low is in range */	
-		if ( privset->set[i].luid.low == 0 || privset->set[i].luid.low > num_privs )
-			return False;
-		
-		r = privs[privset->set[i].luid.low - 1].se_priv;
-		se_priv_add( mask, &r );
+		if ( luid_to_se_priv( &privset->set[i].luid, &r ) )		
+			se_priv_add( mask, &r );
 	}
 
 	return True;

Modified: trunk/source/lib/privileges.c
===================================================================
--- trunk/source/lib/privileges.c	2005-09-23 15:08:17 UTC (rev 10453)
+++ trunk/source/lib/privileges.c	2005-09-23 15:23:16 UTC (rev 10454)
@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@
 	if ( !tdb )
 		return False;
 
+	if ( !sid || (sid->num_auths == 0) ) {
+		DEBUG(0,("set_privileges: Refusing to store empty SID!\n"));
+		return False;
+	}
+
 	/* PRIV_<SID> (NULL terminated) as the key */
 	
 	fstr_sprintf( keystr, "%s%s", PRIVPREFIX, sid_string_static(sid) );
@@ -498,6 +503,12 @@
 		
 	fstrcpy( sid_string, &key.dptr[strlen(PRIVPREFIX)] );
 
+	/* this is a last ditch safety check to preventing returning
+	   and invalid SID (i've somehow run into this on development branches) */
+
+	if ( strcmp( "S-0-0", sid_string ) == 0 )
+		return 0;
+
 	if ( !string_to_sid(&sid, sid_string) ) {
 		DEBUG(0,("travsersal_fn_enum__acct: Could not convert SID [%s]\n",
 			sid_string));
@@ -812,11 +823,28 @@
 /*******************************************************************
 *******************************************************************/
 
-BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
+static BOOL luid_to_se_priv( LUID *luid, SE_PRIV *mask )
 {
 	int i;
 	uint32 num_privs = count_all_privileges();
 	
+	for ( i=0; i<num_privs; i++ ) {
+		if ( luid->low == privs[i].luid.low ) {
+			se_priv_copy( mask, &privs[i].se_priv );
+			return True;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return False;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+*******************************************************************/
+
+BOOL privilege_set_to_se_priv( SE_PRIV *mask, PRIVILEGE_SET *privset )
+{
+	int i;
+	
 	ZERO_STRUCTP( mask );
 	
 	for ( i=0; i<privset->count; i++ ) {
@@ -828,12 +856,8 @@
 		if ( privset->set[i].luid.high != 0 )
 			return False;
 		
-		/* make sure :LUID.low is in range */	
-		if ( privset->set[i].luid.low == 0 || privset->set[i].luid.low > num_privs )
-			return False;
-		
-		r = privs[privset->set[i].luid.low - 1].se_priv;
-		se_priv_add( mask, &r );
+		if ( luid_to_se_priv( &privset->set[i].luid, &r ) )		
+			se_priv_add( mask, &r );
 	}
 
 	return True;