[clug] How you know your Free or Open Source Software Project is doomed to FAIL

Scott Ferguson scott.ferguson.clug at gmail.com
Thu Jul 30 12:27:13 UTC 2015

On 30/07/15 16:36, Paul Harvey wrote:
> On 30 July 2015 at 16:30, James Ring <sjr at jdns.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 11:23 PM, Alex Satrapa
>> <grail at goldweb.com.au> wrote:
>>> On 30 Jul 2015, at 16:05, James Ring <sjr at jdns.org> wrote:
>>>> The possibility that somebody out there is going to somehow 
>>>> modify the encrypted shell script response in-flight is just
>>>> not a concern to me. Also I'd think Google has more to lose by
>>>> publishing bad scripts than I do running them.
>>> It won’t be Google that publishes the bad script. By definition
>>> the actor in the “Man in the Middle” attack is neither end of a
>>> presumably two-way conversation.
>>> You *think* you’ve connected to Google, but the attacker poisoned
>>> your DNS so you’re actually connected to g00gle, and the script
>>> you’re piping into shell sets up a rootkit rather than an
>>> Internet cat picture archive.
>> Well, they'd have to poison the DNS and also convince one of the 
>> certificate authorities trusted by wget to issue a SSL certificate 
>> with Google's name on it to the attacker.
> Which begs the question: if giving tutorial users instructions to do 
> the PGP/shasums dance is the alternative, that's information which 
> will be delivered over https anyway, and if it's good enough for
> one, why not just pipe it to a shell in the first place...
> .. some responses to this line of thinking are mentioned in the 
> Georgiev paper, curl/wget & friends don't do cert pinning etc. but
> at the end of the day, you really have to pick your battles. On this 
> occasion perhaps the hypothetical scalpel that's been splashed with
> a bit of hot water (referring to Scott's reply earlier) is actually
> not the worst that could happen in this case :-)

apropos of which, I'm reminded of one of Moxie's musings:-

Kind regards

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