[cifs-protocol] [EXTERNAL] [MS-KILE] Authentication Policies and RODCs - TrackingID#2310190040000616

Tue Oct 24 16:56:04 UTC 2023

Hi Joseph,

Thank you for uploading the traces. I will analyze them and get back to you. 

Best regards,
Jeff McCashland (He/him) | Senior Escalation Engineer | Microsoft Protocol Open Specifications Team
Phone: +1 (425) 703-8300 x38300 | Hours: 9am-5pm | Time zone: (UTC-08:00) Pacific Time (US and Canada)
Local country phone number found here: http://support.microsoft.com/globalenglish | Extension 1138300

-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Sutton <jsutton at samba.org> 
Sent: Monday, October 23, 2023 5:49 PM
To: Jeff McCashland (He/him) <jeffm at microsoft.com>; cifs-protocol at lists.samba.org
Cc: Microsoft Support <supportmail at microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] [MS-KILE] Authentication Policies and RODCs - TrackingID#2310190040000616

Hi,

I’ve uploaded a trace of a Kerberos TGS exchange with a TGT issued by an RODC krbtgt and with an authentication policy enforced. In response to the TGS-REQ I expect to get a TGS-REP, but, as the trace shows, I get a KDC_ERR_POLICY error instead.

Regards,
Joseph

On 20/10/23 11:50 am, Jeff McCashland (He/him) wrote:
> Hi Joseph,
> 
> To debug this issue, I need to collect an LSASS TTT trace. I have created a file transfer workspace for exchanging files related to this issue (link below).
> 
> The LSASS traces can be quite large, but are highly compressible, so please add them to a .zip archive before uploading (file transfer workspace credentials are below). Please log into the workspace and find PartnerTTDRecorder_x86_x64.zip available for download. The x64 tool can be staged onto the Windows server in any location (instructions below assume C:\TTD).
> 
> To collect the needed traces:
> 	1. From a PowerShell prompt, execute:
> 		C:\TTD\tttracer.exe -Attach ([int](Get-Process -NAME lsass | Format-Wide -Property ID).formatEntryInfo.formatPropertyField.propertyValue)
> 	2. Wait for a little window to pop up in top left corner of your screen, titled “lsass01.run”
> 	3. start a network trace using netsh or WireShark, etc.
> 	4. Repro the attempted operation
> 	5. Stop the network trace and save it
> 	6. CAREFULLY: uncheck the checkbox next to “Tracing” in the small “lsass01.run” window. Do not close or exit the small window or you will need to reboot.
> 	7. The TTTracer.exe process will generate a trace file, then print out the name and location of the file.
> Compress the *.run file into a .zip archive before uploading with the matching network trace. It is a good idea to reboot the machine at the next opportunity to restart the lsass process.
> 
> Workspace credentials:
> Log in as 2310190040000616_joseph at dtmxfer.onmicrosoft.com
> 1-Time: 9dx_7ndz
> 
> Workspace link: 
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsupp
> ort.microsoft.com%2Ffiles%3Fworkspace%3DeyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUz
> I1NiJ9.eyJ3c2lkIjoiNWQ2YjE2MzgtYzU5Ni00N2ZhLTkxNDQtN2QzMzMzNmJmNTlhIiw
> ic3IiOiIyMzEwMTkwMDQwMDAwNjE2IiwiYXBwaWQiOiI0ZTc2ODkxZC04NDUwLTRlNWUtY
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> hGPs9RtGqpgzycy3m9VftAbGjpz4em-_nFAADznArzn4dnIitRjH2zulc-fQRCraq6cgwK
> J6BJrxh9BE_4Qq7xjXP4EsSMcB40wE8Kg%26wid%3D5d6b1638-c596-47fa-9144-7d33
> 336bf59a&data=05%7C01%7Cjeffm%40microsoft.com%7Cd2df6639c0f2400841be08
> dbd42b0baf%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C63833705359329
> 2016%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBT
> iI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=HP0vNpnaAV3ThmBh%2FoKY
> aZ3ae5ZwfG1weaghACVYfZQ%3D&reserved=0
> 
> Best regards,
> Jeff McCashland (He/him) | Senior Escalation Engineer | Microsoft 
> Protocol Open Specifications Team
> Phone: +1 (425) 703-8300 x38300 | Hours: 9am-5pm | Time zone: 
> (UTC-08:00) Pacific Time (US and Canada) Local country phone number 
> found here: 
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsuppo
> rt.microsoft.com%2Fglobalenglish&data=05%7C01%7Cjeffm%40microsoft.com%
> 7Cd2df6639c0f2400841be08dbd42b0baf%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%
> 7C1%7C0%7C638337053593302820%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwM
> DAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdat
> a=klokoLuopKUqNnv7a4km5xKm3HvBVccLEHIWkByzKlo%3D&reserved=0 | 
> Extension 1138300
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeff McCashland (He/him)
> Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2023 10:01 AM
> To: Joseph Sutton <jsutton at samba.org>; cifs-protocol at lists.samba.org
> Cc: Microsoft Support <supportmail at microsoft.com>
> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [MS-KILE] Authentication Policies and RODCs - 
> TrackingID#2310190040000616
> 
> Hi Joseph,
> 
> I will research your issue and get back to you.
> 
> Best regards,
> Jeff McCashland (He/him) | Senior Escalation Engineer | Microsoft 
> Protocol Open Specifications Team
> Phone: +1 (425) 703-8300 x38300 | Hours: 9am-5pm | Time zone: 
> (UTC-08:00) Pacific Time (US and Canada) Local country phone number 
> found here: 
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsuppo
> rt.microsoft.com%2Fglobalenglish&data=05%7C01%7Cjeffm%40microsoft.com%
> 7Cd2df6639c0f2400841be08dbd42b0baf%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%
> 7C1%7C0%7C638337053593308176%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwM
> DAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdat
> a=co7GonF9LAU7bMkiJsT4roGw1FtCCbGIrgrgsqWCnBs%3D&reserved=0 | 
> Extension 1138300
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeff McCashland (He/him)
> Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2023 6:52 PM
> To: Joseph Sutton <jsutton at samba.org>; cifs-protocol at lists.samba.org
> Cc: Microsoft Support <supportmail at microsoft.com>
> Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [MS-KILE] Authentication Policies and RODCs - 
> TrackingID#2310190040000616
> 
> [DocHelp to BCC, support on CC, SR ID on Subject]
> 
> Hi Joseph,
> 
> Thank you for your email. We have created SR 2310190040000616 to track this issue. One of our engineers will respond soon.
> 
> Best regards,
> Jeff McCashland (He/him) | Senior Escalation Engineer | Microsoft 
> Protocol Open Specifications Team
> Phone: +1 (425) 703-8300 x38300 | Hours: 9am-5pm | Time zone: 
> (UTC-08:00) Pacific Time (US and Canada) Local country phone number 
> found here: 
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsuppo
> rt.microsoft.com%2Fglobalenglish&data=05%7C01%7Cjeffm%40microsoft.com%
> 7Cd2df6639c0f2400841be08dbd42b0baf%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%
> 7C1%7C0%7C638337053593312064%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwM
> DAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdat
> a=DLIBS5nA9hhCc9Hf21UgymI2%2FwQoFRadqEBz54UYQwc%3D&reserved=0 | 
> Extension 1138300
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joseph Sutton <jsutton at samba.org>
> Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2023 6:44 PM
> To: cifs-protocol at lists.samba.org; Interoperability Documentation Help 
> <dochelp at microsoft.com>
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [MS-KILE] Authentication Policies and RODCs
> 
> [Some people who received this message don't often get email from 
> jsutton at samba.org. Learn why this is important at 
> https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
> 
> Hi dochelp,
> 
> [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.7, “TGS Exchange”, states that if during a TGS Exchange an Authentication Policy with ‘AllowedToAuthenticateTo’ is in effect, the user and device PACs must be used to perform an access check: if the access check succeeds, a service ticket is issued to the client; if it fails, the KDC returns KDC_ERR_POLICY.
> 
> However, I have found that Windows Server 2019, acting as a RWDC,
> *always* returns KDC_ERR_POLICY if the client’s TGT presented to the KDC has been issued by an RODC.
> 
> If no ‘AllowedToAuthenticateTo’ policy is enforced, or the client’s TGT has been issued by a RWDC, the TGS‐REQ exchange is successful.
> 
> As far as I can tell, this behaviour — disallowing the combination of authentication policies and RODC‐issued tickets — is not documented anywhere. Is matching this behaviour important for the correct and secure operation of MS-KILE implementations? and if so, can it be clearly documented in [MS-KILE]?
> 
> Regards,
> Joseph